Discussion of and reiteration of Previous Post-good for review of Important Topics

D: Again, I haven't read as much western philosophy as I'd like to, so 
far, but I don't know any other philosopher whose mission seems to be 
to mentor us through a fundamental transformation that is ethical and 
spiritual. 

S: Does Socrates/Plato ring a bell? Of course, the spiritual side of that assertion as it applies to S/P does depend on how much "spirituality" you pack in to the concept of the "philosopher king," the one who knows himself. Perhaps the following biconditional has value. One is fully ethical iff one fully knows himself. 

D: Spinoza in this way seems to me more akin to Jnana Yogis, 
or "the Fourth Way," than to his fellow rationalists. let alone 
empiricists.

S: Do you have a GOOD book to recommend on the subject of Jnana Yoga? I not too sure about the couple of things I currently have.

D: I think if we are going to experiment with such an hypothesis, which, for us 
now, is a general "being of reason," we ought to be mindful that we 
apply this standard only to our own nature, because by the measure of 
this abstraction, we are imperfect. Cosmically, if I read Spinoza 
correctly, everyone else may be regarded as quite perfect as they 
are, if in fact there is nothing really defective in nature. 

S: I think I can see your point , but surely Spinoza thought that if it is valid to compare my current self with a more idealized version of myself, and to see the value of the latter by comparison with the former, then it is certainly valid, even necessary, to provide the same service for others. But don't we have to remember, as well, that for Spinoza, perfection=reality=power? And that power is expressed within certain limits since all finite power is a limitation of the power of substance. We literally, if I understand Spinoza at all, become a new individual reality at each step of the way toward that idealized version. One that in itself express more perfection (as defined above) than the individual that existed one step previously. Therefore, when you say


D: Spinoza rarely employs any "ideals" per se, however, we have an exceptional 
situation here, and if we are able to observe ourselves with 
sufficient impartiality, perhaps we will come to understand our 
nature, per item !, not as a result of duration of attention, but 
through the fullness of attention itself.

"We shall thus discern the highest degree of perfection to which man 
is capable of attaining."

I have to confess to a little disappointment with this remark. What 
is it that compels so many philosophers to have to comment on the 
limits of "man?" 

S: I tend to think that it is because you are dealing with an instance of the Socratic tradition. Socrates, you will recall, who is well known for having the reputation of having acquired the highest possible wisdom and at the same time he is said to have admitted that he was ignorant of the consequences of death. He thereby demonstrated, as I like to understand the point anyway, that the fear of death was a form of superstition. As was any opinion formed in the absence of acquaintance with the relevant "Forms." That is why it seems to me that, for example, a David Hume should not only not be dismissed from a spiritual approach to western philosophy, he must be, IN CERTAIN RESPECTS, be treated as indispensable. 


D: Even with the few books I've read, I still seem to 
discover a pattern whereby they seem compelled to express and seem to 
sincerely believe that their own attainments have set the high water 
mark for the entire species, as it were. Because of my love of him, 
I like to think Spinoza might have changed this somehow, even if he 
understood it to be true, because so many state it, and, I believe, 
in error.

S: Here, nevertheless, I totally agree with you. In fact it follows from what I said in the paragraph previous to this one. Setting limits from outside the fourth way of knowing seems a fairly superstitious activity. But you know, I didn't read that specific remark of Spinoza's in that way. BTW, the one Ideal he certainly did mention was acquiescence. Is perfect acquiescence possible? I think Spinoza did think there were limits, eg, your personality can't survive the destruction of the body. I'm guessing, perhaps more relevantly, that he didn't think a completely indomitable Joy was possible, despite the fact that in part 5 of the Ethics, he certainly does speak that way when it comes to the transformation of the affects which is equivalent to the Intellectual Love of God.

D: These four items in p25 are again, vital to my aim of understanding 
what Spinoza is suggesting that we do. If anyone can shed more light 
on them, please do so.

