The work here on the blog has fallen behind as our dialog group has proceeded to meet weekly. Live dialog is best, however, our conversations on conference call are serviceable for our ends. Further:
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[10] (1) But love towards a thing eternal and infinite feeds the
mind wholly with joy, and is itself unmingled with any sadness,
wherefore it is greatly to be desired and sought for with all our
strength. (2) Yet it was not at random that I used the words,
"If I could go to the root of the matter," for, though what I have
urged was perfectly clear to my mind, I could not forthwith lay
aside all love of riches, sensual enjoyment, and fame.
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The first sentence above seems to implore the reader to undertake
Spinoza's inquiry along with him as he says "with all our strength."
It's a hard road for most of us, but the only reasonable way once insight
is gained into metaphysical entities.
If the "eternal thing" is unknown, what is to be the object (are we
not accustomed to imagine some end for which we strive?), sought with
all our strength? Whether we are communists, atheists or Buddhists,
whether we subscribe to this or that sect, belief system, etc., don't
we in some way create, or deal with the "God issue," according to our
understanding or ignorance just as it is? Or perhaps we are too busy
to bother with it at all, or we suffer negative emotions so
habitually that our minds are full of sorrows and swirling confusion
never leaving 10 minutes of quietude for pondering in silence.
Just in thinking about "a thing eternal" right now, is there an
image? So do we end up seeking, rejecting or otherwise opining
about, or forgetting, not-thinking about, a projection of something
that is put together out of our conditioning, rather than "a new
principle?" Or perhaps we have had "mystical experiences," and
endeavor to recapture them. But Spinoza tells us that understanding
true ideas has nothing to do with memory. Memory is associative, whereas
the mystic energy and light is unique unto itself. It can be
"seen" by the impersonal essence of a human being, but not exactly
"remembered."
Is it possible to "do" anything about our minds? Because who would be the agent,
if not ourselves? Spinoza, in "the Ethics" explains why a conditioned thing cannot
un-condition itself. In one respect, this seems true, so what is it that has
the power to simplify the mind? Krishnamurti's utterance upon experiencing
a profound inner transformation was, "I have been made simple."
What does that mean? "Made simple" by what? And what was "made simple?"
==========[11] (1) One thing was evident, namely, that while my mind was
employed with these thoughts it turned away from its former objects
of desire, and seriously considered the search for a new principle;
this state of things was a great comfort to me, for I perceived
that the evils were not such as to resist all remedies. (11:2) Although
these intervals were at first rare, and of very short duration, yet
afterwards, as the true good became more and more discernible to me,
they became more frequent and more lasting; especially after I had
recognized that the acquisition of wealth, sensual pleasure, or fame,
is only a hindrance, so long as they are sought as ends not as means;
if they be sought as means, they will be under restraint, and, far
from being hindrances, will further not a little the end for which
they are sought, as I will show in due time.
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I feel that Spinoza would like to be encouraging to his reader in the
above paragraph. If the true, or "real good," affects the mind
singly, to the exclusion of all else, and if a true idea is clear and
simple, it seems a difficulty that it would be relative, that is,
"more and more discernible to me." If it was unknown to begin with,
how would one then know that is was "more and more discernible to
me?" If it were innate...Strictly speaking, we must inquire whether an
idea of the most perfect being, known only through itself and not by any
lesser being, is somehow emergent within us. We become like divers into
the cold waters where icebergs dwell. We dive to a depth from which we
may never return, driven by an innate desire to find what is at the very bottom
of all things.
Someone in our discussions inquired about the meaning of a "real good,"
which is distinct in meaning from a "true good."In p12 below, Spinoza discusses briefly what he means by a "true
good." This notion of a "true good" is, I think, a principle theme
of Ethics.
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[12] (1) I will here only briefly state what I mean by true good,
and also what is the nature of the highest good. (2) In order that
this may be rightly understood, we must bear in mind that the terms
good and evil are only applied relatively, so that the same thing
may be called both good and bad according to the relations in view,
in the same way as it may be called perfect or imperfect.
(3) Nothing regarded in its own nature can be called perfect or
imperfect; especially when we are aware that all things which come
to pass, come to pass according to the eternal order and fixed
laws of nature.
[13] (1) However, human weakness cannot attain to this order in its
own thoughts, but meanwhile man conceives a human character much more
stable than his own, and sees that there is no reason why he should
not himself acquire such a character. (2) Thus he is led to seek
for means which will bring him to this pitch of perfection, and
calls everything which will serve as such means a true good.
(13:3) The chief good is that he should arrive, together with other
individuals if possible, at the possession of the aforesaid
character. (4) What that character is we shall show in due time,
namely, that it is the knowledge of the union existing being
the mind and the whole of nature. [c]
footnote[c] These matters are explained more at length elsewhere.
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The footnote obviously doesn't say where the further explanation is,
or precisely which "matters" Spinoza means. Sometimes he says this
or that will be explained in "his philosophy," but not here. Perhaps
if Spinoza had finished the treatise, he might have pointed the
reader to specific passages, either in TEI or in "his philosophy."
As it is, this footnote seems vague, and perhaps superfluous. There
are plenty of instances in which more is revealed later, or in other
writings, which do not receive a footnote, so why here especially, I
wonder?
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