The Beginning of the End for this Particular Inquiry

Here are some challenges, objections, etc. by Terry Neff.  His lengthy expositions, which generally express an opinion that there is nothing wrong with TEI such that it was not published by the master, became too time consuming to rebut and at the same time could not be ignored in good faith and the spirit of dialog.  I concluded somewhat later that attempting communication of this caliber via emails was inefficient and lugubrious.  My opinion was that Terry was disingenuous in his expressions of gratitude and was more interested in a sort of "intellectual pissing contest."  In any event,  after a time
he succeeded in getting me to quit posting and there's been very little activity on that list in the ensuing years.  I thought I was making way for him to carry on a "slow reading" of one of Spinoza's works, but he never did this.  This "slow reading" was the expressed aim of the forum but it failed since after I left no one cared to carry on with leadership of the reading.  So, it appeared to me that Terry's role was not to help carry the reading forward but rather to stop anyone else from doing this.
The material (Spinoza) is exceptionally difficult when all pull together.  See if you can read this post. Do you feel it is intellectually obfuscating?  I did.  Anyway, here it is for posterity.  Note that at the end Terry offers me "thanks in advance" for addressing all his points.  I think that was presumptuous.

Hi Donovan,

Thank you for giving me some things to think about regarding your
interpretation of some of the terms which Spinoza uses. I believe that I now
see a bit more concerning the meaning that you have apparently intended by
some of the things you've written in the past which have left me somewhat
baffled.

But, first things first. In an earlier discussion about Spinoza's use of
"with certainty" you wrote:

> D:
> I think that the words "with certainty" in p18s2 above
> are confusing at best, since Spinoza goes on to explain
> how uncertain some of the modes he is going to recap
> really are. I think he would have edited this sentence to
> make it more clear prior to publication, and I would
> thus call the sentence at least "unpolished" as it stands.

...and after I mentioned that the actual Latin word Spinoza had used in that
particular place was "indubie" you went on to say:

> D:
> Depending again on the translation, TIE p20s1 would
> serve as evidence that Elwes ought to have translated
> "indubie" as "without doubt" or something very similiar
> to that. It seems to me to be key to Spinoza's thesis to
> distinguish the difference between absence of doubt
> (which is negative, e.g. lack of an idea which contradicts
> an affirmation, which Spinoza signified in his Latin by
> using the negative prefix, and we know he was sensitive
> to the issue of prefixes) and certainty (possession by the
> mind of the idea of the thing's essence itself, and the
> reflective knowledge of this state of affairs).

...and so I took you to mean by writing that last part beginning with;
"...and certainty..." that you would prefer a more restricted usage of the
term "certainty" should Spinoza have polished his text. Now you responded to
the following which I wrote to Stuart:

> T:
> On the other hand, it seemed to me that Donovan would
> prefer to only use the word "certainty" in discussing the
> highest kind of knowledge

...with:

> D:
> I favor observing for the ideas expressed in all the various
> ways Spinoza is using the term. If such meanings are
> indicative of "roughness," or are part of didactic comments,
> that would be especially on topic in my view.
>
> A few examples of his usage, off the top:
> *****
> TIE p[35] (1) Hence it is clear that certainty is nothing else than
> the subjective essence of a thing: in other words, the mode in
> which we perceive an actual reality is certainty.
> *****
> p25(3) We may, therefore clearly conclude that
> the certainty arising from hearsay cannot be scientific in its
> character.
> *****
> P35(3) Hence, again, it is clear that no one can know
> the nature of the highest certainty, unless he possesses an
> adequate idea, or the subjective essence of a thing:
> certainty is identical with such subjective essence.
> ...

So it appears to me from this that you do NOT have a problem, as you put
it; "observing for the ideas expressed", with Spinoza's use of "certainty"
(Latin: "certitudinem" in this case) in p25(3) where he very explicitly
writes; "certainty arising from hearsay" which cannot possibly mean (can
it?); "possession by the mind of the idea of the thing's essence itself, and
the reflective knowledge of this state of affairs".

