The Means to our End, where we find that the end and the means are One.

As an aside I wish to observe that perhaps deduction is: 
something that works in us very frequently, even as we make inner 
demonstrations to ourselves. Intuitive ideas are operative 
continually right under our noses, that is, like Poe's "Purloined 
Letter," they may seem like part of the familiar furniture. Breaking 
down the components of our thinking into simpler and simpler ideas 
increases the likelihood of producing valid arguments.

Let me reflect about my plans. Tomorrow I will take a drive to Santa 
Barbara, 30 miles from here. At 60 miles an hour on average, the 
trip will take 30 minutes. I don't need a calculator for that one, 
and I know that I know it. If you ask me how, I might say that I 
don't know how, or that it's just obvious, or, I'd have to think 
about how to put it together into a formula.  Like 30 is to 60=30 
divided by 60.

==============
To review: remember that my aim here is to find particular suggestions that
Spinoza makes to us of "things we may 'do'" in order to increase the probability
that the ineffable will realize itself within our mind as the cause of its essence.
Also, I want to know why the treatise wasn't finished.....I am getting no comments,
which is about par for the coarse.  For those loyal friends: Lilli, Bonnie, Joan and
my wife, Mrs. Rundle, I offer these posts as reminders of ideas we may seem to
have studied in a prior age!  Let's dig in and review, and with my undying gratitude
for these friends.  Where are the rest of you?  

I wanted to make this post shorter, but I couldn't figure out how to
separate p25 from the rest of the material here without loss of
continuity.
*****
[25] (1) In order that from these modes of perception the best may
be selected, it is well that we should briefly enumerate the means
necessary for attaining our end.

I. (2) To have an exact knowledge of our nature which we desire to
perfect, and to know as much as is needful of nature in general.

II. To collect in this way the differences, the agreements, and the
oppositions of things.

III. To learn thus exactly how far they can or cannot be modified.

IV. To compare this result with the nature and power of man.
(4) We shall thus discern the highest degree of perfection
to which man is capable of attaining.

[26] (1) We shall then be in a position to see which mode of
perception we ought to choose. (2) As to the first mode, it is
evident that from hearsay our knowledge must always be uncertain,
and, moreover, can give us no insight into the essence of a thing,
as is manifest in our illustration; now one can only arrive at
knowledge of a thing through knowledge of its essence, as will
hereafter appear. (3) We may, therefore clearly conclude that
the certainty arising from hearsay cannot be scientific in its
character. (4) For simple hearsay cannot affect anyone whose
understanding does not, so to speak, meet it half way.

[27] (1) The second mode of perception [i] cannot be said to
give us the idea of the proportion of which we are in search.
(2) Moreover its results are very uncertain and indefinite,
for we shall never discover anything in natural phenomena by its
means, except accidental properties, which are never clearly
understood, unless the essence of the things in question be
known first. (3) Wherefore this mode also must be rejected.

[28] (1) Of the third mode of perception we may say in a manner
that it gives us the idea of the thing sought, and that it
us to draw conclusions without risk of error; yet it is not by
itself sufficient to put us in possession of the perfection we
aim at.
=======
[for my convenience I have interjected Spinoza's description of mode
III here]

III. (19:4) Perception arising when the essence of one thing is inferred
from another thing, but not adequately; this comes when [f] from
someeffect we gather its cause, or when it is inferred from some general
proposition that some property is always present.
=======
[29] (1) The fourth mode alone apprehends the adequate essence of
a thing without danger of error. (2) This mode, therefore, must be
the one which we chiefly employ. (3) How, then, should we avail
ourselves of it so as to gain the fourth kind of knowledge with
the least delay concerning things previously unknown? (4) I will
proceed to explain.
=======
[likewise, I've recapped mode IV here for easy reference]

IV. (5) Lastly, there is the perception arising when a thing is
perceived solely through its essence, or through the knowledge
of its proximate cause.
=======
*****

In p25, Item I is to my purpose, that is, Spinoza is making a
suggestion of action. We are going to be using the favored mode of
perception in order to "have an exact knowledge of our nature." If
David is still with us, I want to mention to him that this is where
the rubber meets the road in the adventure. Very soon we will be
commencing the "great labour," not just talking about it. As far as
nature in general goes-important, but secondary here in the sentence
subordinate to getting exact knowledge of our nature. A lot of
philosophers concentrate on "nature in general." It is implied that
we are somehow going to get ideas via this selected mode of
perception that will aid us in "perfecting our nature," which is, to
an extent, synonymous with our aim. The "means" here described then,
seems to suggest that we come to intuitive ideas about our nature,
and of nature in general to an extent. There have been many able
commentators on Spinoza who, in neglecting this advice regarding
means, have, I believe, denied themselves a chance to understand his
philosophy, except "in abstracto."

Again, I haven't read as much western philosophy as I'd like to, so
far, but I don't know any other philosopher whose mission seems to be
to mentor us through a fundamental transformation that is ethical and
spiritual. Spinoza in this way seems to me more akin to Jnana Yogis,
or "the Fourth Way," than to his fellow rationalists. let alone
empiricists.

Moving on to p25 item II, we hit a rough patch. "To collect in this
way..." What way? I would have supposed via perception mode IV,
applied to our nature, and to nature in general. But Spinoza goes on
to describe "collecting the differences, agreements and the
oppositions of things." What things? Our body as compared with
external causes? There is another problem here. Spinoza is going to
tell us to chiefly employ mode IV, but by making reference to Ethics,
we discover that what he is describing here sounds like what he calls
"reason" in that other work. The terminology gets a bit messy,
because our TIE mode III equals "the second kind of knowledge" in
Ethics. Perhaps an explanation might be that, while we "chiefly"
employ mode IV (in order to intuit our axioms and definitions with
highest certainty), a process of true inference may follow, provided
of course that we employ valid forms of deduction. Spinoza's
"reason," we may find, is unusual in that, I think it depends upon
direct intuitive knowledge of its premisses, rather than what is more
usual. That is, the premisses remain "beings of reason." For
example, we may say anything we like, but are we able, as Spinoza
claims to be, to deduce truths adequately from intuitive
understanding of the attributes, etc? I'm sure there are many
philosophers who put no stock in the possibility that Spinoza may
have attained a completely different level of insight than what is
conceivable to ordinary logicians, and it is no part of my purpose
today to disabuse them of that idea. But to repeat, Item II seems to
me a bit rough in the intelligibility of its meaning, even if my
provisional interpretation should prove verifiable.

Item III seems full of potential for action. I am put in mind here
of the "Serenity Prayer."
"God, grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change,
courage to change the things I can, and wisdom to know the
difference." Technically, if a thing is intuitively understood to be
unchangable, there can be no "separation" from this fact. In a way,
"acceptance" still implies a accepter and the object accepted, i.e.,
a subject/object relationship, which would mean the idea had been, so
to say, "reasoned away." But, are the "things" under study in Item
III still both our nature and nature in general? I suppose, but the
connective tissue here is a little tenuous, leaving room for doubt.

