On Certainty-Remarks by Terry Neff, a devoted Spinoza student

Hi Stuart and All,

Thank you for your response as it seems to indicate that perhaps I did 
not understand what you intended when you mentioned previously that you had 
once commented to someone:

> "But I do know that I am standing here talking to
> you and I know I am not dreaming."

...and about which you then asked:

> I'm wondering, wouldn't Spinoza agree with
> me? And if so, does that imply that there is a form
> of certainty that is, as it were, somewhere in between
> mere psychological confidence and a knowing
> based on understanding or percieving the "essence"
> of the thing?

You asked about; a "form of certainty", which implies another "different 
form of certainty." Although you used different phrases, do those not amount 
to the same thing, that is, "other forms of certainty"? This seemed to me to 
have been related to the question Donovan had posed about the term 
"certainty" as it might or might not apply to the various modes of 
perception which Spinoza presents and which were under discussion. If we use 
the term "certainty" to apply generally to the various ways in which we know 
things, then yes, I agree, we can say there are various forms or levels of 
"certainty." I have no problem with that as long as we then make it clear 
what type of "certainty" is involved in our examples offered. On the other 
hand, it seemed to me that Donovan would prefer to only use the word 
"certainty" in discussing the highest kind of knowledge, and I have no 
problem with that either. I would hope that, either way, the context or 
explicit phrasing in which the term is used would indicate the difference.

So, again, when you said earlier:

> "But I do know that I am standing here talking to
> you and I know I am not dreaming."

...and then asked your question about "a form of certainty" I took you to be 
using the term generally and when you asked; "wouldn't Spinoza agree with 
me?" I suppose I should have asked you; "Agree with what?", but instead I 
went on to think about and to express with my own comments and with 
Spinoza's statements the various "forms of certainty" or "kinds of 
knowledge" which Spinoza seems to me to have expressed in the TEI and later 
expressed even more specifically in the Ethics (especially in the case of 
"Reason".)

Do you think that Spinoza is more or less specific in the Ethics when he 
defines what he means there by "The Second Kind of Knowledge" or "Reason", 
than when he writes about "The Third Kind of Knowledge" in the TEI? I've 
asked you several times in the past if you have examined and thought about 
how Spinoza defines and explains what he means by "Reason", or the "Second 
Kind of Knowledge" in the Ethics (E2P40N2, including of course his 
references to specific earlier propositions) but you have never responded so 
it's hard for me to know sometimes what meaning you apply when you use the 
term or, like now, whether you intended; "...I know I am standing here..." 
to be an example of Reason in the sense that Spinoza explains the term in 
the Ethics.

My own aim is to continue climbing Spinoza's staircase of Reason 
(actually constructing my own "inner" staircase using his method!) as I have 
found that it does lead now and then to Intuitive insight in my own mind, 
even though, at this stage of my growth, I lose that state of clarity and 
often "return" to the level of Imagination. The more I struggle to climb, 
the higher I reach, and even if I do lose my way and unknowingly wander back 
down, it has proven for me time and again that there is even more to be 
revealed on that particular staircase as I work to take a step higher now 
and then and even as I go over what seems at first to be the same steps.

I assume, probably incorrectly, that everyone else who studies Spinoza's 
writings sees this as his aim and so you may have noticed that that is the 
direction in which I aim my comments in this Group.

You have helped to clarify your meaning for me now by writing:

> I will just say here that No, I do not have any analysis
> or fourth level intuition (of "I" or the "external world")
> that would justify my claim to certainty (in the highest
> sense) in specific situations or nail down some precise
> meaning of those terms. But, then, that was kinda my
> point. I don't think my inability to "justify" or "explain"
> the claim contradicts the certainty, though it clearly does
> modify the nature of that certainty. And that was my
> question about Spinoza and certainty. Is there some
> middling kind of certainty? In the second footnote to p21,
> which you present below, the question arises, it seems
> to me. In particular, he seems to assert with certainty
> that his mind and body are a unity even in the absence
> of a fourth level analysis or intuition based on the
> perception of the true essences. Late in the Emendation
> Spinoza talks about how we have to lift ourselves by
> our own bootstraps, so to speak........

And so I can only think to say at this point, yes, I agree that Spinoza 
is helping us to see various ways in which we feel more or less "certain" 
about things, and to point out the vast difference between these various 
"forms of certainty." In this regard I offered that his discussion in the 
TEI with regard to "The Third Kind of Knowledge" (as he named it there), 
included some things which would have to be left out as examples of "The 
Second Kind of Knowledge" or "Reason" as he defines, explains, and uses the 
term in the Ethics. As a footnote to his example in the TEI, which is 
similar to your; "...I am standing here..." he writes:

======= TEI-P21(19):
[Note]: From this example may be clearly seen what I have just drawn 
attention to. For through this union we understand nothing beyond the 
sensation, the effect, to wit, from which we inferred the cause of which we 
understand nothing.
=======

And yet in the Ethics he shows that by beginning, not from the 
sensations of experience, but from "those things which are common to all" 
(and which he says form the bases of Reason) we may, by Reason, know truly 
(E2P41) that the cause of our being is God (as he defines God), E2P45, and 
that this becomes even more clear when we know this same thing directly, by 
the Third Kind of Knowledge, as he explains and Reasons about in Part 5 of 
the Ethics.

I guess for now we may agree that Spinoza presents, by his words, 
different kinds of knowing and that he offers some examples. Seems clear 
enough to me.

Now what? :-)

Best Regards,
Terry