And now I am further confused, beyond what you have variously written
concerning the term "certain", and I hope that you can help me to understand
what you mean when you continue the above with the following comments about
P35(3):

> D:
> P35(3) above, we have not yet reached in our study. We
> discern that in this context, an adequate idea involves
> >knowing the nature< of the highest certainty, as
> distinguished from reflecting the subjective essence of
> the thing, which is >identical with< the highest certainty....

You describe what you say is a distinction (meaning these are two
different things?) between an "adequate idea" and the "subjective essence"
of a thing but I do not see where you find such a distinction in what
Spinoza wrote. He wrote in P35 that to; "know the nature of the highest
certainty" a mind must possess an "adequate idea, or..." [Latin "aut"; which
my Latin dictionary shows may mean; "or", "or rather/else", "either...or"
(aut...aut)] "...the subjective essence of a thing: certainty is identical
with such subjective essence." And apparently you take from this, it appears
to me, that Spinoza is saying that an "adequate idea" is NOT the "subjective
essence of a thing" since you write:

> D:
> The distinction can be described thus:
>
> adequate= affirmed as a simple fact, but external to
> the intellect. subjective essence=reflected without
> division or "space" between the thinker and his thought.
> The latter idea is sometimes referred to by Spinoza as
> "the true idea," and most philosophers deny that we can
> thus conceive the ideas of things
>

It seems to me then that;

(1) You DO believe that Spinoza intends us to understand that these (an
"adequate idea", and the "subjective essence" of a thing) are two distinct
things.

(2) You write, but I see no such description by Spinoza: "adequate= affirmed
as a simple fact, but external to the intellect."

(3) You write, but again I see no such description by Spinoza: "subjective
essence=reflected without division or "space" between the thinker and his
thought."

Please indicate where Spinoza himself explains this. He does express the
difference in the effect on the mind between Reason and Intuition (see for
instance E5: PROP. 36 Corollary, Note) where Intuition is immediate or
direct knowledge which may be expressed variously by other people as the
merging of subject and object, or that there is no subject and object
involved, but before going too much into why you believe Spinoza means
something different by "adequate idea" from what he means by "subjective
essence" please consider what he himself wrote when he continued the above
with:

====== TEI-P36:
Thus, as the truth needs no sign--it being sufficient to possess the
subjective essence of things, or, in other words, the ideas of them, in
order that all doubts may be removed--it follows that the true method does
not consist in seeking for the signs of truth after the acquisition of the
idea, but that the true method teaches us the order in which we should seek
for truth itself, [N4] or the subjective essences of things, or ideas, for
all these expressions are synonymous.
======

He writes;

"...possess the subjective essence of things, or, in other words, the
ideas [presumably adequate ideas] of them..."

...and then he writes that the following are synonymous;

"...truth itself, or the subjective essences of things, or ideas
[presumably adequate ideas], for all these expressions are synonymous."

Does this not mean that when he wrote in the previous paragraph about
possessing an;

"...adequate idea, or the subjective essence of a thing: certainty is
identical with such subjective essence."

...he means that "certainty" is also identical with the "adequate idea"?

You go on to write:

> In this context, I invite you to revisit the question you
> posed to Stuart.
>
> On May 28, 2007, You wrote:
>
>> Did you have an adequate idea of what "I" referred
>> to?

I do not see, unless perhaps you can help me to understand the above
items I questioned, what there is for me to revisit. You seem to think that
I was referring to some idea external to Stuart's intellect but I made no
such claim. In fact, I questioned Stuart as to what idea, adequate or
inadequate he had in his own mind at the time he made his statement.

Anyway, Spinoza writes, with reference to "adequate ideas" (involved in
both the Second and Third Kinds of Knowledge) such things as:

===== E2: PROP. 41 (My CAPS --TNeff):
Knowledge of the first kind is the only source of falsity, knowledge of
the second and third kinds is necessarily true.

Proof.--To knowledge of the first kind we have (in the foregoing note
E2P40N2) assigned all those ideas, which are inadequate and confused;
therefore this kind of knowledge is the only source of falsity (E2P35).
Furthermore, we assigned to the SECOND and THIRD KINDS OF KNOWLEDGE those
ideas which are ADEQUATE; therefore these kinds are necessarily true
(E2P34). Q.E.D.
=====

===== E5: PROP. 28 (My CAPS --TNeff):
The endeavour or desire to know things by the third kind of knowledge
cannot arise from the first, but from the second kind of knowledge.