Item IV is again even more difficult. "To compare this result with
the nature and power of man." "Man" as used here is general, not a
real, particular thing. We've reflected early on about some
universal "character more stable than our own." I can reach that, no
problem, because I am sometimes more stable, sometimes less so. But
now it seems we are to hypothesize a man whose nature is such that he
is conscious of uniting with nature as a whole,is that it? I think
if we are going to experiment with such an hypothesis, which, for us
now, is a general "being of reason," we ought to be mindful that we
apply this standard only to our own nature, because by the measure of
this abstraction, we are imperfect. Cosmically, if I read Spinoza
correctly, everyone else may be regarded as quite perfect as they
are, if in fact there is nothing really defective in nature. Spinoza
rarely employs any "ideals" per se, however, we have an exceptional
situation here, and if we are able to observe ourselves with
sufficient impartiality, perhaps we will come to understand our
nature, per item !, not as a result of duration of attention, but
through the fullness of attention itself.

"We shall thus discern the highest degree of perfection to which man
is capable of attaining."

I have to confess to a little disappointment with this remark. What
is it that compels so many philosophers to have to comment on the
limits of "man?" Even with the few books I've read, I still seem to
discover a pattern whereby they seem compelled to express and seem to
sincerely believe that their own attainments have set the high water
mark for the entire species, as it were. Because of my love of him,
I like to think Spinoza might have changed this somehow, even if he
understood it to be true, because so many state it, and, I believe,
in error.

These four items in p25 are again, vital to my aim of understanding
what Spinoza is suggesting that we do. If anyone can shed more light
on them, please do so.

TEI Footnote (h)

[h] (1)" A conclusion of this sort, though it be certain, is yet
not to be relied on without great caution; for unless we are
exceedingly careful we shall forthwith fall into error.
(2) When things are conceived thus abstractedly, and not
through their true essence, they are apt to be confused by the
imagination. (3) For that which is in itself one, men imagine
to be multiplex. (4) To those things which are conceived
abstractedly, apart, and confusedly, terms are applied which are
apt to become wrested from their strict meaning, and bestowed on
things more familiar; whence it results that these latter are
imagined in the same way as the former to which the terms were
originally given."
*****
The footnote [h]2-4 is an example of what I meant about Spinoza being
unique among Western philosophers insofar as here he implies that he
has conceived a particular thing through its "true essence." I
believe he claims to understand a "thing in itself," as Kant put it,
and which Kant believed beyond human nature to attain.

Does anyone know if Kant was aware of Spinoza's philosophy? It seems
unlikely. From what little I know, Kant is mainly responsible for
devising arguments that endeavor to establish credibility for some
aspects of "a priori" knowledge, which supposedly are part of our
nature. Something to do with "categories" of our reasoning. I
believe he came to speculate that our knowledge of the "thing in
itself" could not be perfectly objective (as Spinoza maintained) but
was precisely what Spinoza would call a mere "confused idea," that
is, a "hybrid" comprised of more than one essence; ours and the thing
we sensed and reasoned about. Philosophers, do please correct me. I
know you're out there, and know much more than I do about Kant, etc.

What does s3 refer to? Spinoza does not say, so perhaps the note
seems non-specific. Does it seem kind of "rough," insofar as it
leaves some puzzlement as to part of its subject matter (pun
intended)? We must refer to Spinoza's "philosophy" to find a fitting
candidate-E1P15 note:
*****
"Extended substance, in so far as it is substance, consists,
as they think, in parts, wherefore they deny that it can be
infinite, or consequently, that it can appertain to God. This
they illustrate with many examples, of which I will take one or
two...matter is everywhere the same...etc."
*****
In s4 we get a thread of Spinoza's philosophy of language. Again, we
have only a brief comment. However, it describes the process by
which meaning for the most important terms for ethical well-being and
for understanding a true philosophy are rendered devoid of substance
by the mind mispronouncing its desire to reduce the fundamentally
"unknown" to the "familiar," the "known." In this way, terms like
"idea" become synonymous with "image," "true ideas" end up
signifying only abstractions...and the awful tragedy is that >all the
words get taken up< with no words left to mean what the words
(supposedly) meant originally. Anyone who has really read
"Beelzebub's Tales to His Grandson" (at least three times, including
once out loud) will appreciate how necessary it becomes to coin
neologisms in an effort to bring some of the vitally important
qualities back to nonsense.

TEI Modes of Perception pp 19-24

• Message 1 of 2 , May 26, 2007

  [19] (1) Reflection shows that all modes of perception or knowledge
  may be reduced to four:-
  I. (2) Perception arising from hearsay or from some sign which
  everyone may name as he please.
  II. (3) Perception arising from mere experience - that is, from
  experience not yet classified by the intellect, and only so called
  because the given event has happened to take place, and we have no
  contradictory fact to set against it, so that it therefore remains
  unassailed in our minds.
  III. (19:4) Perception arising when the essence of one thing is inferred
  from another thing, but not adequately; this comes when [f] from
  some
  effect we gather its cause, or when it is inferred from some general
  proposition that some property is always present.
  IV. (5) Lastly, there is the perception arising when a thing is
  perceived solely through its essence, or through the knowledge
  of its proximate cause.
  
  [f] (1) In this case we do not understand anything of the cause
  from the consideration of it in the effect. (2) This is
  sufficiently evident from the fact that the cause is only
  spoken of in very general terms, such as - there exists then
  something; there exists then some power, &c.; or from the
  that we only express it in a negative manner - it is not
  or that, &c. (3) In the second case something is ascribed
  to the cause because of the effect, as we shall show in an
  example, but only a property, never an essence.
  
  *****
  In the footnote [f] Spinoza says we will get an example later, which
  is probably "when they see that by this process the number is
  produced which they knew beforehand to be the proportional, they
  infer that the process always holds good..." from p23s3
  
  I'm reposting [19] in part because I do not yet feel clear that we
  know what "from some sign which everyone may name as he please,"
  means. Does he mean cases like ancient Hawaiians believing that
  volcanic activity means that Madam Pele is angry? But we are still
  plenty superstitious generally, if this is what Spinoza means. For
  basically superstitious reasons, I abstain from the consumption of
  shark flesh...
  
