Benedict de Spinoza

Sunday, December 8, 2013

TEI Footnote (h)

[h] (1)" A conclusion of this sort, though it be certain, is yet
not to be relied on without great caution; for unless we are
exceedingly careful we shall forthwith fall into error.
(2) When things are conceived thus abstractedly, and not
through their true essence, they are apt to be confused by the
imagination. (3) For that which is in itself one, men imagine
to be multiplex. (4) To those things which are conceived
abstractedly, apart, and confusedly, terms are applied which are
apt to become wrested from their strict meaning, and bestowed on
things more familiar; whence it results that these latter are
imagined in the same way as the former to which the terms were
originally given."
*****
The footnote [h]2-4 is an example of what I meant about Spinoza being
unique among Western philosophers insofar as here he implies that he
has conceived a particular thing through its "true essence." I
believe he claims to understand a "thing in itself," as Kant put it,
and which Kant believed beyond human nature to attain.

Does anyone know if Kant was aware of Spinoza's philosophy? It seems
unlikely. From what little I know, Kant is mainly responsible for
devising arguments that endeavor to establish credibility for some
aspects of "a priori" knowledge, which supposedly are part of our
nature. Something to do with "categories" of our reasoning. I
believe he came to speculate that our knowledge of the "thing in
itself" could not be perfectly objective (as Spinoza maintained) but
was precisely what Spinoza would call a mere "confused idea," that
is, a "hybrid" comprised of more than one essence; ours and the thing
we sensed and reasoned about. Philosophers, do please correct me. I
know you're out there, and know much more than I do about Kant, etc.

What does s3 refer to? Spinoza does not say, so perhaps the note
seems non-specific. Does it seem kind of "rough," insofar as it
leaves some puzzlement as to part of its subject matter (pun
intended)? We must refer to Spinoza's "philosophy" to find a fitting
candidate-E1P15 note:
*****
"Extended substance, in so far as it is substance, consists,
as they think, in parts, wherefore they deny that it can be
infinite, or consequently, that it can appertain to God. This
they illustrate with many examples, of which I will take one or
two...matter is everywhere the same...etc."
*****
In s4 we get a thread of Spinoza's philosophy of language. Again, we
have only a brief comment. However, it describes the process by
which meaning for the most important terms for ethical well-being and
for understanding a true philosophy are rendered devoid of substance
by the mind mispronouncing its desire to reduce the fundamentally
"unknown" to the "familiar," the "known." In this way, terms like
"idea" become synonymous with "image," "true ideas" end up
signifying only abstractions...and the awful tragedy is that >all the
words get taken up< with no words left to mean what the words
(supposedly) meant originally. Anyone who has really read
"Beelzebub's Tales to His Grandson" (at least three times, including
once out loud) will appreciate how necessary it becomes to coin
neologisms in an effort to bring some of the vitally important
qualities back to nonsense.

No comments:

Post a Comment