Proof.--This proposition is self-evident. For whatsoever we understand
clearly and distinctly, we understand either through itself, or through that
which is conceived through itself; that is, ideas which are clear and
distinct in us, or which are referred to the third kind of knowledge E2P40N2
cannot follow from ideas that are fragmentary and confused, and are referred
to knowledge of the first kind, but must follow from ADEQUATE IDEAS, or
ideas of the second and third kind of knowledge; therefore (Def. of the
Emotions, E3DOE1), the desire of knowing things by the third kind of
knowledge cannot arise from the first, but from the second kind. Q.E.D.
=====

Thanks in advance for helping me to understand your meaning, and more
importantly, Spinoza's meaning.

Best Regards,
Terry

More on Certainty, and the possible "rough draft" nature of TEI

I had two principal aims in this discussion of TEI.  One was to see what ideas we could come to about why it was left unfinished, since it had been worked on before some of Spinoza's other works.  Also, could we conceive of any obstacles Spinoza was facing, if these might be causes of the unfinished status, and the apology appended to the work posthumously by Spinoza's friends.  So, back into the investigations....


On May 30, 2007, at 12:08 PM, Terry Neff wrote:

> On the other hand, it seemed to me that Donovan would prefer to
> only use the word
> "certainty" in discussing the highest kind of knowledge

Terry, (d. speaking)

I favor observing for the ideas expressed in all the various ways 
Spinoza is using the term. If such meanings are indicative of 
"roughness," or are part of didactic comments, that would be 
especially on topic in my view.

A few examples of his usage, off the top:
*****
TIE p[35] (1) Hence it is clear that certainty is nothing else than
the subjective essence of a thing: in other words, the mode in
which we perceive an actual reality is certainty.
*****
p25(3) We may, therefore clearly conclude that
the certainty arising from hearsay cannot be scientific in its
character.
*****
P35(3) Hence, again, it is clear that no one can know
the nature of the highest certainty, unless he possesses an
adequate idea, or the subjective essence of a thing:
certainty is identical with such subjective essence.
*****
P35(3) above, we have not yet reached in our study. We discern that 
in this context, an adequate idea involves >knowing the nature< of 
the highest certainty, as distinguished from reflecting the 
subjective essence of the thing, which is >identical with< the 
highest certainty. The distinction can be described thus:

adequate= affirmed as a simple fact, but external to the intellect.
subjective essence=reflected without division or "space" between the 
thinker and his thought. The latter idea is sometimes referred to by 
Spinoza as "the true idea," and most philosophers deny that we can 
thus conceive the ideas of things

On Certainty-Remarks by Terry Neff, a devoted Spinoza student

Hi Stuart and All,

Thank you for your response as it seems to indicate that perhaps I did 
not understand what you intended when you mentioned previously that you had 
once commented to someone:

> "But I do know that I am standing here talking to
> you and I know I am not dreaming."

...and about which you then asked:

> I'm wondering, wouldn't Spinoza agree with
> me? And if so, does that imply that there is a form
> of certainty that is, as it were, somewhere in between
> mere psychological confidence and a knowing
> based on understanding or percieving the "essence"
> of the thing?

You asked about; a "form of certainty", which implies another "different 
form of certainty." Although you used different phrases, do those not amount 
to the same thing, that is, "other forms of certainty"? This seemed to me to 
have been related to the question Donovan had posed about the term 
"certainty" as it might or might not apply to the various modes of 
perception which Spinoza presents and which were under discussion. If we use 
the term "certainty" to apply generally to the various ways in which we know 
things, then yes, I agree, we can say there are various forms or levels of 
"certainty." I have no problem with that as long as we then make it clear 
what type of "certainty" is involved in our examples offered. On the other 
hand, it seemed to me that Donovan would prefer to only use the word 
"certainty" in discussing the highest kind of knowledge, and I have no 
problem with that either. I would hope that, either way, the context or 
explicit phrasing in which the term is used would indicate the difference.