  With regard to Perceptions II and III, while these will be discarded
  as useless for philosophic research, it may be of interest to refine
  our awareness a bit both of the principal of induction, and of
  knowledge inferred from general principals. Hume's "Treatise on the
  Human Understanding" and Russell's "Problems of Philosophy" go into
  these at some length, and are pretty much "intelligible to the
  multitude." Suffice to say, that at best, these kinds of knowledge
  yield probabilities within a reality which, to an extent, "exists"
  only because of our agreement to participate in affirming it. Other
  cultures may have separate realities, which could be closer to the
  truth than our version. But we can't know if they are, because we
  are conditioned to accept certain premises which may be contradictory
  to those of others. For example, most of us affirm that a human being
  is "solid," whereas another take on reality presumes a human to be
  like "a luminous egg" of which solidity is not a property.
  *****
  [20] (1) All these kinds of perception I will illustrate by examples.
  (2) By hearsay I know the day of my birth, my parentage, and other
  matters about which I have never felt any doubt. (3) By mere
  experience I know that I shall die, for this I can affirm from
  having seen that others like myself have died, though all did not
  live for the same period, or die by the same disease. (4) I know
  by mere experience that oil has the property of feeding fire, and
  water of extinguishing it. (5) In the same way I know that a dog
  is a barking animal, man a rational animal, and in fact nearly all
  the practical knowledge of life.
  *****
  It's interesting that Spinoza chooses death as an example out of all
  the possibilities. As far as water extinguishing fire, did Spinoza
  only know this fact because it happened over and over again in the
  past? Wasn't it known that fire required the presence of a certain
  level of air which is not found in water? Couldn't a "cause" be
  inferred from other examples of fire being extinguished, e.g.inside a
  sealed jar, covered with soil, and so on? I'm not seriously
  challenging p20s5, however, if memory serves, Hume's "Treatise on the
  Human Understanding" shows convincingly that there is little in the
  way of observable ratiocination to distinguish men from dogs, if one
  is to judge by their behavior, and how they typically learn through
  repetitions of associated experiences.
  *****
  [21] (1) We deduce one thing from another as follows: when we
  clearly perceive that we feel a certain body and no other, we
  thence clearly infer that the mind is united [g] to the body,
  and that their union is the cause of the given sensation; but
  we cannot thence absolutely understand [h] the nature of the
  sensation and the union. (2) Or, after I have become acquainted
  with the nature of vision, and know that it has the property of
  making one and the same thing appear smaller when far off than
  when near, I can infer that the sun is larger than it appears,
  and can draw other conclusions of the same kind.
  
  [g] (1) From this example may be clearly seen what I have just
  drawn attention to. (2) For through this union we understand
  nothing beyond the sensation, the effect, to wit, from which
  we inferred the cause of which we understand nothing.
  [h] (1) A conclusion of this sort, though it be certain, is yet
  not to be relied on without great caution; for unless we are
  exceedingly careful we shall forthwith fall into error.
  (2) When things are conceived thus abstractedly, and not
  through their true essence, they are apt to be confused by the
  imagination. (3) For that which is in itself one, men imagine
  to be multiplex. (4) To those things which are conceived
  abstractedly, apart, and confusedly, terms are applied which are
  apt to become wrested from their strict meaning, and bestowed on
  things more familiar; whence it results that these latter are
  imagined in the same way as the former to which the terms were
  originally given.
  
  *****
  p21s1 shifts gears, radically and a bit suddenly, from the fairly
  mundane, to the very subtle and intimate. We are no longer in
  relationship with the "outside world" as before, with fire, dogs,
  etc. We may have believed we were "experiencing" that world
  directly. Now, Spinoza raises a question in my mind. Do we
  ordinarily clearly perceive that "we feel a certain body and no
  other?" Is this related to Russell saying that we don't know anything
  to certainly exist, except our own sense-data? It's quite an
  experiment to see if we can do this "feeling a certain body and no
  other," (I must assume he is saying we feel our own body, nothing
  else) and also thereby clearly infer that the mind is united to the
  body, etc. In Ethics, Spinoza maintains that the mind "feels." Can
  the mind "feel" the idea of the body as a whole without reference to
  an external cause? Yoga, I think, says so. If a posture is done
  correctly, the entire body is a unified homogenous field of energy
  (prana), as is the mind which is the reflection.
  *****
  [22] (1) Lastly, a thing may be perceived solely through its essence;
  when, from the fact of knowing something, I know what it is to know
  that thing, or when, from knowing the essence of the mind, I know
  that it is united to the body. (2) By the same kind of knowledge
  we know that two and three make five, or that two lines each parallel
  to a third, are parallel to one another, &c. (3) The things which I
  have been able to know by this kind of knowledge are as yet very few.
  *****
  By "a thing," or "things," in p22s1 and s3 respectively, we suppose
  actually existent things, not "beings of reason." p22 seems to
  maintain what I think most philosophers deny. Russell, for example,
  says we are acquainted with our sense-data, not a thing in itself,
  and only probably with ourselves. In TPT Spinoza states flatly that
  few people know themselves. Spinoza endeavors to show what he means
  by giving us (abstract) examples in p22s2, which could be piled up
  indefinitely, but then he explains immediately thereafter
  (indirectly) that he's not really talking about what he was just
  giving so many examples of, because the "things" he knows by the mode
  in question are in fact very few. He could name these very few
  things, one supposes, but he does not. If he had told us, perhaps we
  might concentrate on understanding those few things too. What could
  they be?
  *****
  [23] (1) In order that the whole matter may be put in a clearer
  light, I will make use of a single illustration as follows.
  (2) Three numbers are given - it is required to find a fourth,
  which shall be to the third as the second is to the first.
  (23:3) Tradesmen will at once tell us that they know what is required
  to find the fourth number, for they have not yet forgotten the rule
  which was given to them arbitrarily without proof by their masters;
  others construct a universal axiom from their experience with simple
  numbers, where the fourth number is self-evident, as in the case of
  2, 4, 3, 6; here it is evident that if the second number be
  multiplied by the third, and the product divided by the first,
  the quotient is 6; when they see that by this process the number
  is produced which they knew beforehand to be the proportional,
  they infer that the process always holds good for finding a fourth
  number proportional.
  
  [24] (1) Mathematicians, however, know by the proof of the nineteenth
  proposition of the seventh book of Euclid, what numbers are
  proportionals, namely, from the nature and property of proportion
  it follows that the product of the first and fourth will be equal
  to the product of the second and third: still they do not see the
  adequate proportionality of the given numbers, or, if they do see it,
  they see it not by virtue of Euclid's proposition, but intuitively,
  without going through any process.
  *****
  Spinoza's proportionals are an elegant demonstration if you are of a
  certain type, I suppose, but an example might work better for me
  which could not be so readily imagined as scaled relative quantities.
  "I am exactly here at this moment." Or, "I'm here, now." Do I go
  through a process to understand these propositions? I guess
  Descartes did.
  *****
  
  "The general principles of science, such as the belief in the reign of
  law, and the belief that every event must have a cause, are as
  completely dependent upon the inductive principle as are the
  beliefs of daily life. All such general principles are believed because
  mankind have found innumerable instances of their truth and no
  instances of their falsehood. But this affords no evidence for their
  truth in the future, unless the inductive principle is assumed."
  