S: Spinoza does not adduce general natures. No. But he does think we, virtually all of us (he admits that he doesn't know what to say about "madman," for example), are alike in certain respects. A perfect Stuart will not be identical to a perfect Donovan, but we would in those conditions, being each of us a perfect each of us, we would have much, if not most things in common. Certainly the things in the Ethics which "pertain to wisdom."



-----Original Message-----
From: Rundle Donovan 
To: spinoza@yahoogroups.com
Sent: Tue, 29 May 2007 12:22 pm
Subject: [spinoza] TIE p25-29






I wanted to make this post shorter, but I couldn't figure out how to 
separate p25 from the rest of the material here without loss of 
continuity.
*****
[25] (1) In order that from these modes of perception the best may
be selected, it is well that we should briefly enumerate the means
necessary for attaining our end.

I. (2) To have an exact knowledge of our nature which we desire to
perfect, and to know as much as is needful of nature in general.

II. To collect in this way the differences, the agreements, and the
oppositions of things.

III. To learn thus exactly how far they can or cannot be modified.

IV. To compare this result with the nature and power of man.
(4) We shall thus discern the highest degree of perfection
to which man is capable of attaining.

[26] (1) We shall then be in a position to see which mode of
perception we ought to choose. (2) As to the first mode, it is
evident that from hearsay our knowledge must always be uncertain,
and, moreover, can give us no insight into the essence of a thing,
as is manifest in our illustration; now one can only arrive at
knowledge of a thing through knowledge of its essence, as will
hereafter appear. (3) We may, therefore clearly conclude that
the certainty arising from hearsay cannot be scientific in its
character. (4) For simple hearsay cannot affect anyone whose
understanding does not, so to speak, meet it half way.

[27] (1) The second mode of perception [i] cannot be said to
give us the idea of the proportion of which we are in search.
(2) Moreover its results are very uncertain and indefinite,
for we shall never discover anything in natural phenomena by its
means, except accidental properties, which are never clearly
understood, unless the essence of the things in question be
known first. (3) Wherefore this mode also must be rejected.

[28] (1) Of the third mode of perception we may say in a manner
that it gives us the idea of the thing sought, and that it
us to draw conclusions without risk of error; yet it is not by
itself sufficient to put us in possession of the perfection we
aim at.
=======
[for my convenience I have interjected Spinoza's description of mode 
III here]

III. (19:4) Perception arising when the essence of one thing is inferred
from another thing, but not adequately; this comes when [f] from 
some
effect we gather its cause, or when it is inferred from some general
proposition that some property is always present.
=======
[29] (1) The fourth mode alone apprehends the adequate essence of
a thing without danger of error. (2) This mode, therefore, must be
the one which we chiefly employ. (3) How, then, should we avail
ourselves of it so as to gain the fourth kind of knowledge with
the least delay concerning things previously unknown? (4) I will
proceed to explain.
=======
[likewise, I've recapped mode IV here for easy reference]

IV. (5) Lastly, there is the perception arising when a thing is
perceived solely through its essence, or through the knowledge
of its proximate cause.
=======
*****

In p25, Item I is to my purpose, that is, Spinoza is, he is making a 
suggestion of action. We are going to be using the favored mode of 
perception in order to "have an exact knowledge of our nature." If 
David is still with us, I want to mention to him that this is where 
the rubber meets the road in the adventure. Very soon we will be 
commencing the "great labour," not just talking about it. As far as 
nature in general goes-important, but secondary here in the sentence 
subordinate to getting exact knowledge of our nature. A lot of 
philosophers concentrate on "nature in general." It is implied that 
we are somehow going to get ideas via this selected mode of 
perception that will aid us in "perfecting our nature," which is, to 
an extent, synonymous with our aim. The "means" here described then, 
seems to suggest that we come to intuitive ideas about our nature, 
and of nature in general to an extent. There have been many able 
commentators on Spinoza who, in neglecting this advice regarding 
means, have, I believe, denied themselves a chance to understand his 
philosophy, except "in abstracto."