So, again, when you said earlier:

> "But I do know that I am standing here talking to
> you and I know I am not dreaming."

...and then asked your question about "a form of certainty" I took you to be 
using the term generally and when you asked; "wouldn't Spinoza agree with 
me?" I suppose I should have asked you; "Agree with what?", but instead I 
went on to think about and to express with my own comments and with 
Spinoza's statements the various "forms of certainty" or "kinds of 
knowledge" which Spinoza seems to me to have expressed in the TEI and later 
expressed even more specifically in the Ethics (especially in the case of 
"Reason".)

Do you think that Spinoza is more or less specific in the Ethics when he 
defines what he means there by "The Second Kind of Knowledge" or "Reason", 
than when he writes about "The Third Kind of Knowledge" in the TEI? I've 
asked you several times in the past if you have examined and thought about 
how Spinoza defines and explains what he means by "Reason", or the "Second 
Kind of Knowledge" in the Ethics (E2P40N2, including of course his 
references to specific earlier propositions) but you have never responded so 
it's hard for me to know sometimes what meaning you apply when you use the 
term or, like now, whether you intended; "...I know I am standing here..." 
to be an example of Reason in the sense that Spinoza explains the term in 
the Ethics.

My own aim is to continue climbing Spinoza's staircase of Reason 
(actually constructing my own "inner" staircase using his method!) as I have 
found that it does lead now and then to Intuitive insight in my own mind, 
even though, at this stage of my growth, I lose that state of clarity and 
often "return" to the level of Imagination. The more I struggle to climb, 
the higher I reach, and even if I do lose my way and unknowingly wander back 
down, it has proven for me time and again that there is even more to be 
revealed on that particular staircase as I work to take a step higher now 
and then and even as I go over what seems at first to be the same steps.

I assume, probably incorrectly, that everyone else who studies Spinoza's 
writings sees this as his aim and so you may have noticed that that is the 
direction in which I aim my comments in this Group.

You have helped to clarify your meaning for me now by writing:

> I will just say here that No, I do not have any analysis
> or fourth level intuition (of "I" or the "external world")
> that would justify my claim to certainty (in the highest
> sense) in specific situations or nail down some precise
> meaning of those terms. But, then, that was kinda my
> point. I don't think my inability to "justify" or "explain"
> the claim contradicts the certainty, though it clearly does
> modify the nature of that certainty. And that was my
> question about Spinoza and certainty. Is there some
> middling kind of certainty? In the second footnote to p21,
> which you present below, the question arises, it seems
> to me. In particular, he seems to assert with certainty
> that his mind and body are a unity even in the absence
> of a fourth level analysis or intuition based on the
> perception of the true essences. Late in the Emendation
> Spinoza talks about how we have to lift ourselves by
> our own bootstraps, so to speak........

And so I can only think to say at this point, yes, I agree that Spinoza 
is helping us to see various ways in which we feel more or less "certain" 
about things, and to point out the vast difference between these various 
"forms of certainty." In this regard I offered that his discussion in the 
TEI with regard to "The Third Kind of Knowledge" (as he named it there), 
included some things which would have to be left out as examples of "The 
Second Kind of Knowledge" or "Reason" as he defines, explains, and uses the 
term in the Ethics. As a footnote to his example in the TEI, which is 
similar to your; "...I am standing here..." he writes:

======= TEI-P21(19):
[Note]: From this example may be clearly seen what I have just drawn 
attention to. For through this union we understand nothing beyond the 
sensation, the effect, to wit, from which we inferred the cause of which we 
understand nothing.
=======

And yet in the Ethics he shows that by beginning, not from the 
sensations of experience, but from "those things which are common to all" 
(and which he says form the bases of Reason) we may, by Reason, know truly 
(E2P41) that the cause of our being is God (as he defines God), E2P45, and 
that this becomes even more clear when we know this same thing directly, by 
the Third Kind of Knowledge, as he explains and Reasons about in Part 5 of 
the Ethics.

