"Certain Rules of Life as Provisionally Good"

• Spinoza had said:
  *****
  [15] (1) We must seek the assistance of Moral Philosophy [d] and
  the Theory of Education; further, as health is no insignificant means
  for attaining our end, we must also include the whole science of
  Medicine...
  *****
  Now he is going to elaborate a bit, that is, he will engage in some
  moral philosophizing. N.B. below he lays down these rules as
  "provisionally good..."
  
  *****
  17 Certain rules of life...
  
  [17] (1) Yet, as it is necessary that while we are endeavoring to
  attain our purpose, and bring the understanding into the right path
  we should carry on our life, we are compelled first of all to lay
  down certain rules of life as provisionally good, to wit the
  following:-
  I. (2) To speak in a manner intelligible to the multitude, and to
  comply with every general custom that does not hinder the
  attainment of our purpose. (3) For we can gain from the multitude
  no small advantages, provided that we strive to accommodate
  ourselves to its understanding as far as possible: moreover,
  we shall in this way gain a friendly audience for the reception
  of the truth.
  II. (17:4) To indulge ourselves with pleasures only in so far as they
  are necessary for preserving health.
  III. (5) Lastly, to endeavor to obtain only sufficient money or other
  commodities to enable us to preserve our life and health, and to
  follow such general customs as are consistent with our purpose.
  *****
  I wonder why Spinoza uses that word, "provisionally?" To me, it
  suggests that the goodness of the rules cannot be completely
  understood until some later development of one's ethical objectivity
  with regard to one's own nature and the nature of our relationship
  with our fellows.
  
  The first rule is complex and seems to cohere because, while it
  consists really in two distinct rules and explanations of their
  advantages, it is all concerned with my relationship to my fellows in
  the social order.
  
  I have wondered a good deal about the significance of "speak in a
  manner intelligible to the multitude." On the one hand, the efficacy
  of this rule seems so self-evident that it seems unworthy of
  mention. The explanation implicit in that would be that Spinoza is
  merely telling us to "comply with general custom" with regard to
  speaking, when carrying out our lives. I might confide to my wife
  during one of our daily walks on the beach, "Donovan feels...now,
  that... emptiness...that...Oceanic..." She will receive an
  impression from these words that she will describe as coherent to
  her. But we share what I'll call a "semi-private language."
  Obviously, there is no one among "the multitude" to whom I would
  utter such a remark, because it would be unintelligible and produce
  unwanted effects. If one of my surfing buddies complains "that
  freaking kook fully burned me," to which, if I respond with a mention
  of Spinoza's definition of hatred etc., which might be on my mind, he
  is going to find this unintelligible. Instead, perhaps the
  appropriate response in this hypothetical "language game" might be
  "yeah, this place is a pig-pile today." Ludwig Wittgenstein is a good

  philosopher of language, and his writings are full of cogent observations

  about the use of language.  I am tempted to try and explain how this

  deconstruction of language was vital to the pursuit of building smart

  cars, bombs, etc., but I leave it for another time or someone else to

  investigate.
  
  Another interpretation about why this first rule is important to our
  aims might be explained by "moreover, we shall in this way gain a
  friendly audience for the reception of the truth." Spinoza makes no
  bones about the fact that he knows he understands the true
  philosophy. It is a blessing, and he wants us to understand as he
  does. But we don't know these truths yet at this stage, so I must
  assume that he is saying we ought to go ahead and cultivate this
  correct way of speaking, in case we should learn what our master is
  endeavoring to impart and in turn have occasion to find an audience
  for it ourselves.
  
  But, is the rule "speak in a manner intelligible to the multitude"
  fully operative within Spinoza's own writings, or his discussions
  with his circle of friends and students? Or are we engaged in a
  "semi-private language" here, communing with Spinoza via language
  that is pretty much unintelligible to the multitude? What degree of
  understanding does "intelligible" signify?  "Intelligibility" may come

  after an arduous desire to learn meets a philosophy that emanates

  a sense of wisdom as it touches our intuition.
  
