Why Didn't Spinoza Finish Such a Powerful Treatise?

Oops, I overlooked a post that should have preceded the post before

last concerning "Certain Rules of Life." It doesn't matter; my primary

purpose here today is to invite more participation by individuals who

have a love of philosophy and who would be willing to share their know-

lege of Spinoza with us either in comments or on our weekly phone meeting.

Please send me an email if you would like to join our inquiry. 

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"Another item that I overlooked is the table of contents. I've been
using the Dover edition for a long time, and the contents page is
separated from the text of TEI by all the propositions of Ethics. In
our study, we are about to embark upon #17, "Certain Rules of Life,"
--perfectly germain to one of my chief interests in this reading.
That is, responding to the question, "What would Spinoza have us
ordinary readers do that is perhaps within our power now?" That is

a most vital question, but one which has many pitfalls which in sum

are perhaps symbolized by Baron Munchausen who, if memory serves,

managed to pull himself out of the dreck by grabbing his own hair.

A Bulgarian composer I once studied with called it, "trying to jump

higher than your belly button."

At this point, I feel compelled to explain the obvious. I am not
educated in philosophy generally, although I had an excellent teacher
insofar as the practical aspects of following Spinoza are concerned.
Even then, however, I was not among the most advanced students. I
expect that anyone with a reasonable degree of education in the field
of philosophy may have many ideas come to mind which would be worthy
of note with regard to TEI, ideas which are beyond my very limited
knowledge. I am interested in learning, so please do offer your
remarks if you are out there following along. I doubt anyone is going to

be put off by my bias that  intellectual knowledge of Spinoza is likely to

be very incomplete  knowledge without being accompanied by the endeavor 

to live the teachings. But the converse is also true, I believe. Critical
thinking about the philosophy is clearly useful, and this must
include not only the eternal aspects, but also the historical and
philosophical context within which they were expressed, and what
Spinoza means to philosophers now.

After doing a little research, I've encountered an opinion by an
historian of philosophy, to the effect that Spinoza chose not to
finish TEI for reasons pertaining to the science of logic. For me, a
better understanding of the substance and history of logic would be a
prerequisite to attempting to paraphrase the idea. I want to come
to my own ideas about why the treatise is incomplete, but will
gladly accept help in acquiring evidence useful in developing them.
Because of Spinoza's mention of Logic in Part 5 of Ethics, I have
tried to make progress in learning about its evolution, and to come
to terms with what Spinoza understood as the difference between
classical Logic and what he called "true logic." However, I must say
that my efforts have been rather paltry thus far, as such studies do
not come easily for me even when I put in the time.

From what I am learning, it turns out (not surprisingly) that for
some, Spinoza's TEI is an important document in the whole history of
logic. If anyone can explain more about this, I hope they will,
especially since it may shed light on why TEI is unfinished.

Cheers,

DR"
*****
TABLE OF CONTENTS:

1 On the Improvement of the Understanding
3 Of the ordinary objects of men's desires
12 Of the true and final good
17 Certain rules of life
19 Of the four modes of perception
25 Of the best mode of perception
33 Of the instruments of the intellect, or true ideas
43 Answers to objections


First part of method:

50 Distinction of true ideas from fictitious ideas
64 And from false ideas
77 Of doubt
81 Of memory and forgetfulness
86 Mental hindrances from words - and from the popular confusion
of ready imagination with distinct understanding.


Second part of method:

91 Its object, the acquisition of clear and distinct ideas
94 Its means, good definitions
Conditions of definition
107 How to define understanding

Stuart's Remarks About the Previous Post Re: "Provisional rules of life..."

What follows are remarks by Stuart treating of the question of the "provisional" nature of the rules of life Spinoza is setting forth.  Why doesn't Spinoza just say, "Here are a few rules I suggest you follow to progress toward our aim...?"

On the "provisionality" of the rules: 