I guess for now we may agree that Spinoza presents, by his words, 
different kinds of knowing and that he offers some examples. Seems clear 
enough to me.

Now what? :-)

Best Regards,
Terry

Worthy Remarks by Stuart correlation Aspects of S., K. and P.

Hello "everyone",

What follows is an aside relative to the intepretaion of the Emendation; but if we treat Spinoza as a paradigm instance of a western philosophical tradition that may have certain goals and dynamics in common with other traditions, then what follows is not irrelevant to our overall understanding of the Emendation. So I'm not trying to change the discussion. But I do think the quotes below are worth pondering. 

Thanks in advance for your indulgence,

Stuart.

HI Donovan,

I thought of K when I asked the question. My understanding of K in a nutshell: Pay attention. I used a Krishnamurti quotation once as a chapter heading (MA thesis on SPinoza) K along with a couple of quotes from Plato in order to indicate the ways in which Plato, K and Spinoza all dovetail. Well, heck, here they are. I arranged them in the following order for philosophical and dramatic effect:



"For there is no way of putting it into words like other studies. Acquaintance with it must come rather after a long period of attendance on intstruction in the subject itself and of close companionship, when suddenly, like a blaze kindled by a leaping spark, it is generated in the soul and at once becomes self-sustaining.

The study of virtue and vice must be accompanied by an inquiry into what is false and true of the existence in general and must be carried on by constant practice through a long period. After practicing detail3ed comparisons of names, definitions, and visual and other sense perceptions, after scrutinizing them in benevolent disputation by the use of questions and answers without jealousy, at last a flash of understanding in each blazes up, and the mind, as it exerts all its powers to the limit of human capacity, is flooded with light." (Plato, Letter VII)


"Meditation is the summation of all energy. It is not to be gathered little by little, denying this and denying that, capturing this and holding on to that; but rather, it is the total denial without choice, of all wasteful energy. Choice is the outcome of confusion; and the essence of wasted energy is confusion and conflict. To see clearly what is at any time needs the attention of all energy; and in this there is no contradiction or duality. 
IN the total attention of meditation there is no knowing, no recognition nor the remembrance of something that has happened. Time and thought have entirely come to an end, for they are the center which limits its own vision." (The Only Revolution)

"......those who really apply themselves in the right way to philosophy are directly and of their own accord preparing themselves for dying and death." (Plato, Phaedo)

I'm also familiar with (though specific memories would require reminders at this point) Needleman (in writing). He impressed me as a "down to earth" man of "high culture" in the best and Spinozistic sense of that term.

Stuart

Spinoza, Krishnamurti as "Jnana" Yoga, etc.

> S: Do you have a GOOD book to recommend on the subject of Jnana
> Yoga? I not too sure about the couple of things I currently have.

The Awakening of Intelligence by J. Krishnamurti

This isn't on the subject of Jnana Yoga, but it consists in 
transcriptions of dialogs between K. and, for example, Jacob 
Needleman, a philosophy professor at S.F. State who is affiliated 
with the Gurdjieff Foundation. There are many other dialogs with 
interesting individuals. Mr. Krishnamurti would not necessarily like 
to be called a Jnana Yogi, or a philosopher, teacher, etc., however, 
I think it's an apt enough description that he came to mind as the 
greatest Jnana Yogi I can think of. He never "set down" his 
philosophy in any systematic way. DVD's are available of some of his 
conversations with, for example, David Bohm. Bohm was a noted 
quantum theorist who became very interested in K.'s ideas.

Re: Plato/Socrates

I've read most, if not all, of the Republic at one time or another, 
most recently chapters 6-7 (and about that many years ago.) My 
recollections right now about it are vague. I suppose it did not make 
a great impression on me.

Bertrand Russell still held that Plato was probably right about 
"Universals," which sufficed as a proof of for him of one sort of a 
priori knowledge. I may have mentioned that I first made a 
rudimentary "survey" of the history of philosophy (by reading the 
works suggested by Russell at the end of "Problems of Philosophy") 
after my teacher died, and I began to have contact with others 
outside of that situation, regarding Spinoza. Naturally, the ideas 
of other philosophers came up as they are now, and I wanted to be 
conversant with them to an extent, and I am interested in some of 
their ideas. My knowledge of the history of philosophy is definitely 
a work in progress.

