something that works in us very frequently, even as we make inner
demonstrations to ourselves. Intuitive ideas are operative
continually right under our noses, that is, like Poe's "Purloined
Letter," they may seem like part of the familiar furniture. Breaking
down the components of our thinking into simpler and simpler ideas
increases the likelihood of producing valid arguments.
Let me reflect about my plans. Tomorrow I will take a drive to Santa
Barbara, 30 miles from here. At 60 miles an hour on average, the
trip will take 30 minutes. I don't need a calculator for that one,
and I know that I know it. If you ask me how, I might say that I
don't know how, or that it's just obvious, or, I'd have to think
about how to put it together into a formula. Like 30 is to 60=30
divided by 60.
==============
To review: remember that my aim here is to find particular suggestions that
Spinoza makes to us of "things we may 'do'" in order to increase the probability
that the ineffable will realize itself within our mind as the cause of its essence.
Also, I want to know why the treatise wasn't finished.....I am getting no comments,
which is about par for the coarse. For those loyal friends: Lilli, Bonnie, Joan and
my wife, Mrs. Rundle, I offer these posts as reminders of ideas we may seem to
have studied in a prior age! Let's dig in and review, and with my undying gratitude
for these friends. Where are the rest of you?
I wanted to make this post shorter, but I couldn't figure out how to
separate p25 from the rest of the material here without loss of
continuity.
*****
[25] (1) In order that from these modes of perception the best may
be selected, it is well that we should briefly enumerate the means
necessary for attaining our end.
I. (2) To have an exact knowledge of our nature which we desire to
perfect, and to know as much as is needful of nature in general.
II. To collect in this way the differences, the agreements, and the
oppositions of things.
III. To learn thus exactly how far they can or cannot be modified.
IV. To compare this result with the nature and power of man.
(4) We shall thus discern the highest degree of perfection
to which man is capable of attaining.
[26] (1) We shall then be in a position to see which mode of
perception we ought to choose. (2) As to the first mode, it is
evident that from hearsay our knowledge must always be uncertain,
and, moreover, can give us no insight into the essence of a thing,
as is manifest in our illustration; now one can only arrive at
knowledge of a thing through knowledge of its essence, as will
hereafter appear. (3) We may, therefore clearly conclude that
the certainty arising from hearsay cannot be scientific in its
character. (4) For simple hearsay cannot affect anyone whose
understanding does not, so to speak, meet it half way.
[27] (1) The second mode of perception [i] cannot be said to
give us the idea of the proportion of which we are in search.
(2) Moreover its results are very uncertain and indefinite,
for we shall never discover anything in natural phenomena by its
means, except accidental properties, which are never clearly
understood, unless the essence of the things in question be
known first. (3) Wherefore this mode also must be rejected.
[28] (1) Of the third mode of perception we may say in a manner
that it gives us the idea of the thing sought, and that it
us to draw conclusions without risk of error; yet it is not by
itself sufficient to put us in possession of the perfection we
aim at.
=======
[for my convenience I have interjected Spinoza's description of mode
III here]
III. (19:4) Perception arising when the essence of one thing is inferred
from another thing, but not adequately; this comes when [f] from
someeffect we gather its cause, or when it is inferred from some general
proposition that some property is always present.
=======
[29] (1) The fourth mode alone apprehends the adequate essence of
a thing without danger of error. (2) This mode, therefore, must be
the one which we chiefly employ. (3) How, then, should we avail
ourselves of it so as to gain the fourth kind of knowledge with
the least delay concerning things previously unknown? (4) I will
proceed to explain.
=======
[likewise, I've recapped mode IV here for easy reference]
IV. (5) Lastly, there is the perception arising when a thing is
perceived solely through its essence, or through the knowledge
of its proximate cause.