  -Bertrand Russell, Problems of Philosophy

A Little More on the "Provisional Rules" Set Out by BDS in TEI

E4P45 note:
"I say it is the part of a wise man to
refresh and recreate himself with moderate and pleasant food and
drink, and also with perfumes, with the soft beauty of growing
plants, with dress, with music, with many sports, with theatres,
and the like, such as every man may make use of without injury to
his neighbour. For the human body is composed of very numerous
parts, of diverse nature, which continually stand in need of
fresh and varied nourishment, so that the whole body may be
equally capable of performing all the actions, which follow from
the necessity of its own nature ; and, consequently, so that the
mind may also be equally capable of understanding many things
simultaneously. This way of life, then, agrees best with our
principles, and also with general practice ; therefore, if there
be any question of another plan, the plan we have mentioned is
the best, and in every way to be commended. There is no need for
me to set forth the matter more clearly or in more detail."
*****
Also, this little blurb from a website:

"The Buddha referred to his teachings as 'the Middle Way', avoiding
the extremes of sensual indulgence and self-mortification. His own
life, prior to attaining enlightenment, witnessed both extremes - the
luxury of his life in his father's palace in his youth in contrast to
the severe ascetic practices he engaged in during his six-year search
for enlightenment. Neither brought a release from suffering."
*****
[18] (1) Having laid down these preliminary rules, I will betake
myself to the first and most important task, namely, the amendment
of the understanding, and the rendering it capable of understanding
things in the manner necessary for attaining our end. (2) In order
to bring this about, the natural order demands that I should here
recapitulate all the modes of perception, which I have hitherto
employed for affirming or denying anything with certainty, so that
I may choose the best, and at the same time begin to know my own
powers and the nature which I wish to perfect.
*****
I think that the words "with certainty" in p18s2 above are confusing
at best, since Spinoza goes on to explain how uncertain some of the
modes he is going to recap really are. I think he would have edited
this sentence to make it more clear prior to publication, and I would
thus call the sentence at least "unpolished" as it stands.
*****

19 Of the four modes of perception

[19] (1) Reflection shows that all modes of perception or knowledge
may be reduced to four:-
I. (2) Perception arising from hearsay or from some sign which
everyone may name as he please.
II. (3) Perception arising from mere experience - that is, from
experience not yet classified by the intellect, and only so called
because the given event has happened to take place, and we have no
contradictory fact to set against it, so that it therefore remains
unassailed in our minds.
III. (19:4) Perception arising when the essence of one thing is inferred
from another thing, but not adequately; this comes when [f] from
some
effect we gather its cause, or when it is inferred from some general
proposition that some property is always present.
IV. (5) Lastly, there is the perception arising when a thing is
perceived solely through its essence, or through the knowledge
of its proximate cause.
*****
These should be broken down so that each phrase is very clear. What
is an example of "from some sign which everyone may name as he
please?" These modes may very quickly transition one into another.
For example, I am disturbed to see a splotchy color coat after my
stucco guy has finished one of my jobs. For an instant, there was a
raw perception...then it was very generally classified, as a poor
stucco job. accompanied by fear. But then, more specifically, I
recall cases where splotches had been caused by inadequate
mixing...but was that with stucco, or paint? Maybe paint, hmmm...It
turns out, there has been an error of perception. Small puddles of
water on the ground were casting direct reflections of sunlight on
the wall, the color was fine.

These things go on in us constantly, in the proverbial blink of an
"i." Come to think of it, the question of how much light is
reflected, and how much reaches say, the bottom of the puddle, is an
extremely involved calculation, involving quantum electro dynamics,
etc. Why does it happen that way? What is really going on with light
and color.....perception??? Who is perceiving what? Why was there
fear, and what is at its root? The brain begins to light up as
understanding becomes more and more discernible...individual/
relationship with world...and there is Love.

Spinoza is going to illustrate his modes with his famous
"proportionals," but we get ahead of ourselves. I want to see
continually how each of these kinds of knowledge work within the
contents of my own consciousness, so I observe for examples, moment
to moment.

I wonder though, since Spinoza states that "the natural order demands
that I should here recapitulate all the modes of perception," why do
they appear to be in reverse order, with respect to what he calls
"the natural order" later on? We'd have to jump ahead and consider
what Spinoza says about the proper order of investigation and all of
that in order to fully illuminate the question, so I'm going to leave
it an open question for now. If he had called that which is here
styled "the fourth kind" of knowledge "the first kind" instead, this
would have saved a bit of confusion when he included a variation of
this scheme into Ethics. Let's recall that what we are shown here as
the "fourth kind" of knowledge is always "the third kind of
knowledge" in Ethics. I tend to think that the scheme in Ethics is
the one Spinoza considered more polished, which was condensed
(generally, hearsay and experience were lumped under a single head as
the "first kind of knowledge") and it would be worthwhile to compare
these schemes in detail. Perhaps Spinoza was endeavoring to speak
more intelligibly to us by arranging the order thus, in spite of it
being technically reversed. However, the fact that he reworked the
scheme for Ethics might speak to our present scheme's "lack of
polish," although I have tended to prefer this scheme personally.
See E2P40 note for these same rudiments of his epistemology in
Ethics. That note, BTW, also includes:
*****
" Again we should discern whence the notions called
secondary derived their origin, and consequently the axioms on
which they are founded, and other points of interest connected
with these questions. But I have decided to pass over the
subject here, partly because I have set it aside for another
treatise..."
*****
What treatise? Is this some content for TEI that Spinoza was
proposing? I don't understand what he is talking about here. What
are the "notions call secondary," "axioms" etc? If he did include
this stuff in TEI, I am not aware of it. If he did not, but intended
to, this would speak to the incompleteness factor. If I cannot get
some answer from the list re these questions, I hope I may find them
in a history of philosophy, however, any help would be appreciated.

DR

Why Didn't Spinoza Finish Such a Powerful Treatise?

Oops, I overlooked a post that should have preceded the post before

last concerning "Certain Rules of Life." It doesn't matter; my primary

purpose here today is to invite more participation by individuals who

have a love of philosophy and who would be willing to share their know-

lege of Spinoza with us either in comments or on our weekly phone meeting.

Please send me an email if you would like to join our inquiry. 

==========

"Another item that I overlooked is the table of contents. I've been
using the Dover edition for a long time, and the contents page is
separated from the text of TEI by all the propositions of Ethics. In
our study, we are about to embark upon #17, "Certain Rules of Life,"
--perfectly germain to one of my chief interests in this reading.
That is, responding to the question, "What would Spinoza have us
ordinary readers do that is perhaps within our power now?" That is

a most vital question, but one which has many pitfalls which in sum

are perhaps symbolized by Baron Munchausen who, if memory serves,

managed to pull himself out of the dreck by grabbing his own hair.

A Bulgarian composer I once studied with called it, "trying to jump

higher than your belly button."

