Benedict de Spinoza

Monday, April 8, 2013

More Response to Stuart's Cogent Remarks

Stuart, a true student of Spinoza remarked before:

> S: Anyway, if we think about the comparison he makes of caution and
cowardice (in the Ethics) where he pretty much talks about them being essentially the same emotion but the former is the response of a rational person, while the latter is the response of an irrational person, the following ratios would be natural: caution/ cowardice::providing for oneself/seeking wealth::being a respected individual/seeking fame and notoriety(or adulation).

>D. As we get deeper into "The Improvement" you could parse your text/ideas and determine what kinds they are according to Spinoza's typology, which will be revealed later. Compare your ideas with these from Spinoza's Ethics.  You seem to be on the right
track.

==========E5P4note"For it must be especially remarked,that the appetite through which a man is said to be active, and that through which he is said to be passive is one and the same. For instance, we have shown that human nature is so constituted, that everyone desires his fellow-men to live after his own fashion (III. xxxi. note) ; in a man, who is not guided by reason, this appetite is a passion which is called ambition, and does not greatly differ from pride ; whereas in a man, who lives by the dictates of reason, it is an activity or virtue which is called piety (IV. xxxvii. note. i. and second proof). In like manner all appetites or desires are only passions, in so far as they spring from inadequate ideas ; the same results are accredited to virtue, when they are aroused or generated by adequate ideas. For all desires, whereby we are determined to any given action, may arise as much from adequate as from inadequate ideas (IV. lix.).E4P64PROP. LIX. To all the actions, whereto we are determined by emotion wherein the mind is passive ; we can be determined without emotion by reason.Proof.-To act rationally, is nothing else (III. iii. and Def.ii.) but to perform those actions, which follow from the necessity, of our nature considered in itself alone. But pain is bad, in so far as it diminishes or checks the power of action(IV. xli.) ; wherefore we cannot by pain be determined to any action, which we should be unable to perform under the guidanceof reason. Again, pleasure is bad only in so far as it hinders a man's capability for action (IV. xli. xliii.) ; therefore to this extent we could not be determined by it to any action, which we could not perform under the guidance of reason. Lastly,pleasure, in so far as it is good, is in harmony with reason (for it consists in the fact that a man's capability for action is increased or aided) ; nor is the mind passive therein, except inso far as a man's power of action is not increased to the extent of affording him an adequate conception of himself and his actions (III. iii., and note).Wherefore, if a man who is pleasurably affected be brought tosuch a state of perfection, that he gains an adequate conception of himself and his own actions, he will be equally, nay more, capable of those actions, to which he is determined by emotion wherein the mind is passive. But all emotions are attributable to pleasure, to pain, or to desire (Def. of the Emotions, iv.explanation) ; and desire (Def. of the Emotions, i.) is nothing else but the attempt to act ; therefore, to all actions, &c.Q.E.D.Another Proof.-A given action is called bad, in so far as it arises from one being affected by hatred or any evil emotion. But no action, considered in itself alone, is either good or bad (as we pointed out in the preface to Pt. IV.), one and the same action being sometimes good, sometimes bad ; wherefore to the action which is sometimes bad, or arises from some evil emotion, we may be led by reason (IV. xix.). Q.E.D.Note.-An example will put this point in a clearer light. The action of striking, in so far as it is considered physically, and in so far as we merely look to the fact that a man raises his arm, clenches his fist, and moves his whole arm violently downwards, is a virtue or excellence which is conceived as proper to the structure of the human body. If, then, a man, moved by anger or hatred, is led to clench his fist or to move his arm, this result takes place (as we showed in Pt. II.), because one and the same action can be associated with various mental images of things ; therefore we may be determined to the performance of one and the same action by confused ideas, or by clear and distinct ideas. Hence it is evident that every desire which springs from emotion, wherein the mind is passive, would become useless, if men could be guided by reason. Let us now see why desire which arises from emotion, wherein the mind is passive, is called by us blind."

More Catching Up With the Notes: [b] P7S3

Spiniza, TEI:

"[7] (1) Further reflection convinced me that if I could really get
to the root of the matter I should be leaving certain evils for a
certain good. (2) I thus perceived that I was in a state of great
peril, and I compelled myself to seek with all my strength for a
remedy, however uncertain it might be; as a sick man struggling with
a deadly disease, when he sees that death will surely be upon him
unless a remedy be found, is compelled to seek a remedy with all his
strength, inasmuch as his whole hope lies therein. (7:3) All the
objects pursued by the multitude not only bring no remedy that tends
to preserve our being, but even act as hindrances, causing the death
not seldom of those who possess them, [b] and always of those who
are possessed by them.