  Spinoza says in TPT that "such as persuade themselves, that the
  multitude or men distracted by politics can ever be induced to live
  according to the bare dictate of reason, must be dreaming of the
  poetic golden age, or of a stage-play." So how does this proposition
  of his fit in with the rule we are examining? Did Spinoza write the
  rule in an idealistic youth, which was tempered by experience by the
  time he wrote TPT? Does this issue of "intelligibility" play a role
  in the apparent fact that TEI languished in Spinoza's desk for years,
  never published? BTW, is there any evidence it was even circulated
  among his friends?
  
  As an aside, the matter of "degree" of "intellibility", with respect
  to "first philosophy, etc. (epistemology)" is extensively addressed in Yoga
  philosophy and in that of Gurdjieff, but seems absent in Western
  philosophy, by and large. Spinoza is talking about this "relativity
  of being" when he tells his readers that the true good became "more
  and more discernible" to him. Yogis who have penetrated within to
  the innermost "sheaths" discuss things intelligibly amongst
  themselves with a greater degree of objectivity than what can be
  obtained in discussion among professers of "hard sciences," and which
  would be complete nonsense to a logical positivist (if there are any
  left), or even to Descartes. Descartes at least recognized in his
  way that these inner sheaths "existed," and he endeavored to
  penetrate, which he did to a very limited extent.
  
  Well...it's a deep subject...Examination of this first rule could be
  drawn out at length. Did Spinoza, the bible scholar nonpareil, have
  some internal reference to the Biblical accounts of the apostles
  speaking to "multitudes" in their own languages (Gift of Tongues)?
  LOL, Orthodox Jews have something in common with logical positivists,
  and this has a lot to do with why some of the Orthodox still regard
  Spinoza as a heretic. He isn't "allowed/supposed" to know and talk
  about the "heavenly" things he understands and put into words. That
  is over-reaching for a human, according to their moral philosophy,
  which has some roots in this interesting story...
  *****
  Gen. 11:1 And the whole earth was of one language, and of one speech.
  Gen. 11:2 And it came to pass, as they journeyed from the east, that
  they found a plain in the land of Shinar; and they dwelt there.
  Gen. 11:3 And they said one to another, Go to, let us make brick, and
  burn them throughly. And they had brick for stone, and slime had they
  for morter.
  Gen. 11:4 And they said, Go to, let us build us a city and a tower,
  whose top may reach unto heaven; and let us make us a name, lest we
  be scattered abroad upon the face of the whole earth.
  Gen. 11:5 And the LORD came down to see the city and the tower, which
  the children of men builded.
  Gen. 11:6 And the LORD said, Behold, the people is one, and they have
  all one language; and this they begin to do: and now nothing will be
  restrained from them, which they have imagined to do.
  Gen. 11:7 Go to, let us go down, and there confound their language,
  that they may not understand one another’s speech.
  Gen. 11:8 So the LORD scattered them abroad from thence upon the face
  of all the earth: and they left off to build the city.
  Gen. 11:9 Therefore is the name of it called Babel; because the LORD
  did there confound the language of all the earth: and from thence did
  the LORD scatter them abroad upon the face of all the earth.
  *****
  Yoga-Sutra 3.17 The name associated with an object, the object itself
  implied by that name, and the conceptual existence of the object, all
  three usually interpenetrate or commingle with one another. By
  samyama on the distinction between these three, the meaning of the
  sounds made by all beings becomes available.
  *****
  "I begin, then, with the first point, and warn my readers to
  make an accurate distinction between an idea, or conception of
  the mind, and the images of things which we imagine. It is
  further necessary that they should distinguish between idea and
  words, whereby we signify things. These three-namely, images,
  words, and ideas-are by many persons either entirely confused
  together, or not distinguished with sufficient accuracy or care..."
  
  -Spinoza Ethics