At this point, I feel compelled to explain the obvious. I am not
educated in philosophy generally, although I had an excellent teacher
insofar as the practical aspects of following Spinoza are concerned.
Even then, however, I was not among the most advanced students. I
expect that anyone with a reasonable degree of education in the field
of philosophy may have many ideas come to mind which would be worthy
of note with regard to TEI, ideas which are beyond my very limited
knowledge. I am interested in learning, so please do offer your
remarks if you are out there following along. I doubt anyone is going to

be put off by my bias that  intellectual knowledge of Spinoza is likely to

be very incomplete  knowledge without being accompanied by the endeavor 

to live the teachings. But the converse is also true, I believe. Critical
thinking about the philosophy is clearly useful, and this must
include not only the eternal aspects, but also the historical and
philosophical context within which they were expressed, and what
Spinoza means to philosophers now.

After doing a little research, I've encountered an opinion by an
historian of philosophy, to the effect that Spinoza chose not to
finish TEI for reasons pertaining to the science of logic. For me, a
better understanding of the substance and history of logic would be a
prerequisite to attempting to paraphrase the idea. I want to come
to my own ideas about why the treatise is incomplete, but will
gladly accept help in acquiring evidence useful in developing them.
Because of Spinoza's mention of Logic in Part 5 of Ethics, I have
tried to make progress in learning about its evolution, and to come
to terms with what Spinoza understood as the difference between
classical Logic and what he called "true logic." However, I must say
that my efforts have been rather paltry thus far, as such studies do
not come easily for me even when I put in the time.

From what I am learning, it turns out (not surprisingly) that for
some, Spinoza's TEI is an important document in the whole history of
logic. If anyone can explain more about this, I hope they will,
especially since it may shed light on why TEI is unfinished.

Cheers,

DR"
*****
TABLE OF CONTENTS:

1 On the Improvement of the Understanding
3 Of the ordinary objects of men's desires
12 Of the true and final good
17 Certain rules of life
19 Of the four modes of perception
25 Of the best mode of perception
33 Of the instruments of the intellect, or true ideas
43 Answers to objections


First part of method:

50 Distinction of true ideas from fictitious ideas
64 And from false ideas
77 Of doubt
81 Of memory and forgetfulness
86 Mental hindrances from words - and from the popular confusion
of ready imagination with distinct understanding.


Second part of method:

91 Its object, the acquisition of clear and distinct ideas
94 Its means, good definitions
Conditions of definition
107 How to define understanding

Stuart's Remarks About the Previous Post Re: "Provisional rules of life..."

What follows are remarks by Stuart treating of the question of the "provisional" nature of the rules of life Spinoza is setting forth.  Why doesn't Spinoza just say, "Here are a few rules I suggest you follow to progress toward our aim...?"

On the "provisionality" of the rules: 

Spinoza has already shown the limitations of the endeavor to obtain, for their own sake, fame, sensual pleasures and wealth and power. The first rule speaks to the acquisition of fame which has the defect of imprisoning one in the passivity of conforming oneself to the opinions of others. But men, even men of unequal clarity, are ultimately dependent on each other. By adopting this rule, the need for acceptance, respect and utility of and by others is furthered while not having to indulge in submissive "thinking" or "actions." Second rule, states the basic minimum principle that follows from his earlier critique of the life denying consequences of overindulgence in pleasures. Similarly for the third rule. In other words, if the dear reader has gotten that far in TEI, then if he has understood what has gone before, he sees these three rules as necessary beginning points. For though one must begin by completely giving up the love of those three qualities as things in themselves, nevertheless a certain cultivation of these same qualities is necessary for one's sustenance and even for one's thriving. Even though the practicality for his project of adopting these rules seems obvious to him, he allows that at the level of mental discipline they also function as practical hypotheses that will be borne out as correct by further personal development. Also, since at this stage of one's development -one is just beginning on the project suggested by the critique of the previous 16 paragraphs - it is unknown whether the sought for selfsustaining Good is actually obtainable beyond being a matter of Platonic principle, one must practice certain dynamics -moderation in the pursuit of pleasure and power and adaptability in the pursuit of good communication that results from mutual respect - one must act "as if" or one may never be able to determine whether the "as if" can be transformed into an "it is." So there is a kind of tension here. On the one hand, the rules are simply distillations from the earlier critique and are certainly correct to that extent. But whether following them as a disciplinary first step will ultimately lead to the place where they are followed by the force of reason is precisely what one must still learn. To that extent there is still uncertainty. That, of course, is almost the entire purpose of the Ethics. To pass from the external necessities of being in bondage to rule governed behavior to the internal necessity of the freedom of behavior based on one's understanding. To that extent there is still uncertainty at this point in the development of the argument in TEI.
=============

Thank you, Stuart.  I wish I could get you to join our conversations on Thursday nights, but I realize you are not on the telecommunication grid at this time.  Do you remember writing this? 

"Certain Rules of Life as Provisionally Good"

• Spinoza had said:
  *****
  [15] (1) We must seek the assistance of Moral Philosophy [d] and
  the Theory of Education; further, as health is no insignificant means
  for attaining our end, we must also include the whole science of
  Medicine...
  *****
  Now he is going to elaborate a bit, that is, he will engage in some
  moral philosophizing. N.B. below he lays down these rules as
  "provisionally good..."
  
  *****
  17 Certain rules of life...
  
  [17] (1) Yet, as it is necessary that while we are endeavoring to
  attain our purpose, and bring the understanding into the right path
  we should carry on our life, we are compelled first of all to lay
  down certain rules of life as provisionally good, to wit the
  following:-
  I. (2) To speak in a manner intelligible to the multitude, and to
  comply with every general custom that does not hinder the
  attainment of our purpose. (3) For we can gain from the multitude
  no small advantages, provided that we strive to accommodate
  ourselves to its understanding as far as possible: moreover,
  we shall in this way gain a friendly audience for the reception
  of the truth.
  II. (17:4) To indulge ourselves with pleasures only in so far as they
  are necessary for preserving health.
  III. (5) Lastly, to endeavor to obtain only sufficient money or other
  commodities to enable us to preserve our life and health, and to
  follow such general customs as are consistent with our purpose.
  *****
  I wonder why Spinoza uses that word, "provisionally?" To me, it
  suggests that the goodness of the rules cannot be completely
  understood until some later development of one's ethical objectivity
  with regard to one's own nature and the nature of our relationship
  with our fellows.
  
  The first rule is complex and seems to cohere because, while it
  consists really in two distinct rules and explanations of their
  advantages, it is all concerned with my relationship to my fellows in
  the social order.
  
  I have wondered a good deal about the significance of "speak in a
  manner intelligible to the multitude." On the one hand, the efficacy
  of this rule seems so self-evident that it seems unworthy of
  mention. The explanation implicit in that would be that Spinoza is
  merely telling us to "comply with general custom" with regard to
  speaking, when carrying out our lives. I might confide to my wife
  during one of our daily walks on the beach, "Donovan feels...now,
  that... emptiness...that...Oceanic..." She will receive an
  impression from these words that she will describe as coherent to
  her. But we share what I'll call a "semi-private language."
  Obviously, there is no one among "the multitude" to whom I would
  utter such a remark, because it would be unintelligible and produce
  unwanted effects. If one of my surfing buddies complains "that
  freaking kook fully burned me," to which, if I respond with a mention
  of Spinoza's definition of hatred etc., which might be on my mind, he
  is going to find this unintelligible. Instead, perhaps the
  appropriate response in this hypothetical "language game" might be
  "yeah, this place is a pig-pile today." Ludwig Wittgenstein is a good

  philosopher of language, and his writings are full of cogent observations

  about the use of language.  I am tempted to try and explain how this

  deconstruction of language was vital to the pursuit of building smart

  cars, bombs, etc., but I leave it for another time or someone else to

  investigate.
  