=======
*****
In p25, Item I is to my purpose, that is, Spinoza is making a
suggestion of action. We are going to be using the favored mode of
perception in order to "have an exact knowledge of our nature." If
David is still with us, I want to mention to him that this is where
the rubber meets the road in the adventure. Very soon we will be
commencing the "great labour," not just talking about it. As far as
nature in general goes-important, but secondary here in the sentence
subordinate to getting exact knowledge of our nature. A lot of
philosophers concentrate on "nature in general." It is implied that
we are somehow going to get ideas via this selected mode of
perception that will aid us in "perfecting our nature," which is, to
an extent, synonymous with our aim. The "means" here described then,
seems to suggest that we come to intuitive ideas about our nature,
and of nature in general to an extent. There have been many able
commentators on Spinoza who, in neglecting this advice regarding
means, have, I believe, denied themselves a chance to understand his
philosophy, except "in abstracto."
Again, I haven't read as much western philosophy as I'd like to, so
far, but I don't know any other philosopher whose mission seems to be
to mentor us through a fundamental transformation that is ethical and
spiritual. Spinoza in this way seems to me more akin to Jnana Yogis,
or "the Fourth Way," than to his fellow rationalists. let alone
empiricists.
Moving on to p25 item II, we hit a rough patch. "To collect in this
way..." What way? I would have supposed via perception mode IV,
applied to our nature, and to nature in general. But Spinoza goes on
to describe "collecting the differences, agreements and the
oppositions of things." What things? Our body as compared with
external causes? There is another problem here. Spinoza is going to
tell us to chiefly employ mode IV, but by making reference to Ethics,
we discover that what he is describing here sounds like what he calls
"reason" in that other work. The terminology gets a bit messy,
because our TIE mode III equals "the second kind of knowledge" in
Ethics. Perhaps an explanation might be that, while we "chiefly"
employ mode IV (in order to intuit our axioms and definitions with
highest certainty), a process of true inference may follow, provided
of course that we employ valid forms of deduction. Spinoza's
"reason," we may find, is unusual in that, I think it depends upon
direct intuitive knowledge of its premisses, rather than what is more
usual. That is, the premisses remain "beings of reason." For
example, we may say anything we like, but are we able, as Spinoza
claims to be, to deduce truths adequately from intuitive
understanding of the attributes, etc? I'm sure there are many
philosophers who put no stock in the possibility that Spinoza may
have attained a completely different level of insight than what is
conceivable to ordinary logicians, and it is no part of my purpose
today to disabuse them of that idea. But to repeat, Item II seems to
me a bit rough in the intelligibility of its meaning, even if my
provisional interpretation should prove verifiable.
Item III seems full of potential for action. I am put in mind here
of the "Serenity Prayer."
"God, grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change,
courage to change the things I can, and wisdom to know the
difference." Technically, if a thing is intuitively understood to be
unchangable, there can be no "separation" from this fact. In a way,
"acceptance" still implies a accepter and the object accepted, i.e.,
a subject/object relationship, which would mean the idea had been, so
to say, "reasoned away." But, are the "things" under study in Item
III still both our nature and nature in general? I suppose, but the
connective tissue here is a little tenuous, leaving room for doubt.
Item IV is again even more difficult. "To compare this result with
the nature and power of man." "Man" as used here is general, not a
real, particular thing. We've reflected early on about some
universal "character more stable than our own." I can reach that, no
problem, because I am sometimes more stable, sometimes less so. But
now it seems we are to hypothesize a man whose nature is such that he
is conscious of uniting with nature as a whole,is that it? I think
if we are going to experiment with such an hypothesis, which, for us
now, is a general "being of reason," we ought to be mindful that we
apply this standard only to our own nature, because by the measure of
this abstraction, we are imperfect. Cosmically, if I read Spinoza
correctly, everyone else may be regarded as quite perfect as they
are, if in fact there is nothing really defective in nature. Spinoza
rarely employs any "ideals" per se, however, we have an exceptional
situation here, and if we are able to observe ourselves with
sufficient impartiality, perhaps we will come to understand our
nature, per item !, not as a result of duration of attention, but
through the fullness of attention itself.