You mentioned David Hume. His "Treatise on the Human Understanding" 
was among the works I read, and it was notable both for its beautiful 
style and for the incisive critical thinking with which he showed the 
scope of the induction principle in our knowledge.

Discussion of and reiteration of Previous Post-good for review of Important Topics

D: Again, I haven't read as much western philosophy as I'd like to, so 
far, but I don't know any other philosopher whose mission seems to be 
to mentor us through a fundamental transformation that is ethical and 
spiritual. 

S: Does Socrates/Plato ring a bell? Of course, the spiritual side of that assertion as it applies to S/P does depend on how much "spirituality" you pack in to the concept of the "philosopher king," the one who knows himself. Perhaps the following biconditional has value. One is fully ethical iff one fully knows himself. 

D: Spinoza in this way seems to me more akin to Jnana Yogis, 
or "the Fourth Way," than to his fellow rationalists. let alone 
empiricists.

S: Do you have a GOOD book to recommend on the subject of Jnana Yoga? I not too sure about the couple of things I currently have.

D: I think if we are going to experiment with such an hypothesis, which, for us 
now, is a general "being of reason," we ought to be mindful that we 
apply this standard only to our own nature, because by the measure of 
this abstraction, we are imperfect. Cosmically, if I read Spinoza 
correctly, everyone else may be regarded as quite perfect as they 
are, if in fact there is nothing really defective in nature. 

S: I think I can see your point , but surely Spinoza thought that if it is valid to compare my current self with a more idealized version of myself, and to see the value of the latter by comparison with the former, then it is certainly valid, even necessary, to provide the same service for others. But don't we have to remember, as well, that for Spinoza, perfection=reality=power? And that power is expressed within certain limits since all finite power is a limitation of the power of substance. We literally, if I understand Spinoza at all, become a new individual reality at each step of the way toward that idealized version. One that in itself express more perfection (as defined above) than the individual that existed one step previously. Therefore, when you say


D: Spinoza rarely employs any "ideals" per se, however, we have an exceptional 
situation here, and if we are able to observe ourselves with 
sufficient impartiality, perhaps we will come to understand our 
nature, per item !, not as a result of duration of attention, but 
through the fullness of attention itself.

"We shall thus discern the highest degree of perfection to which man 
is capable of attaining."

I have to confess to a little disappointment with this remark. What 
is it that compels so many philosophers to have to comment on the 
limits of "man?" 

S: I tend to think that it is because you are dealing with an instance of the Socratic tradition. Socrates, you will recall, who is well known for having the reputation of having acquired the highest possible wisdom and at the same time he is said to have admitted that he was ignorant of the consequences of death. He thereby demonstrated, as I like to understand the point anyway, that the fear of death was a form of superstition. As was any opinion formed in the absence of acquaintance with the relevant "Forms." That is why it seems to me that, for example, a David Hume should not only not be dismissed from a spiritual approach to western philosophy, he must be, IN CERTAIN RESPECTS, be treated as indispensable. 


D: Even with the few books I've read, I still seem to 
discover a pattern whereby they seem compelled to express and seem to 
sincerely believe that their own attainments have set the high water 
mark for the entire species, as it were. Because of my love of him, 
I like to think Spinoza might have changed this somehow, even if he 
understood it to be true, because so many state it, and, I believe, 
in error.

S: Here, nevertheless, I totally agree with you. In fact it follows from what I said in the paragraph previous to this one. Setting limits from outside the fourth way of knowing seems a fairly superstitious activity. But you know, I didn't read that specific remark of Spinoza's in that way. BTW, the one Ideal he certainly did mention was acquiescence. Is perfect acquiescence possible? I think Spinoza did think there were limits, eg, your personality can't survive the destruction of the body. I'm guessing, perhaps more relevantly, that he didn't think a completely indomitable Joy was possible, despite the fact that in part 5 of the Ethics, he certainly does speak that way when it comes to the transformation of the affects which is equivalent to the Intellectual Love of God.