  Another interpretation about why this first rule is important to our
  aims might be explained by "moreover, we shall in this way gain a
  friendly audience for the reception of the truth." Spinoza makes no
  bones about the fact that he knows he understands the true
  philosophy. It is a blessing, and he wants us to understand as he
  does. But we don't know these truths yet at this stage, so I must
  assume that he is saying we ought to go ahead and cultivate this
  correct way of speaking, in case we should learn what our master is
  endeavoring to impart and in turn have occasion to find an audience
  for it ourselves.
  
  But, is the rule "speak in a manner intelligible to the multitude"
  fully operative within Spinoza's own writings, or his discussions
  with his circle of friends and students? Or are we engaged in a
  "semi-private language" here, communing with Spinoza via language
  that is pretty much unintelligible to the multitude? What degree of
  understanding does "intelligible" signify?  "Intelligibility" may come

  after an arduous desire to learn meets a philosophy that emanates

  a sense of wisdom as it touches our intuition.
  
  Spinoza says in TPT that "such as persuade themselves, that the
  multitude or men distracted by politics can ever be induced to live
  according to the bare dictate of reason, must be dreaming of the
  poetic golden age, or of a stage-play." So how does this proposition
  of his fit in with the rule we are examining? Did Spinoza write the
  rule in an idealistic youth, which was tempered by experience by the
  time he wrote TPT? Does this issue of "intelligibility" play a role
  in the apparent fact that TEI languished in Spinoza's desk for years,
  never published? BTW, is there any evidence it was even circulated
  among his friends?
  
  As an aside, the matter of "degree" of "intellibility", with respect
  to "first philosophy, etc. (epistemology)" is extensively addressed in Yoga
  philosophy and in that of Gurdjieff, but seems absent in Western
  philosophy, by and large. Spinoza is talking about this "relativity
  of being" when he tells his readers that the true good became "more
  and more discernible" to him. Yogis who have penetrated within to
  the innermost "sheaths" discuss things intelligibly amongst
  themselves with a greater degree of objectivity than what can be
  obtained in discussion among professers of "hard sciences," and which
  would be complete nonsense to a logical positivist (if there are any
  left), or even to Descartes. Descartes at least recognized in his
  way that these inner sheaths "existed," and he endeavored to
  penetrate, which he did to a very limited extent.
  
  Well...it's a deep subject...Examination of this first rule could be
  drawn out at length. Did Spinoza, the bible scholar nonpareil, have
  some internal reference to the Biblical accounts of the apostles
  speaking to "multitudes" in their own languages (Gift of Tongues)?
  LOL, Orthodox Jews have something in common with logical positivists,
  and this has a lot to do with why some of the Orthodox still regard
  Spinoza as a heretic. He isn't "allowed/supposed" to know and talk
  about the "heavenly" things he understands and put into words. That
  is over-reaching for a human, according to their moral philosophy,
  which has some roots in this interesting story...
  *****
  Gen. 11:1 And the whole earth was of one language, and of one speech.
  Gen. 11:2 And it came to pass, as they journeyed from the east, that
  they found a plain in the land of Shinar; and they dwelt there.
  Gen. 11:3 And they said one to another, Go to, let us make brick, and
  burn them throughly. And they had brick for stone, and slime had they
  for morter.
  Gen. 11:4 And they said, Go to, let us build us a city and a tower,
  whose top may reach unto heaven; and let us make us a name, lest we
  be scattered abroad upon the face of the whole earth.
  Gen. 11:5 And the LORD came down to see the city and the tower, which
  the children of men builded.
  Gen. 11:6 And the LORD said, Behold, the people is one, and they have
  all one language; and this they begin to do: and now nothing will be
  restrained from them, which they have imagined to do.
  Gen. 11:7 Go to, let us go down, and there confound their language,
  that they may not understand one another’s speech.
  Gen. 11:8 So the LORD scattered them abroad from thence upon the face
  of all the earth: and they left off to build the city.
  Gen. 11:9 Therefore is the name of it called Babel; because the LORD
  did there confound the language of all the earth: and from thence did
  the LORD scatter them abroad upon the face of all the earth.
  *****
  Yoga-Sutra 3.17 The name associated with an object, the object itself
  implied by that name, and the conceptual existence of the object, all
  three usually interpenetrate or commingle with one another. By
  samyama on the distinction between these three, the meaning of the
  sounds made by all beings becomes available.
  *****
  "I begin, then, with the first point, and warn my readers to
  make an accurate distinction between an idea, or conception of
  the mind, and the images of things which we imagine. It is
  further necessary that they should distinguish between idea and
  words, whereby we signify things. These three-namely, images,
  words, and ideas-are by many persons either entirely confused
  together, or not distinguished with sufficient accuracy or care..."
  
  -Spinoza Ethics

"This, then, is the end for which I strive..."

After our hopefully interesting side trip to behold a cameo appearance here by one of my most beloved souls and purveyors of the real truth, J. Krishnamurti, we return to the text of TEI.  I've gotten behind in my blog posts, relative to our "creative conversations" phone conference, so I am playing catch up.  Our meeting takes place on Thursday evenings, 5:30 PM PDT.  Please join us, won't you?  Okay, back to TEI...

==========

[14] (1) This, then, is the end for which I strive, to attain to

such a character myself, and to endeavor that many should attain to

it with me. (2) In other words, it is part of my happiness to lend

a helping hand, that many others may understand even as I do, so

that their understanding and desire may entirely agree with my own.

(3) In order to bring this about, it is necessary to understand as much of nature as will enable us to attain to the aforesaid character,

and also to form a social order such as is most conducive to the

attainment of this character by the greatest number with the least

difficulty and danger.

==========

The first two sentences above can't be argued with to the extent that

Spinoza is offering a recap and development of his personal aims.

These aims are being fulfilled still, since some among us have more than

a sense that Spinoza's ideas are vitally important, and we wish to

understand just as he does.  Clearly, this is different from merely

being able to assimilate his philosophy logically/ intellectually.

It includes study of our own nature, and the nature of our relationship

with Cosmic Consciousness and with each other. Observation

through what Krishnamurti called "choiceless awareness," as

distinguished from analysis, is the most vital activity in living what

Spinoza is trying to impart.  I'm most thankful for having a small

but persevering group of friends (including my wife, Jeneth) who are

meeting by phone to see what we can do to understand as Spinoza does.