"We shall thus discern the highest degree of perfection to which man
is capable of attaining."
I have to confess to a little disappointment with this remark. What
is it that compels so many philosophers to have to comment on the
limits of "man?" Even with the few books I've read, I still seem to
discover a pattern whereby they seem compelled to express and seem to
sincerely believe that their own attainments have set the high water
mark for the entire species, as it were. Because of my love of him,
I like to think Spinoza might have changed this somehow, even if he
understood it to be true, because so many state it, and, I believe,
in error.
These four items in p25 are again, vital to my aim of understanding
what Spinoza is suggesting that we do. If anyone can shed more light
on them, please do so.
separate p25 from the rest of the material here without loss of
continuity.
*****
[25] (1) In order that from these modes of perception the best may
be selected, it is well that we should briefly enumerate the means
necessary for attaining our end.
I. (2) To have an exact knowledge of our nature which we desire to
perfect, and to know as much as is needful of nature in general.
II. To collect in this way the differences, the agreements, and the
oppositions of things.
III. To learn thus exactly how far they can or cannot be modified.
IV. To compare this result with the nature and power of man.
(4) We shall thus discern the highest degree of perfection
to which man is capable of attaining.
[26] (1) We shall then be in a position to see which mode of
perception we ought to choose. (2) As to the first mode, it is
evident that from hearsay our knowledge must always be uncertain,
and, moreover, can give us no insight into the essence of a thing,
as is manifest in our illustration; now one can only arrive at
knowledge of a thing through knowledge of its essence, as will
hereafter appear. (3) We may, therefore clearly conclude that
the certainty arising from hearsay cannot be scientific in its
character. (4) For simple hearsay cannot affect anyone whose
understanding does not, so to speak, meet it half way.
[27] (1) The second mode of perception [i] cannot be said to
give us the idea of the proportion of which we are in search.
(2) Moreover its results are very uncertain and indefinite,
for we shall never discover anything in natural phenomena by its
means, except accidental properties, which are never clearly
understood, unless the essence of the things in question be
known first. (3) Wherefore this mode also must be rejected.
[28] (1) Of the third mode of perception we may say in a manner
that it gives us the idea of the thing sought, and that it
us to draw conclusions without risk of error; yet it is not by
itself sufficient to put us in possession of the perfection we
aim at.
=======
[for my convenience I have interjected Spinoza's description of mode
III here]
III. (19:4) Perception arising when the essence of one thing is inferred
from another thing, but not adequately; this comes when [f] from
someeffect we gather its cause, or when it is inferred from some general
proposition that some property is always present.
=======
[29] (1) The fourth mode alone apprehends the adequate essence of
a thing without danger of error. (2) This mode, therefore, must be
the one which we chiefly employ. (3) How, then, should we avail
ourselves of it so as to gain the fourth kind of knowledge with
the least delay concerning things previously unknown? (4) I will
proceed to explain.
=======
[likewise, I've recapped mode IV here for easy reference]
IV. (5) Lastly, there is the perception arising when a thing is
perceived solely through its essence, or through the knowledge
of its proximate cause.
=======
*****
In p25, Item I is to my purpose, that is, Spinoza is making a
suggestion of action. We are going to be using the favored mode of
perception in order to "have an exact knowledge of our nature." If
David is still with us, I want to mention to him that this is where
the rubber meets the road in the adventure. Very soon we will be
commencing the "great labour," not just talking about it. As far as
nature in general goes-important, but secondary here in the sentence
subordinate to getting exact knowledge of our nature. A lot of
philosophers concentrate on "nature in general." It is implied that
we are somehow going to get ideas via this selected mode of
perception that will aid us in "perfecting our nature," which is, to
an extent, synonymous with our aim. The "means" here described then,
seems to suggest that we come to intuitive ideas about our nature,
and of nature in general to an extent. There have been many able
commentators on Spinoza who, in neglecting this advice regarding
means, have, I believe, denied themselves a chance to understand his
philosophy, except "in abstracto."