Spinoza has already shown the limitations of the endeavor to obtain, for their own sake, fame, sensual pleasures and wealth and power. The first rule speaks to the acquisition of fame which has the defect of imprisoning one in the passivity of conforming oneself to the opinions of others. But men, even men of unequal clarity, are ultimately dependent on each other. By adopting this rule, the need for acceptance, respect and utility of and by others is furthered while not having to indulge in submissive "thinking" or "actions." Second rule, states the basic minimum principle that follows from his earlier critique of the life denying consequences of overindulgence in pleasures. Similarly for the third rule. In other words, if the dear reader has gotten that far in TEI, then if he has understood what has gone before, he sees these three rules as necessary beginning points. For though one must begin by completely giving up the love of those three qualities as things in themselves, nevertheless a certain cultivation of these same qualities is necessary for one's sustenance and even for one's thriving. Even though the practicality for his project of adopting these rules seems obvious to him, he allows that at the level of mental discipline they also function as practical hypotheses that will be borne out as correct by further personal development. Also, since at this stage of one's development -one is just beginning on the project suggested by the critique of the previous 16 paragraphs - it is unknown whether the sought for selfsustaining Good is actually obtainable beyond being a matter of Platonic principle, one must practice certain dynamics -moderation in the pursuit of pleasure and power and adaptability in the pursuit of good communication that results from mutual respect - one must act "as if" or one may never be able to determine whether the "as if" can be transformed into an "it is." So there is a kind of tension here. On the one hand, the rules are simply distillations from the earlier critique and are certainly correct to that extent. But whether following them as a disciplinary first step will ultimately lead to the place where they are followed by the force of reason is precisely what one must still learn. To that extent there is still uncertainty. That, of course, is almost the entire purpose of the Ethics. To pass from the external necessities of being in bondage to rule governed behavior to the internal necessity of the freedom of behavior based on one's understanding. To that extent there is still uncertainty at this point in the development of the argument in TEI.
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Thank you, Stuart.  I wish I could get you to join our conversations on Thursday nights, but I realize you are not on the telecommunication grid at this time.  Do you remember writing this? 

"Certain Rules of Life as Provisionally Good"

• Spinoza had said:
  *****
  [15] (1) We must seek the assistance of Moral Philosophy [d] and
  the Theory of Education; further, as health is no insignificant means
  for attaining our end, we must also include the whole science of
  Medicine...
  *****
  Now he is going to elaborate a bit, that is, he will engage in some
  moral philosophizing. N.B. below he lays down these rules as
  "provisionally good..."
  
  *****
  17 Certain rules of life...
  
  [17] (1) Yet, as it is necessary that while we are endeavoring to
  attain our purpose, and bring the understanding into the right path
  we should carry on our life, we are compelled first of all to lay
  down certain rules of life as provisionally good, to wit the
  following:-
  I. (2) To speak in a manner intelligible to the multitude, and to
  comply with every general custom that does not hinder the
  attainment of our purpose. (3) For we can gain from the multitude
  no small advantages, provided that we strive to accommodate
  ourselves to its understanding as far as possible: moreover,
  we shall in this way gain a friendly audience for the reception
  of the truth.
  II. (17:4) To indulge ourselves with pleasures only in so far as they
  are necessary for preserving health.
  III. (5) Lastly, to endeavor to obtain only sufficient money or other
  commodities to enable us to preserve our life and health, and to
  follow such general customs as are consistent with our purpose.
  *****
  I wonder why Spinoza uses that word, "provisionally?" To me, it
  suggests that the goodness of the rules cannot be completely
  understood until some later development of one's ethical objectivity
  with regard to one's own nature and the nature of our relationship
  with our fellows.
  
  The first rule is complex and seems to cohere because, while it
  consists really in two distinct rules and explanations of their
  advantages, it is all concerned with my relationship to my fellows in
  the social order.
  
  I have wondered a good deal about the significance of "speak in a
  manner intelligible to the multitude." On the one hand, the efficacy
  of this rule seems so self-evident that it seems unworthy of
  mention. The explanation implicit in that would be that Spinoza is
  merely telling us to "comply with general custom" with regard to
  speaking, when carrying out our lives. I might confide to my wife
  during one of our daily walks on the beach, "Donovan feels...now,
  that... emptiness...that...Oceanic..." She will receive an
  impression from these words that she will describe as coherent to
  her. But we share what I'll call a "semi-private language."
  Obviously, there is no one among "the multitude" to whom I would
  utter such a remark, because it would be unintelligible and produce
  unwanted effects. If one of my surfing buddies complains "that
  freaking kook fully burned me," to which, if I respond with a mention
  of Spinoza's definition of hatred etc., which might be on my mind, he
  is going to find this unintelligible. Instead, perhaps the
  appropriate response in this hypothetical "language game" might be
  "yeah, this place is a pig-pile today." Ludwig Wittgenstein is a good

  philosopher of language, and his writings are full of cogent observations

  about the use of language.  I am tempted to try and explain how this

  deconstruction of language was vital to the pursuit of building smart

  cars, bombs, etc., but I leave it for another time or someone else to

  investigate.
  