Again, I haven't read as much western philosophy as I'd like to, so 
far, but I don't know any other philosopher whose mission seems to be 
to mentor us through a fundamental transformation that is ethical and 
spiritual. Spinoza in this way seems to me more akin to Jnana Yogis, 
or "the Fourth Way," than to his fellow rationalists. let alone 
empiricists.

Moving on to p25 item II, we hit a rough patch. "To collect in this 
way..." What way? I would have supposed via perception mode IV, 
applied to our nature, and to nature in general. But Spinoza goes on 
to describe "collecting the differences, agreements and the 
oppositions of things." What things? Our body as compared with 
external causes? There is another problem here. Spinoza is going to 
tell us to chiefly employ mode IV, but by making reference to Ethics, 
we discover that what he is describing here sounds like what he calls 
"reason" in that other work. The terminology gets a bit messy, 
because our TIE mode III equals "the second kind of knowledge" in 
Ethics. Perhaps an explanation might be that, while we "chiefly" 
employ mode IV (in order to intuit our axioms and definitions with 
highest certainty), a process of true inference may follow, provided 
of course that we employ valid forms of deduction. Spinoza's 
"reason," we may find, is unusual in that, I think it depends upon 
direct intuitive knowledge of its premisses, rather than what is more 
usual. That is, the premisses remain "beings of reason." For 
example, we may say anything we like, but are we able, as Spinoza 
claims to be, to deduce truths adequately from intuitive 
understanding of the attributes, etc? I'm sure there are many 
philosophers who put no stock in the possibility that Spinoza may 
have attained a completely different level of insight than what is 
conceivable to ordinary logicians, and it is no part of my purpose 
today to disabuse them of that idea. But to repeat, Item II seems to 
me a bit rough in the intelligibility of its meaning, even if my 
provisional interpretation should prove verifiable.

Item III seems full of potential for action. I am put in mind here 
of the "Serenity Prayer."
"God, grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change, 
courage to change the things I can, and wisdom to know the 
difference." Technically, if a thing is intuitively understood to be 
unchangable, there can be no "separation" from this fact. In a way, 
"acceptance" still implies a accepter and the object accepted, i.e., 
a subject/object relationship, which would mean the idea had been, so 
to say, "reasoned away." But, are the "things" under study in Item 
III still both our nature and nature in general? I suppose, but the 
connective tissue here is a little tenuous, leaving room for doubt.

Item IV is again even more difficult. "To compare this result with 
the nature and power of man." "Man" as used here is general, not a 
real, particular thing. We've reflected early on about some 
universal "character more stable than our own." I can reach that, no 
problem, because I am sometimes more stable, sometimes less so. But 
now it seems we are to hypothesize a man whose nature is such that he 
is conscious of uniting with nature as a whole,is that it? I think 
if we are going to experiment with such an hypothesis, which, for us 
now, is a general "being of reason," we ought to be mindful that we 
apply this standard only to our own nature, because by the measure of 
this abstraction, we are imperfect. Cosmically, if I read Spinoza 
correctly, everyone else may be regarded as quite perfect as they 
are, if in fact there is nothing really defective in nature. Spinoza 
rarely employs any "ideals" per se, however, we have an exceptional 
situation here, and if we are able to observe ourselves with 
sufficient impartiality, perhaps we will come to understand our 
nature, per item !, not as a result of duration of attention, but 
through the fullness of attention itself.

"We shall thus discern the highest degree of perfection to which man 
is capable of attaining."

I have to confess to a little disappointment with this remark. What 
is it that compels so many philosophers to have to comment on the 
limits of "man?" Even with the few books I've read, I still seem to 
discover a pattern whereby they seem compelled to express and seem to 
sincerely believe that their own attainments have set the high water 
mark for the entire species, as it were. Because of my love of him, 
I like to think Spinoza might have changed this somehow, even if he 
understood it to be true, because so many state it, and, I believe, 
in error.

These four items in p25 are again, vital to my aim of understanding 
what Spinoza is suggesting that we do. If anyone can shed more light 
on them, please do so.