More Response to Stuart's Cogent Remarks

Stuart, a true student of Spinoza remarked before:

> S: Anyway, if we think about the comparison he makes of caution and
cowardice (in the Ethics) where he pretty much talks about them being essentially the same emotion but the former is the response of a rational person, while the latter is the response of an irrational person, the following ratios would be natural: caution/ cowardice::providing for oneself/seeking wealth::being a respected individual/seeking fame and notoriety(or adulation).

>D. As we get deeper into "The Improvement" you could parse your text/ideas and determine what kinds they are according to Spinoza's typology, which will be revealed later. Compare your ideas with these from Spinoza's Ethics.  You seem to be on the right
track.

==========E5P4note"For it must be especially remarked,that the appetite through which a man is said to be active, and that through which he is said to be passive is one and the same. For instance, we have shown that human nature is so constituted, that everyone desires his fellow-men to live after his own fashion (III. xxxi. note) ; in a man, who is not guided by reason, this appetite is a passion which is called ambition, and does not greatly differ from pride ; whereas in a man, who lives by the dictates of reason, it is an activity or virtue which is called piety (IV. xxxvii. note. i. and second proof). In like manner all appetites or desires are only passions, in so far as they spring from inadequate ideas ; the same results are accredited to virtue, when they are aroused or generated by adequate ideas. For all desires, whereby we are determined to any given action, may arise as much from adequate as from inadequate ideas (IV. lix.).E4P64PROP. LIX. To all the actions, whereto we are determined by emotion wherein the mind is passive ; we can be determined without emotion by reason.Proof.-To act rationally, is nothing else (III. iii. and Def.ii.) but to perform those actions, which follow from the necessity, of our nature considered in itself alone. But pain is bad, in so far as it diminishes or checks the power of action(IV. xli.) ; wherefore we cannot by pain be determined to any action, which we should be unable to perform under the guidanceof reason. Again, pleasure is bad only in so far as it hinders a man's capability for action (IV. xli. xliii.) ; therefore to this extent we could not be determined by it to any action, which we could not perform under the guidance of reason. Lastly,pleasure, in so far as it is good, is in harmony with reason (for it consists in the fact that a man's capability for action is increased or aided) ; nor is the mind passive therein, except inso far as a man's power of action is not increased to the extent of affording him an adequate conception of himself and his actions (III. iii., and note).Wherefore, if a man who is pleasurably affected be brought tosuch a state of perfection, that he gains an adequate conception of himself and his own actions, he will be equally, nay more, capable of those actions, to which he is determined by emotion wherein the mind is passive. But all emotions are attributable to pleasure, to pain, or to desire (Def. of the Emotions, iv.explanation) ; and desire (Def. of the Emotions, i.) is nothing else but the attempt to act ; therefore, to all actions, &c.Q.E.D.Another Proof.-A given action is called bad, in so far as it arises from one being affected by hatred or any evil emotion. But no action, considered in itself alone, is either good or bad (as we pointed out in the preface to Pt. IV.), one and the same action being sometimes good, sometimes bad ; wherefore to the action which is sometimes bad, or arises from some evil emotion, we may be led by reason (IV. xix.). Q.E.D.Note.-An example will put this point in a clearer light. The action of striking, in so far as it is considered physically, and in so far as we merely look to the fact that a man raises his arm, clenches his fist, and moves his whole arm violently downwards, is a virtue or excellence which is conceived as proper to the structure of the human body. If, then, a man, moved by anger or hatred, is led to clench his fist or to move his arm, this result takes place (as we showed in Pt. II.), because one and the same action can be associated with various mental images of things ; therefore we may be determined to the performance of one and the same action by confused ideas, or by clear and distinct ideas. Hence it is evident that every desire which springs from emotion, wherein the mind is passive, would become useless, if men could be guided by reason. Let us now see why desire which arises from emotion, wherein the mind is passive, is called by us blind."