The Beginning of the End for this Particular Inquiry

Here are some challenges, objections, etc. by Terry Neff.  His lengthy expositions, which generally express an opinion that there is nothing wrong with TEI such that it was not published by the master, became too time consuming to rebut and at the same time could not be ignored in good faith and the spirit of dialog.  I concluded somewhat later that attempting communication of this caliber via emails was inefficient and lugubrious.  My opinion was that Terry was disingenuous in his expressions of gratitude and was more interested in a sort of "intellectual pissing contest."  In any event,  after a time
he succeeded in getting me to quit posting and there's been very little activity on that list in the ensuing years.  I thought I was making way for him to carry on a "slow reading" of one of Spinoza's works, but he never did this.  This "slow reading" was the expressed aim of the forum but it failed since after I left no one cared to carry on with leadership of the reading.  So, it appeared to me that Terry's role was not to help carry the reading forward but rather to stop anyone else from doing this.
The material (Spinoza) is exceptionally difficult when all pull together.  See if you can read this post. Do you feel it is intellectually obfuscating?  I did.  Anyway, here it is for posterity.  Note that at the end Terry offers me "thanks in advance" for addressing all his points.  I think that was presumptuous.

Hi Donovan,

Thank you for giving me some things to think about regarding your
interpretation of some of the terms which Spinoza uses. I believe that I now
see a bit more concerning the meaning that you have apparently intended by
some of the things you've written in the past which have left me somewhat
baffled.

But, first things first. In an earlier discussion about Spinoza's use of
"with certainty" you wrote:

> D:
> I think that the words "with certainty" in p18s2 above
> are confusing at best, since Spinoza goes on to explain
> how uncertain some of the modes he is going to recap
> really are. I think he would have edited this sentence to
> make it more clear prior to publication, and I would
> thus call the sentence at least "unpolished" as it stands.

...and after I mentioned that the actual Latin word Spinoza had used in that
particular place was "indubie" you went on to say:

> D:
> Depending again on the translation, TIE p20s1 would
> serve as evidence that Elwes ought to have translated
> "indubie" as "without doubt" or something very similiar
> to that. It seems to me to be key to Spinoza's thesis to
> distinguish the difference between absence of doubt
> (which is negative, e.g. lack of an idea which contradicts
> an affirmation, which Spinoza signified in his Latin by
> using the negative prefix, and we know he was sensitive
> to the issue of prefixes) and certainty (possession by the
> mind of the idea of the thing's essence itself, and the
> reflective knowledge of this state of affairs).

...and so I took you to mean by writing that last part beginning with;
"...and certainty..." that you would prefer a more restricted usage of the
term "certainty" should Spinoza have polished his text. Now you responded to
the following which I wrote to Stuart:

> T:
> On the other hand, it seemed to me that Donovan would
> prefer to only use the word "certainty" in discussing the
> highest kind of knowledge

...with:

> D:
> I favor observing for the ideas expressed in all the various
> ways Spinoza is using the term. If such meanings are
> indicative of "roughness," or are part of didactic comments,
> that would be especially on topic in my view.
>
> A few examples of his usage, off the top:
> *****
> TIE p[35] (1) Hence it is clear that certainty is nothing else than
> the subjective essence of a thing: in other words, the mode in
> which we perceive an actual reality is certainty.
> *****
> p25(3) We may, therefore clearly conclude that
> the certainty arising from hearsay cannot be scientific in its
> character.
> *****
> P35(3) Hence, again, it is clear that no one can know
> the nature of the highest certainty, unless he possesses an
> adequate idea, or the subjective essence of a thing:
> certainty is identical with such subjective essence.
> ...

So it appears to me from this that you do NOT have a problem, as you put
it; "observing for the ideas expressed", with Spinoza's use of "certainty"
(Latin: "certitudinem" in this case) in p25(3) where he very explicitly
writes; "certainty arising from hearsay" which cannot possibly mean (can
it?); "possession by the mind of the idea of the thing's essence itself, and
the reflective knowledge of this state of affairs".

And now I am further confused, beyond what you have variously written
concerning the term "certain", and I hope that you can help me to understand
what you mean when you continue the above with the following comments about
P35(3):

> D:
> P35(3) above, we have not yet reached in our study. We
> discern that in this context, an adequate idea involves
> >knowing the nature< of the highest certainty, as
> distinguished from reflecting the subjective essence of
> the thing, which is >identical with< the highest certainty....