Already, some of us are noticing distinct changes in our experience of life

as our minds become sensitized to the qualities of the ideas which comprise

the content of our consciousness.

With regard to the first two sentences (expressing sentiments not 

generally found in Western philosophy): in order to discern the value

of Spinoza as distinguished from your run-of-the-mill televangelist

or perhaps very skilled and charismatic purveyor/orator of this or

that "road to salvation," (perhaps on "educational" TV, LOL...) we

must discriminate accurately between the properties of the truly

pious and those of  the merely ambitious. Real piety is a rarity in the

sense that Spinoza uses the word.  It is operative as the expression of

desires which Spinoza is here expressing.  Piety cannot be expressed by

someone without true knowledge.  And, when someone is blessed with such

knowledge, it comes with a high-minded compassion that renders it necessary

that those so blessed will reach out a hand to help pull us up.  It strikes me that this reaching out was painted by the remarkable Michelangelo on the ceiling of

the Sistine Chapel.  Jesus said, "My cup runneth over..."  Fortunate are those

who can strip away all the superstition and theology in order to pay attention

solely to the sayings attributed to Jesus.  The ideas contained in these sayings may be judged on their merits by the discriminative intelligence, which can become highly developed in people with a strong sense of their own essence, and once developed, can  recognize the essence of what all the great spiritual masters have placed into "vessels" of one sort or another to be transmitted to the spiritually thirsty down through the ages. In the Bhagavad Gita it is said that Yoga has existed since the origination of the universe.  In Silence, let us ponder the meaning of this...

With ambition, we have daily experience.  "People pleasing" is part of it. What Spinoza means by "ambition" needs to be studied and understood, then compared with the content of our consciousness as we continue in life.  Everyone likes to feel that they are the cause of someone else's  happiness (or misery in the case of an enemy).  It is explained in Spinoza's Ethics that ambition and piety are both outcomes of the same appetite.  However,in the case of true piety, the high-minded person has true ideas which are shared for the well-being of the other.  Ambition, on the other hand, involves inadequate ideas, which the purveyor feels empowered by when others seem to affirm them, producing an egoistic illusion of leadership and superiority.I think it is especially important  to understand the definition of ambition (E3P30, and others in that part of the Ethics, inc. P37) because it is such a pervasive influence in our moment to moment imaginings with regard to other people. I don't think it is easy to observe this comprehensively in our thoughts/images/ feelings, because the mind has a desire to keep this power, not realizing that the machinations of ambition are stifling to the perception of the Real.

When Spinoza says "it is part of my happiness to lend a helping

hand," we may feel that we can relate; it sounds so perfectly natural

as a statement. But that isn't true, unless someone out there may be

truly pious. Instead, I maintain that we have perhaps only the

faintest glimmer of where he is coming from, and perhaps project our

own inadequate experience of "compassion" by way of trying to explain

Spinoza's motives.   This is the kind of compassion that

compels one who is overcome by it to attempt to rescue a drowning

person, even though the individual is not a strong swimmer themselves

and has no training. Often as not, they become the second fatality -

but our tendency to regard this as more heroic than foolish is what

I'm talking about as "compassion." (Little to do with the Buddhist

meaning of the term, BTW.)  Forgive me if to an extent I use hyperbole

rhetorically in an endeavor to illustrate a point, however, I do not

think I exaggerate. Please see Spinoza's def. of "compassion" in the

Ethics.

As an aside, I want to explain how practical it is to study Spinoza.

For example, if one realizes that we are all ambitious, it is

possible to go far from home and make friends easily, and learn a

great deal into the bargain. If we recognize that an individual

really wants to hear what we have to say, we tend to enjoy sharing

with them things they seem to likewise enjoy hearing about. Hence,

ask a stranger a few sincere questions, then do a great deal of

listening, and friendly people will regard you as a nice new friend

even though you may have said but little through which they might

have become acquainted with you.

==========

[15] (1) We must seek the assistance of Moral Philosophy [d] and

the Theory of Education; further, as health is no insignificant means

for attaining our end, we must also include the whole science of

Medicine, and, as many difficult things are by contrivance rendered

easy, and we can in this way gain much time and convenience, the

science of Mechanics must in no way be despised.

[16] (1) But before all things, a means must be devised for

improving the understanding and purifying it, as far as may be at

the outset, so that it may apprehend things without error, and in

the best possible way. (2) Thus it is apparent to everyone that I

wish to direct all science to one end [e] and aim, so that we may

attain to the supreme human perfection which we have named; and,

therefore, whatsoever in the sciences does not serve to promote

our object will have to be rejected as useless. (3) To sum up the

matter in a word, all our actions and thoughts must be directed to

this one end.

==========

I made comments about p15 and 16 at the outset, especially because

Spinoza says, "we must...etc." I forgot to include the footnotes.

==========

[d] N.B. I do no more here than enumerate the sciences necessary

for our purpose; I lay no stress on their order.

Spinoza and Krishnamurti's "Amma"

About ten years ago, and for several years, Jeneth and I spent every Thursday night in "Dialogue" with Mary Zimbalist and a number of other close associatesof J. Krishnamurti (whom the Dalai Llama called "the greatest philosopherof our age...)  There is much I understood and recognized in the K. teaching, and I went about investigating whether there might be some influence of Spinozaism on the seminal period of K.'s life when he was groomed by the leaders of Theosophy, particularly Annie Besant, for his mission as a new "World Teacher."  I went to research at the   library on the grounds of Krotona in Ojai (a property ownedand lived on by current day Theosophists) where I did certainly discover that Annie Besant, K.'s guardian whom he called "amma" orMother, was a discriminating and devoted Spinozist. 

She wrote:

"Then Pantheism unveiled its all-alluring beauties, and the inter-
cosmic God shone forth dispelling all the clouds of doubt and fear,
and turning into gardens of delight the erstwhile desert sands. Had
it come in its native garb, it would have won all to itself, but to
intellectual Europe the most generally recognised exponent of this
theory was Spinoza, and while his strong thought fascinated and
compelled the intelligence, presented - as it often was by opponents
- without the ethic based on it, it left the spirit starving and the
heart a-cold. The idea got abroad that “Pantheism” was a chill and
stern philosophy, that its God was unconscious, inaccessible - the
“Father” had disappeared. “God is a being absolutely infinite; a
substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses
His eternal and infinite essence” (Ethics, Book 1, Definition 6.). Of
these attributes man knows but two, extension and mind or will. Mr.
Froude in his Short Studies - from which the quotation from Spinoza
is borrowed - says, summarising Spinoza’s views, that God “is not a
personal [Page 226] being, existing apart from the universe; but
Himself in His own reality, He is expressed in the universe, which is
His living garment” (Page 360). All things exist as He willed them to
be, evil is not positive, there is “an infinite gradation in created
things”, “all in their way obedient”. Two things in Spinoza have
repelled the emotional - his steady logical destructive analysis and
calm acceptance of its results, and his theory of necessitarianism.
The latter has been held fatal to morals, the former to devotion. Yet
Spinoza was so far from being incapable of strenuous devotion that he
was described by his enemies as “a God-intoxicated man”, and his
lofty, serene virtue and calm acquiescence in the law of life as he
saw it were in themselves evidences of the fine fibre of his soul."
-Annie Besant