[b] These considerations should be set forth more precisely."
==========


Spinoza does not say here that this clarifying should be done
elsewhere, as he did in the previous note. The subject matter is
closely related. I feel as if Spinoza is saying that this topic in
the treatise could use polishing. I have never heard anyone raise
the subject and speculate upon what more he might have said about
these matters. With a little reflection, I think most of us could
observe hindrances along these lines within ourselves at any given moment.
What objects or ends are being pursued within the content of my own
consciousness? I feel that Spinoza often artfully invites us to
learn as much about our own nature as we can.


Here is a bit of dialogue between Stuart and I a few years ago, slightly
edited to avoid certain difficulties in recalling source material and with
certain additions which I hope shed a bit more light on the subjects at hand:
===============
D:What did S. know of riches and fame?

S: If Spinoza is not a clever fraud, then he appears to be a "spiritual" prodigy
of some sort. And he is pretty confident, since while he does not ..."come out
and say, 'If you want to follow me, this is how it goes,' he does say if you
want to understand certain things more clearly, you will need to think like me
on a few points. I believe the phrase is pretty much something like '...so that
others may understand even as I understand.' Anyway, if we think about the
comparison he makes of caution and cowardice (in the Ethics) where he pretty
much talks about them being essentially the same emotion but the former is the
response of a rational person, while the latter is the response of an irrational
person, the following ratios would be natural: caution/cowardice::providing for
oneself/seeking wealth::being a respected individual/seeking fame and
notoriety(or adulation).

D:Spinoza may have expressed that "Jesus is the best philosopher."

S: Did he actually use that wording? I know in the Tractatus, he says that Jesus
was the last and the greatest of the Jewish prophets. And he unpacks that phrase
with the description of Jesus as one who spoke and thought with the "mind of
God." If I remember correctly.

D: I believe it was expressed in a note to Tschirnhausen, but I am not clear about it.

I am clear that Spinoza said that Jesus understood God by means of a clear idea, a
true idea of the highest order, whereas the Prophets connected with more imagination.
E.g. Moses experienced God as a burning bush, some prophets saw angels, etc.  There is a tremendous difference.  God alone understands God clearly, and that is why it was said that "I am in the Father and the Father is in Me."  So, Christ was human, except for the God Consciousness.  One comes to the point of asking, "Is God synonymous with Reality?" 
Matt. 19:26: But Jesus beheld them, and said unto them, With men this is impossible; 
but with God all things are possible.

S: "Stamp out" ill will, cultivate gratitude, and be prepared for grace.

The Note in Sentence 2, Paragraph 4-Spinoza's View of "The Middle Way"


[4] (1) By sensual pleasure the mind is enthralled to the extent
of quiescence, as if the supreme good were actually attained, so
that it is quite incapable of thinking of any other object; when
such pleasure has been gratified it is followed by extreme
melancholy, whereby the mind, though not enthralled, is disturbed
and dulled. (2) The pursuit of honors and riches is likewise very
absorbing, especially if such objects be sought simply for their
own sake, [a] inasmuch as they are then supposed to constitute the
highest good.
==========
Sorry, I overlooked the note in p4 in s2 so we will need to review 
paragraph 4, in light of the note (a). Here it is:
==========
[a] (1) This might be explained more at large and more clearly:
I mean by distinguishing riches according as they are pursued for
their own sake, in or furtherance of fame, or sensual pleasure,
or the advancement of science and art. (2) But this subject is
reserved to its own place, for it is not here proper to
investigate the matter more accurately.
==========
So, we learn that Spinoza is not dogmatically opposed to the acquisition
of wealth.  However, it should be noted that while Spinoza was not an advocate
of asceticism, a study of his life shows that when he said "the wise man is 
content with little," he practiced what he preached.