You describe what you say is a distinction (meaning these are two
different things?) between an "adequate idea" and the "subjective essence"
of a thing but I do not see where you find such a distinction in what
Spinoza wrote. He wrote in P35 that to; "know the nature of the highest
certainty" a mind must possess an "adequate idea, or..." [Latin "aut"; which
my Latin dictionary shows may mean; "or", "or rather/else", "either...or"
(aut...aut)] "...the subjective essence of a thing: certainty is identical
with such subjective essence." And apparently you take from this, it appears
to me, that Spinoza is saying that an "adequate idea" is NOT the "subjective
essence of a thing" since you write:

> D:
> The distinction can be described thus:
>
> adequate= affirmed as a simple fact, but external to
> the intellect. subjective essence=reflected without
> division or "space" between the thinker and his thought.
> The latter idea is sometimes referred to by Spinoza as
> "the true idea," and most philosophers deny that we can
> thus conceive the ideas of things
>

It seems to me then that;

(1) You DO believe that Spinoza intends us to understand that these (an
"adequate idea", and the "subjective essence" of a thing) are two distinct
things.

(2) You write, but I see no such description by Spinoza: "adequate= affirmed
as a simple fact, but external to the intellect."

(3) You write, but again I see no such description by Spinoza: "subjective
essence=reflected without division or "space" between the thinker and his
thought."

Please indicate where Spinoza himself explains this. He does express the
difference in the effect on the mind between Reason and Intuition (see for
instance E5: PROP. 36 Corollary, Note) where Intuition is immediate or
direct knowledge which may be expressed variously by other people as the
merging of subject and object, or that there is no subject and object
involved, but before going too much into why you believe Spinoza means
something different by "adequate idea" from what he means by "subjective
essence" please consider what he himself wrote when he continued the above
with:

====== TEI-P36:
Thus, as the truth needs no sign--it being sufficient to possess the
subjective essence of things, or, in other words, the ideas of them, in
order that all doubts may be removed--it follows that the true method does
not consist in seeking for the signs of truth after the acquisition of the
idea, but that the true method teaches us the order in which we should seek
for truth itself, [N4] or the subjective essences of things, or ideas, for
all these expressions are synonymous.
======

He writes;

"...possess the subjective essence of things, or, in other words, the
ideas [presumably adequate ideas] of them..."

...and then he writes that the following are synonymous;

"...truth itself, or the subjective essences of things, or ideas
[presumably adequate ideas], for all these expressions are synonymous."

Does this not mean that when he wrote in the previous paragraph about
possessing an;

"...adequate idea, or the subjective essence of a thing: certainty is
identical with such subjective essence."

...he means that "certainty" is also identical with the "adequate idea"?

You go on to write:

> In this context, I invite you to revisit the question you
> posed to Stuart.
>
> On May 28, 2007, You wrote:
>
>> Did you have an adequate idea of what "I" referred
>> to?

I do not see, unless perhaps you can help me to understand the above
items I questioned, what there is for me to revisit. You seem to think that
I was referring to some idea external to Stuart's intellect but I made no
such claim. In fact, I questioned Stuart as to what idea, adequate or
inadequate he had in his own mind at the time he made his statement.

Anyway, Spinoza writes, with reference to "adequate ideas" (involved in
both the Second and Third Kinds of Knowledge) such things as:

===== E2: PROP. 41 (My CAPS --TNeff):
Knowledge of the first kind is the only source of falsity, knowledge of
the second and third kinds is necessarily true.

Proof.--To knowledge of the first kind we have (in the foregoing note
E2P40N2) assigned all those ideas, which are inadequate and confused;
therefore this kind of knowledge is the only source of falsity (E2P35).
Furthermore, we assigned to the SECOND and THIRD KINDS OF KNOWLEDGE those
ideas which are ADEQUATE; therefore these kinds are necessarily true
(E2P34). Q.E.D.
=====

===== E5: PROP. 28 (My CAPS --TNeff):
The endeavour or desire to know things by the third kind of knowledge
cannot arise from the first, but from the second kind of knowledge.

Proof.--This proposition is self-evident. For whatsoever we understand
clearly and distinctly, we understand either through itself, or through that
which is conceived through itself; that is, ideas which are clear and
distinct in us, or which are referred to the third kind of knowledge E2P40N2
cannot follow from ideas that are fragmentary and confused, and are referred
to knowledge of the first kind, but must follow from ADEQUATE IDEAS, or
ideas of the second and third kind of knowledge; therefore (Def. of the
Emotions, E3DOE1), the desire of knowing things by the third kind of
knowledge cannot arise from the first, but from the second kind. Q.E.D.
=====

Thanks in advance for helping me to understand your meaning, and more
importantly, Spinoza's meaning.

Best Regards,
Terry