TEI Modes of Perception pp 19-24

• Message 1 of 2 , May 26, 2007

  [19] (1) Reflection shows that all modes of perception or knowledge
  may be reduced to four:-
  I. (2) Perception arising from hearsay or from some sign which
  everyone may name as he please.
  II. (3) Perception arising from mere experience - that is, from
  experience not yet classified by the intellect, and only so called
  because the given event has happened to take place, and we have no
  contradictory fact to set against it, so that it therefore remains
  unassailed in our minds.
  III. (19:4) Perception arising when the essence of one thing is inferred
  from another thing, but not adequately; this comes when [f] from
  some
  effect we gather its cause, or when it is inferred from some general
  proposition that some property is always present.
  IV. (5) Lastly, there is the perception arising when a thing is
  perceived solely through its essence, or through the knowledge
  of its proximate cause.
  
  [f] (1) In this case we do not understand anything of the cause
  from the consideration of it in the effect. (2) This is
  sufficiently evident from the fact that the cause is only
  spoken of in very general terms, such as - there exists then
  something; there exists then some power, &c.; or from the
  that we only express it in a negative manner - it is not
  or that, &c. (3) In the second case something is ascribed
  to the cause because of the effect, as we shall show in an
  example, but only a property, never an essence.
  
  *****
  In the footnote [f] Spinoza says we will get an example later, which
  is probably "when they see that by this process the number is
  produced which they knew beforehand to be the proportional, they
  infer that the process always holds good..." from p23s3
  
  I'm reposting [19] in part because I do not yet feel clear that we
  know what "from some sign which everyone may name as he please,"
  means. Does he mean cases like ancient Hawaiians believing that
  volcanic activity means that Madam Pele is angry? But we are still
  plenty superstitious generally, if this is what Spinoza means. For
  basically superstitious reasons, I abstain from the consumption of
  shark flesh...
  
  With regard to Perceptions II and III, while these will be discarded
  as useless for philosophic research, it may be of interest to refine
  our awareness a bit both of the principal of induction, and of
  knowledge inferred from general principals. Hume's "Treatise on the
  Human Understanding" and Russell's "Problems of Philosophy" go into
  these at some length, and are pretty much "intelligible to the
  multitude." Suffice to say, that at best, these kinds of knowledge
  yield probabilities within a reality which, to an extent, "exists"
  only because of our agreement to participate in affirming it. Other
  cultures may have separate realities, which could be closer to the
  truth than our version. But we can't know if they are, because we
  are conditioned to accept certain premises which may be contradictory
  to those of others. For example, most of us affirm that a human being
  is "solid," whereas another take on reality presumes a human to be
  like "a luminous egg" of which solidity is not a property.
  *****
  [20] (1) All these kinds of perception I will illustrate by examples.
  (2) By hearsay I know the day of my birth, my parentage, and other
  matters about which I have never felt any doubt. (3) By mere
  experience I know that I shall die, for this I can affirm from
  having seen that others like myself have died, though all did not
  live for the same period, or die by the same disease. (4) I know
  by mere experience that oil has the property of feeding fire, and
  water of extinguishing it. (5) In the same way I know that a dog
  is a barking animal, man a rational animal, and in fact nearly all
  the practical knowledge of life.
  *****
  It's interesting that Spinoza chooses death as an example out of all
  the possibilities. As far as water extinguishing fire, did Spinoza
  only know this fact because it happened over and over again in the
  past? Wasn't it known that fire required the presence of a certain
  level of air which is not found in water? Couldn't a "cause" be
  inferred from other examples of fire being extinguished, e.g.inside a
  sealed jar, covered with soil, and so on? I'm not seriously
  challenging p20s5, however, if memory serves, Hume's "Treatise on the
  Human Understanding" shows convincingly that there is little in the
  way of observable ratiocination to distinguish men from dogs, if one
  is to judge by their behavior, and how they typically learn through
  repetitions of associated experiences.
  *****
  [21] (1) We deduce one thing from another as follows: when we
  clearly perceive that we feel a certain body and no other, we
  thence clearly infer that the mind is united [g] to the body,
  and that their union is the cause of the given sensation; but
  we cannot thence absolutely understand [h] the nature of the
  sensation and the union. (2) Or, after I have become acquainted
  with the nature of vision, and know that it has the property of
  making one and the same thing appear smaller when far off than
  when near, I can infer that the sun is larger than it appears,
  and can draw other conclusions of the same kind.
  