  Another interpretation about why this first rule is important to our
  aims might be explained by "moreover, we shall in this way gain a
  friendly audience for the reception of the truth." Spinoza makes no
  bones about the fact that he knows he understands the true
  philosophy. It is a blessing, and he wants us to understand as he
  does. But we don't know these truths yet at this stage, so I must
  assume that he is saying we ought to go ahead and cultivate this
  correct way of speaking, in case we should learn what our master is
  endeavoring to impart and in turn have occasion to find an audience
  for it ourselves.
  
  But, is the rule "speak in a manner intelligible to the multitude"
  fully operative within Spinoza's own writings, or his discussions
  with his circle of friends and students? Or are we engaged in a
  "semi-private language" here, communing with Spinoza via language
  that is pretty much unintelligible to the multitude? What degree of
  understanding does "intelligible" signify?  "Intelligibility" may come

  after an arduous desire to learn meets a philosophy that emanates

  a sense of wisdom as it touches our intuition.
  
  Spinoza says in TPT that "such as persuade themselves, that the
  multitude or men distracted by politics can ever be induced to live
  according to the bare dictate of reason, must be dreaming of the
  poetic golden age, or of a stage-play." So how does this proposition
  of his fit in with the rule we are examining? Did Spinoza write the
  rule in an idealistic youth, which was tempered by experience by the
  time he wrote TPT? Does this issue of "intelligibility" play a role
  in the apparent fact that TEI languished in Spinoza's desk for years,
  never published? BTW, is there any evidence it was even circulated
  among his friends?
  
  As an aside, the matter of "degree" of "intellibility", with respect
  to "first philosophy, etc. (epistemology)" is extensively addressed in Yoga
  philosophy and in that of Gurdjieff, but seems absent in Western
  philosophy, by and large. Spinoza is talking about this "relativity
  of being" when he tells his readers that the true good became "more
  and more discernible" to him. Yogis who have penetrated within to
  the innermost "sheaths" discuss things intelligibly amongst
  themselves with a greater degree of objectivity than what can be
  obtained in discussion among professers of "hard sciences," and which
  would be complete nonsense to a logical positivist (if there are any
  left), or even to Descartes. Descartes at least recognized in his
  way that these inner sheaths "existed," and he endeavored to
  penetrate, which he did to a very limited extent.
  
  Well...it's a deep subject...Examination of this first rule could be
  drawn out at length. Did Spinoza, the bible scholar nonpareil, have
  some internal reference to the Biblical accounts of the apostles
  speaking to "multitudes" in their own languages (Gift of Tongues)?
  LOL, Orthodox Jews have something in common with logical positivists,
  and this has a lot to do with why some of the Orthodox still regard
  Spinoza as a heretic. He isn't "allowed/supposed" to know and talk
  about the "heavenly" things he understands and put into words. That
  is over-reaching for a human, according to their moral philosophy,
  which has some roots in this interesting story...
  *****
  Gen. 11:1 And the whole earth was of one language, and of one speech.
  Gen. 11:2 And it came to pass, as they journeyed from the east, that
  they found a plain in the land of Shinar; and they dwelt there.
  Gen. 11:3 And they said one to another, Go to, let us make brick, and
  burn them throughly. And they had brick for stone, and slime had they
  for morter.
  Gen. 11:4 And they said, Go to, let us build us a city and a tower,
  whose top may reach unto heaven; and let us make us a name, lest we
  be scattered abroad upon the face of the whole earth.
  Gen. 11:5 And the LORD came down to see the city and the tower, which
  the children of men builded.
  Gen. 11:6 And the LORD said, Behold, the people is one, and they have
  all one language; and this they begin to do: and now nothing will be
  restrained from them, which they have imagined to do.
  Gen. 11:7 Go to, let us go down, and there confound their language,
  that they may not understand one another’s speech.
  Gen. 11:8 So the LORD scattered them abroad from thence upon the face
  of all the earth: and they left off to build the city.
  Gen. 11:9 Therefore is the name of it called Babel; because the LORD
  did there confound the language of all the earth: and from thence did
  the LORD scatter them abroad upon the face of all the earth.
  *****
  Yoga-Sutra 3.17 The name associated with an object, the object itself
  implied by that name, and the conceptual existence of the object, all
  three usually interpenetrate or commingle with one another. By
  samyama on the distinction between these three, the meaning of the
  sounds made by all beings becomes available.
  *****
  "I begin, then, with the first point, and warn my readers to
  make an accurate distinction between an idea, or conception of
  the mind, and the images of things which we imagine. It is
  further necessary that they should distinguish between idea and
  words, whereby we signify things. These three-namely, images,
  words, and ideas-are by many persons either entirely confused
  together, or not distinguished with sufficient accuracy or care..."
  
  -Spinoza Ethics