D: These four items in p25 are again, vital to my aim of understanding 
what Spinoza is suggesting that we do. If anyone can shed more light 
on them, please do so.

S: Spinoza does not adduce general natures. No. But he does think we, virtually all of us (he admits that he doesn't know what to say about "madman," for example), are alike in certain respects. A perfect Stuart will not be identical to a perfect Donovan, but we would in those conditions, being each of us a perfect each of us, we would have much, if not most things in common. Certainly the things in the Ethics which "pertain to wisdom."



-----Original Message-----
From: Rundle Donovan 
To: spinoza@yahoogroups.com
Sent: Tue, 29 May 2007 12:22 pm
Subject: [spinoza] TIE p25-29






I wanted to make this post shorter, but I couldn't figure out how to 
separate p25 from the rest of the material here without loss of 
continuity.
*****
[25] (1) In order that from these modes of perception the best may
be selected, it is well that we should briefly enumerate the means
necessary for attaining our end.

I. (2) To have an exact knowledge of our nature which we desire to
perfect, and to know as much as is needful of nature in general.

II. To collect in this way the differences, the agreements, and the
oppositions of things.

III. To learn thus exactly how far they can or cannot be modified.

IV. To compare this result with the nature and power of man.
(4) We shall thus discern the highest degree of perfection
to which man is capable of attaining.

[26] (1) We shall then be in a position to see which mode of
perception we ought to choose. (2) As to the first mode, it is
evident that from hearsay our knowledge must always be uncertain,
and, moreover, can give us no insight into the essence of a thing,
as is manifest in our illustration; now one can only arrive at
knowledge of a thing through knowledge of its essence, as will
hereafter appear. (3) We may, therefore clearly conclude that
the certainty arising from hearsay cannot be scientific in its
character. (4) For simple hearsay cannot affect anyone whose
understanding does not, so to speak, meet it half way.

[27] (1) The second mode of perception [i] cannot be said to
give us the idea of the proportion of which we are in search.
(2) Moreover its results are very uncertain and indefinite,
for we shall never discover anything in natural phenomena by its
means, except accidental properties, which are never clearly
understood, unless the essence of the things in question be
known first. (3) Wherefore this mode also must be rejected.

[28] (1) Of the third mode of perception we may say in a manner
that it gives us the idea of the thing sought, and that it
us to draw conclusions without risk of error; yet it is not by
itself sufficient to put us in possession of the perfection we
aim at.
=======
[for my convenience I have interjected Spinoza's description of mode 
III here]

III. (19:4) Perception arising when the essence of one thing is inferred
from another thing, but not adequately; this comes when [f] from 
some
effect we gather its cause, or when it is inferred from some general
proposition that some property is always present.
=======
[29] (1) The fourth mode alone apprehends the adequate essence of
a thing without danger of error. (2) This mode, therefore, must be
the one which we chiefly employ. (3) How, then, should we avail
ourselves of it so as to gain the fourth kind of knowledge with
the least delay concerning things previously unknown? (4) I will
proceed to explain.
=======
[likewise, I've recapped mode IV here for easy reference]

IV. (5) Lastly, there is the perception arising when a thing is
perceived solely through its essence, or through the knowledge
of its proximate cause.
=======
*****

In p25, Item I is to my purpose, that is, Spinoza is, he is making a 
suggestion of action. We are going to be using the favored mode of 
perception in order to "have an exact knowledge of our nature." If 
David is still with us, I want to mention to him that this is where 
the rubber meets the road in the adventure. Very soon we will be 
commencing the "great labour," not just talking about it. As far as 
nature in general goes-important, but secondary here in the sentence 
subordinate to getting exact knowledge of our nature. A lot of 
philosophers concentrate on "nature in general." It is implied that 
we are somehow going to get ideas via this selected mode of 
perception that will aid us in "perfecting our nature," which is, to 
an extent, synonymous with our aim. The "means" here described then, 
seems to suggest that we come to intuitive ideas about our nature, 
and of nature in general to an extent. There have been many able 
commentators on Spinoza who, in neglecting this advice regarding 
means, have, I believe, denied themselves a chance to understand his 
philosophy, except "in abstracto."