  [g] (1) From this example may be clearly seen what I have just
  drawn attention to. (2) For through this union we understand
  nothing beyond the sensation, the effect, to wit, from which
  we inferred the cause of which we understand nothing.
  [h] (1) A conclusion of this sort, though it be certain, is yet
  not to be relied on without great caution; for unless we are
  exceedingly careful we shall forthwith fall into error.
  (2) When things are conceived thus abstractedly, and not
  through their true essence, they are apt to be confused by the
  imagination. (3) For that which is in itself one, men imagine
  to be multiplex. (4) To those things which are conceived
  abstractedly, apart, and confusedly, terms are applied which are
  apt to become wrested from their strict meaning, and bestowed on
  things more familiar; whence it results that these latter are
  imagined in the same way as the former to which the terms were
  originally given.
  
  *****
  p21s1 shifts gears, radically and a bit suddenly, from the fairly
  mundane, to the very subtle and intimate. We are no longer in
  relationship with the "outside world" as before, with fire, dogs,
  etc. We may have believed we were "experiencing" that world
  directly. Now, Spinoza raises a question in my mind. Do we
  ordinarily clearly perceive that "we feel a certain body and no
  other?" Is this related to Russell saying that we don't know anything
  to certainly exist, except our own sense-data? It's quite an
  experiment to see if we can do this "feeling a certain body and no
  other," (I must assume he is saying we feel our own body, nothing
  else) and also thereby clearly infer that the mind is united to the
  body, etc. In Ethics, Spinoza maintains that the mind "feels." Can
  the mind "feel" the idea of the body as a whole without reference to
  an external cause? Yoga, I think, says so. If a posture is done
  correctly, the entire body is a unified homogenous field of energy
  (prana), as is the mind which is the reflection.
  *****
  [22] (1) Lastly, a thing may be perceived solely through its essence;
  when, from the fact of knowing something, I know what it is to know
  that thing, or when, from knowing the essence of the mind, I know
  that it is united to the body. (2) By the same kind of knowledge
  we know that two and three make five, or that two lines each parallel
  to a third, are parallel to one another, &c. (3) The things which I
  have been able to know by this kind of knowledge are as yet very few.
  *****
  By "a thing," or "things," in p22s1 and s3 respectively, we suppose
  actually existent things, not "beings of reason." p22 seems to
  maintain what I think most philosophers deny. Russell, for example,
  says we are acquainted with our sense-data, not a thing in itself,
  and only probably with ourselves. In TPT Spinoza states flatly that
  few people know themselves. Spinoza endeavors to show what he means
  by giving us (abstract) examples in p22s2, which could be piled up
  indefinitely, but then he explains immediately thereafter
  (indirectly) that he's not really talking about what he was just
  giving so many examples of, because the "things" he knows by the mode
  in question are in fact very few. He could name these very few
  things, one supposes, but he does not. If he had told us, perhaps we
  might concentrate on understanding those few things too. What could
  they be?
  *****
  [23] (1) In order that the whole matter may be put in a clearer
  light, I will make use of a single illustration as follows.
  (2) Three numbers are given - it is required to find a fourth,
  which shall be to the third as the second is to the first.
  (23:3) Tradesmen will at once tell us that they know what is required
  to find the fourth number, for they have not yet forgotten the rule
  which was given to them arbitrarily without proof by their masters;
  others construct a universal axiom from their experience with simple
  numbers, where the fourth number is self-evident, as in the case of
  2, 4, 3, 6; here it is evident that if the second number be
  multiplied by the third, and the product divided by the first,
  the quotient is 6; when they see that by this process the number
  is produced which they knew beforehand to be the proportional,
  they infer that the process always holds good for finding a fourth
  number proportional.
  
  [24] (1) Mathematicians, however, know by the proof of the nineteenth
  proposition of the seventh book of Euclid, what numbers are
  proportionals, namely, from the nature and property of proportion
  it follows that the product of the first and fourth will be equal
  to the product of the second and third: still they do not see the
  adequate proportionality of the given numbers, or, if they do see it,
  they see it not by virtue of Euclid's proposition, but intuitively,
  without going through any process.
  *****
  Spinoza's proportionals are an elegant demonstration if you are of a
  certain type, I suppose, but an example might work better for me
  which could not be so readily imagined as scaled relative quantities.
  "I am exactly here at this moment." Or, "I'm here, now." Do I go
  through a process to understand these propositions? I guess
  Descartes did.
  *****
  
  "The general principles of science, such as the belief in the reign of
  law, and the belief that every event must have a cause, are as
  completely dependent upon the inductive principle as are the
  beliefs of daily life. All such general principles are believed because
  mankind have found innumerable instances of their truth and no
  instances of their falsehood. But this affords no evidence for their
  truth in the future, unless the inductive principle is assumed."
  
  -Bertrand Russell, Problems of Philosophy