Again, I haven't read as much western philosophy as I'd like to, so
far, but I don't know any other philosopher whose mission seems to be
to mentor us through a fundamental transformation that is ethical and
spiritual. Spinoza in this way seems to me more akin to Jnana Yogis,
or "the Fourth Way," than to his fellow rationalists. let alone
empiricists.
Moving on to p25 item II, we hit a rough patch. "To collect in this
way..." What way? I would have supposed via perception mode IV,
applied to our nature, and to nature in general. But Spinoza goes on
to describe "collecting the differences, agreements and the
oppositions of things." What things? Our body as compared with
external causes? There is another problem here. Spinoza is going to
tell us to chiefly employ mode IV, but by making reference to Ethics,
we discover that what he is describing here sounds like what he calls
"reason" in that other work. The terminology gets a bit messy,
because our TIE mode III equals "the second kind of knowledge" in
Ethics. Perhaps an explanation might be that, while we "chiefly"
employ mode IV (in order to intuit our axioms and definitions with
highest certainty), a process of true inference may follow, provided
of course that we employ valid forms of deduction. Spinoza's
"reason," we may find, is unusual in that, I think it depends upon
direct intuitive knowledge of its premisses, rather than what is more
usual. That is, the premisses remain "beings of reason." For
example, we may say anything we like, but are we able, as Spinoza
claims to be, to deduce truths adequately from intuitive
understanding of the attributes, etc? I'm sure there are many
philosophers who put no stock in the possibility that Spinoza may
have attained a completely different level of insight than what is
conceivable to ordinary logicians, and it is no part of my purpose
today to disabuse them of that idea. But to repeat, Item II seems to
me a bit rough in the intelligibility of its meaning, even if my
provisional interpretation should prove verifiable.
Item III seems full of potential for action. I am put in mind here
of the "Serenity Prayer."
"God, grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change,
courage to change the things I can, and wisdom to know the
difference." Technically, if a thing is intuitively understood to be
unchangable, there can be no "separation" from this fact. In a way,
"acceptance" still implies a accepter and the object accepted, i.e.,
a subject/object relationship, which would mean the idea had been, so
to say, "reasoned away." But, are the "things" under study in Item
III still both our nature and nature in general? I suppose, but the
connective tissue here is a little tenuous, leaving room for doubt.
Item IV is again even more difficult. "To compare this result with
the nature and power of man." "Man" as used here is general, not a
real, particular thing. We've reflected early on about some
universal "character more stable than our own." I can reach that, no
problem, because I am sometimes more stable, sometimes less so. But
now it seems we are to hypothesize a man whose nature is such that he
is conscious of uniting with nature as a whole,is that it? I think
if we are going to experiment with such an hypothesis, which, for us
now, is a general "being of reason," we ought to be mindful that we
apply this standard only to our own nature, because by the measure of
this abstraction, we are imperfect. Cosmically, if I read Spinoza
correctly, everyone else may be regarded as quite perfect as they
are, if in fact there is nothing really defective in nature. Spinoza
rarely employs any "ideals" per se, however, we have an exceptional
situation here, and if we are able to observe ourselves with
sufficient impartiality, perhaps we will come to understand our
nature, per item !, not as a result of duration of attention, but
through the fullness of attention itself.
"We shall thus discern the highest degree of perfection to which man
is capable of attaining."
I have to confess to a little disappointment with this remark. What
is it that compels so many philosophers to have to comment on the
limits of "man?" Even with the few books I've read, I still seem to
discover a pattern whereby they seem compelled to express and seem to
sincerely believe that their own attainments have set the high water
mark for the entire species, as it were. Because of my love of him,
I like to think Spinoza might have changed this somehow, even if he
understood it to be true, because so many state it, and, I believe,
in error.
These four items in p25 are again, vital to my aim of understanding
what Spinoza is suggesting that we do. If anyone can shed more light
on them, please do so.
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