When K. disbanded the Order of the Star in 1929, he told a story:

"You may remember the story of how the devil and a friend of his were
walking down the street, when they saw ahead of them a man stoop down
and pick up something from the ground, look at it, and put it away in
his pocket. The friend said to the devil, "What did that man pick
up?" "He picked up a piece of the truth," said the devil. "That is a
very bad business for you, then," said his friend. "Oh, not at all,"
the devil replied, "I am going to help him organize it."
When K. disbanded the Order of the Star in 1929, he told a story:
You may remember the story of how the devil and a friend of his were
walking down the street, when they saw ahead of them a man stoop down
and pick up something from the ground, look at it, and put it away in
his pocket. The friend said to the devil, 'What did that man pick
up?' 'He picked up a piece of the truth,' said the devil. 'That is a
very bad business for you, then,' said his friend. 'Oh, not at all,'
the devil replied, 'I am going to help him organize it.'
You may remember the story of how the devil and a friend of his were
walking down the street, when they saw ahead of them a man stoop down
and pick up something from the ground, look at it, and put it away in
his pocket. The friend said to the devil, 'What did that man pick
up?' "He picked up a piece of the truth,' said the devil. 'That is a
very bad business for you, then,' said his friend. 'Oh, not at all,'
the devil replied, 'I am going to help him organize it.'"

Love Towards a Thing Eternal....pp.10-13

The work here on the blog has fallen behind as our dialog group has proceeded to meet weekly.  Live dialog is best, however, our conversations on conference call are serviceable  for our ends.  Further:

==========

[10] (1) But love towards a thing eternal and infinite feeds the
mind wholly with joy, and is itself unmingled with any sadness,
wherefore it is greatly to be desired and sought for with all our
strength. (2) Yet it was not at random that I used the words,
"If I could go to the root of the matter," for, though what I have
urged was perfectly clear to my mind, I could not forthwith lay
aside all love of riches, sensual enjoyment, and fame.
==========
The first sentence above seems to implore the reader to undertake
Spinoza's inquiry along with him as he says "with all our strength."  
It's a hard road for most of us, but the only reasonable way once insight
is gained into metaphysical entities.

If the "eternal thing" is unknown, what is to be the object (are we
not accustomed to imagine some end for which we strive?), sought with
all our strength? Whether we are communists, atheists or Buddhists,
whether we subscribe to this or that sect, belief system, etc., don't
we in some way create, or deal with the "God issue," according to our
understanding or ignorance just as it is? Or perhaps we are too busy
to bother with it at all, or we suffer negative emotions so
habitually that our minds are full of sorrows and swirling confusion
never leaving 10 minutes of quietude for pondering in silence.

Just in thinking about "a thing eternal" right now, is there an
image? So do we end up seeking, rejecting or otherwise opining
about, or forgetting, not-thinking about, a projection of something
that is put together out of our conditioning, rather than "a new
principle?" Or perhaps we have had "mystical experiences," and
endeavor to recapture them. But Spinoza tells us that understanding
true ideas has nothing to do with memory. Memory is associative, whereas
the mystic energy and light is unique unto itself.  It can be
"seen" by the impersonal essence of a human being, but not exactly 
"remembered."  

Is it possible to "do" anything about our minds? Because who would be the agent, 
if not ourselves?  Spinoza, in "the Ethics" explains why a conditioned thing cannot
un-condition itself.  In one respect, this seems true, so what is it that has

the power to simplify the mind?  Krishnamurti's utterance upon experiencing

a profound inner transformation was, "I have been made simple."

What does that mean?  "Made simple" by what?  And what was "made simple?"

==========
[11] (1) One thing was evident, namely, that while my mind was
employed with these thoughts it turned away from its former objects
of desire, and seriously considered the search for a new principle;
this state of things was a great comfort to me, for I perceived
that the evils were not such as to resist all remedies. (11:2) Although
these intervals were at first rare, and of very short duration, yet
afterwards, as the true good became more and more discernible to me,
they became more frequent and more lasting; especially after I had
recognized that the acquisition of wealth, sensual pleasure, or fame,
is only a hindrance, so long as they are sought as ends not as means;
if they be sought as means, they will be under restraint, and, far
from being hindrances, will further not a little the end for which
they are sought, as I will show in due time.
==========
I feel that Spinoza would like to be encouraging to his reader in the
above paragraph. If the true, or "real good," affects the mind
singly, to the exclusion of all else, and if a true idea is clear and
simple, it seems a difficulty that it would be relative, that is,
"more and more discernible to me." If it was unknown to begin with,
how would one then know that is was "more and more discernible to
me?" If it were innate...Strictly speaking, we must inquire whether an
idea of the most perfect being, known only through itself and not by any
lesser being, is somehow emergent within us.  We become like divers into
the cold waters where icebergs dwell.  We dive to a depth from which we
may never return, driven by an innate desire to find what is at the very bottom
of all things.

Someone in our discussions inquired about the meaning of a "real good," 

which is distinct in meaning from a "true good."
In p12 below, Spinoza discusses briefly what he means by a "true
good." This notion of a "true good" is, I think, a principle theme
of Ethics.
==========

[12] (1) I will here only briefly state what I mean by true good,
and also what is the nature of the highest good. (2) In order that
this may be rightly understood, we must bear in mind that the terms
good and evil are only applied relatively, so that the same thing
may be called both good and bad according to the relations in view,
in the same way as it may be called perfect or imperfect.
(3) Nothing regarded in its own nature can be called perfect or
imperfect; especially when we are aware that all things which come
to pass, come to pass according to the eternal order and fixed
laws of nature.
[13] (1) However, human weakness cannot attain to this order in its
own thoughts, but meanwhile man conceives a human character much more
stable than his own, and sees that there is no reason why he should
not himself acquire such a character. (2) Thus he is led to seek
for means which will bring him to this pitch of perfection, and
calls everything which will serve as such means a true good.
(13:3) The chief good is that he should arrive, together with other
individuals if possible, at the possession of the aforesaid
character. (4) What that character is we shall show in due time,
namely, that it is the knowledge of the union existing being
the mind and the whole of nature. [c]

footnote[c] These matters are explained more at length elsewhere.
==========
The footnote obviously doesn't say where the further explanation is,
or precisely which "matters" Spinoza means. Sometimes he says this
or that will be explained in "his philosophy," but not here. Perhaps
if Spinoza had finished the treatise, he might have pointed the
reader to specific passages, either in TEI or in "his philosophy."
As it is, this footnote seems vague, and perhaps superfluous. There
are plenty of instances in which more is revealed later, or in other
writings, which do not receive a footnote, so why here especially, I
wonder?