Again, I haven't read as much western philosophy as I'd like to, so 
far, but I don't know any other philosopher whose mission seems to be 
to mentor us through a fundamental transformation that is ethical and 
spiritual. Spinoza in this way seems to me more akin to Jnana Yogis, 
or "the Fourth Way," than to his fellow rationalists. let alone 
empiricists.

Moving on to p25 item II, we hit a rough patch. "To collect in this 
way..." What way? I would have supposed via perception mode IV, 
applied to our nature, and to nature in general. But Spinoza goes on 
to describe "collecting the differences, agreements and the 
oppositions of things." What things? Our body as compared with 
external causes? There is another problem here. Spinoza is going to 
tell us to chiefly employ mode IV, but by making reference to Ethics, 
we discover that what he is describing here sounds like what he calls 
"reason" in that other work. The terminology gets a bit messy, 
because our TIE mode III equals "the second kind of knowledge" in 
Ethics. Perhaps an explanation might be that, while we "chiefly" 
employ mode IV (in order to intuit our axioms and definitions with 
highest certainty), a process of true inference may follow, provided 
of course that we employ valid forms of deduction. Spinoza's 
"reason," we may find, is unusual in that, I think it depends upon 
direct intuitive knowledge of its premisses, rather than what is more 
usual. That is, the premisses remain "beings of reason." For 
example, we may say anything we like, but are we able, as Spinoza 
claims to be, to deduce truths adequately from intuitive 
understanding of the attributes, etc? I'm sure there are many 
philosophers who put no stock in the possibility that Spinoza may 
have attained a completely different level of insight than what is 
conceivable to ordinary logicians, and it is no part of my purpose 
today to disabuse them of that idea. But to repeat, Item II seems to 
me a bit rough in the intelligibility of its meaning, even if my 
provisional interpretation should prove verifiable.

Item III seems full of potential for action. I am put in mind here 
of the "Serenity Prayer."
"God, grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change, 
courage to change the things I can, and wisdom to know the 
difference." Technically, if a thing is intuitively understood to be 
unchangable, there can be no "separation" from this fact. In a way, 
"acceptance" still implies a accepter and the object accepted, i.e., 
a subject/object relationship, which would mean the idea had been, so 
to say, "reasoned away." But, are the "things" under study in Item 
III still both our nature and nature in general? I suppose, but the 
connective tissue here is a little tenuous, leaving room for doubt.

Item IV is again even more difficult. "To compare this result with 
the nature and power of man." "Man" as used here is general, not a 
real, particular thing. We've reflected early on about some 
universal "character more stable than our own." I can reach that, no 
problem, because I am sometimes more stable, sometimes less so. But 
now it seems we are to hypothesize a man whose nature is such that he 
is conscious of uniting with nature as a whole,is that it? I think 
if we are going to experiment with such an hypothesis, which, for us 
now, is a general "being of reason," we ought to be mindful that we 
apply this standard only to our own nature, because by the measure of 
this abstraction, we are imperfect. Cosmically, if I read Spinoza 
correctly, everyone else may be regarded as quite perfect as they 
are, if in fact there is nothing really defective in nature. Spinoza 
rarely employs any "ideals" per se, however, we have an exceptional 
situation here, and if we are able to observe ourselves with 
sufficient impartiality, perhaps we will come to understand our 
nature, per item !, not as a result of duration of attention, but 
through the fullness of attention itself.

"We shall thus discern the highest degree of perfection to which man 
is capable of attaining."

I have to confess to a little disappointment with this remark. What 
is it that compels so many philosophers to have to comment on the 
limits of "man?" Even with the few books I've read, I still seem to 
discover a pattern whereby they seem compelled to express and seem to 
sincerely believe that their own attainments have set the high water 
mark for the entire species, as it were. Because of my love of him, 
I like to think Spinoza might have changed this somehow, even if he 
understood it to be true, because so many state it, and, I believe, 
in error.

These four items in p25 are again, vital to my aim of understanding 
what Spinoza is suggesting that we do. If anyone can shed more light 
on them, please do so.