The concern here is not with money or property, possessions and so on,
for there is nothing in these that cannot be put to good use.  The difficulty
for the follower of Spinoza's path lies in the emotional identification with
these things, as if they were parts of our body.  So, we experience pain when
there is a modification of loss in our investment portfolio, or discover that someone
has stolen the box of cash we had hidden in a piece of furniture.  We are identified
with the existential first and the spiritual is often lost and forgotten.  This is the
wrong order.  The best illustration of the true order is the crucifixion of Jesus, and 
how unfortunate that his ultimate sacrifice of the existential for the sake of Truth,
has been perverted into superstition for the profit of the priest class and at great cost 
to humanity in general.  Likewise, perhaps, Socrates displayed an indifference to 
death and continued to maintain his ideas to the end.

https://sites.google.com/site/jacqueslouisdavidlifeandworks/the-death-of-socrates

Nature begins with the incorporeal Eternal and Infinite, and our
conceptions of particular things are not objective because we don't understand 
their cause.  The finite mind cannot understand the infinite in essence.

Jesus famously said that a rich man has about as much chance of entering Heaven as
a camel has of passing through the eye of a needle.  However, a
close reading of what comes after reveals the humility of Jesus before God,
indicating that God may accomplish what is inconceivable for man.  As an
aside, it is very interesting that just after this saying, Jesus offers the parable
of the men hired to work in the vineyard. Each receives the same pay, regardless
of the hours they put in, and the last hired may be the first paid.
As Krishnamurti said, and I often repeat it, "It is the truth that frees, not your efforts to be free." K. gave his heart and soul to union with the immeasurable, and while he was educated in fine English
schools and given the trappings of wealth and prestige by his Theosophical "parents" who had
great ambitions for him, he came to see as Spinoza did, that these surroundings were vain and futile.  He divorced himself from the organization that was created for him because he had "been made simple" by
conscious contact with his real creator.  And while his friends always made sure that he was provided for, he actually had very few personal possessions despite the many books of his ideas that attained a certain popularity.  But, again, as Spinoza indicates in the last proposition of the Ethics, we are content with little because of our inner treasure.  In the spiritual paths known generally as "The Fourth Way," we don't renounce our position, family, possessions and so on as monks and certain Yogins and Fakirs may do, and as the Apostles of Christ did.  We merely begin to observe ourselves.  In a sense, this is the end and the beginning, just as the shaman put it: "to see…"

Spinoza writes in TPT that "the arts and sciences...are also entirely necessary to the perfection and blessedness of human nature."  As we can clearly see from the citation below, Spinoza embraces what a Buddhist might well 
describe as "the middle way"  with regard to enjoyment of the sensual aspects of our existential life. The intention is precisely the same, and it would be fair to say generally that Spinoza is more akin to the Shakyamuni Buddha than he is to Locke, Hobbes, Descartes, Leibniz, Hume, Kant,or even Wittgenstein, Heidegger, etc.
==========
From Ethics Part IV:  Of Human Bondage, or the Strength of the Emotions

Proposition 45 (XLV)….
 Note.-Between derision (which I have in Coroll. I. stated to
be bad) and laughter I recognize a great difference.  For
laughter, as also jocularity, is merely pleasure ; therefore, so
long as it be not excessive, it is in itself good (IV. xli.). 
Assuredly nothing forbids man to enjoy himself, save grim and
gloomy superstition.  For why is it more lawful to satiate one's
hunger and thirst than to drive away one's melancholy? I reason,
and have convinced myself as follows : No deity, nor anyone else,
save the envious, takes pleasure in my infirmity and discomfort,
nor sets down to my virtue the tears, sobs, fear, and the like,
which are signs of infirmity of spirit ; on the contrary, the
greater the pleasure wherewith we are affected, the greater the
perfection whereto we pass ; in other words, the more must we
necessarily partake of the divine nature.  Therefore, to make use
of what comes in our way, and to enjoy it as much as possible
(not to the point of satiety, for that would not be enjoyment) is
the part of a wise man.  I say it is the part of a wise man to
refresh and recreate himself with moderate and pleasant food and
drink, and also with perfumes, with the soft beauty of growing
plants, with dress, with music, with many sports, with theatres,
and the like, such as every man may make use of without injury to
his neighbour.  For the human body is composed of very numerous
parts, of diverse nature, which continually stand in need of
fresh and varied nourishment, so that the whole body may be
equally capable of performing all the actions, which follow from
the necessity of its own nature ; and, consequently, so that the
mind may also be equally capable of understanding many things
simultaneously.  This way of life, then, agrees best with our
principles, and also with general practice ; therefore, if there
be any question of another plan, the plan we have mentioned is
the best, and in every way to be commended.  There is no need for
me to set forth the matter more clearly or in more detail.