Benedict de Spinoza

Friday, June 21, 2013

Love Towards a Thing Eternal....pp.10-13


The work here on the blog has fallen behind as our dialog group has proceeded to meet weekly.  Live dialog is best, however, our conversations on conference call are serviceable  for our ends.  Further:

==========

[10] (1) But love towards a thing eternal and infinite feeds the
mind wholly with joy, and is itself unmingled with any sadness,
wherefore it is greatly to be desired and sought for with all our
strength. (2) Yet it was not at random that I used the words,
"If I could go to the root of the matter," for, though what I have
urged was perfectly clear to my mind, I could not forthwith lay
aside all love of riches, sensual enjoyment, and fame.
==========
The first sentence above seems to implore the reader to undertake
Spinoza's inquiry along with him as he says "with all our strength."  
It's a hard road for most of us, but the only reasonable way once insight
is gained into metaphysical entities.

If the "eternal thing" is unknown, what is to be the object (are we
not accustomed to imagine some end for which we strive?), sought with
all our strength? Whether we are communists, atheists or Buddhists,
whether we subscribe to this or that sect, belief system, etc., don't
we in some way create, or deal with the "God issue," according to our
understanding or ignorance just as it is? Or perhaps we are too busy
to bother with it at all, or we suffer negative emotions so
habitually that our minds are full of sorrows and swirling confusion
never leaving 10 minutes of quietude for pondering in silence.

Just in thinking about "a thing eternal" right now, is there an
image? So do we end up seeking, rejecting or otherwise opining
about, or forgetting, not-thinking about, a projection of something
that is put together out of our conditioning, rather than "a new
principle?" Or perhaps we have had "mystical experiences," and
endeavor to recapture them. But Spinoza tells us that understanding
true ideas has nothing to do with memory. Memory is associative, whereas
the mystic energy and light is unique unto itself.  It can be
"seen" by the impersonal essence of a human being, but not exactly 
"remembered."  

Is it possible to "do" anything about our minds? Because who would be the agent, 
if not ourselves?  Spinoza, in "the Ethics" explains why a conditioned thing cannot
un-condition itself.  In one respect, this seems true, so what is it that has
the power to simplify the mind?  Krishnamurti's utterance upon experiencing
a profound inner transformation was, "I have been made simple."
What does that mean?  "Made simple" by what?  And what was "made simple?"
==========
[11] (1) One thing was evident, namely, that while my mind was
employed with these thoughts it turned away from its former objects
of desire, and seriously considered the search for a new principle;
this state of things was a great comfort to me, for I perceived
that the evils were not such as to resist all remedies. (11:2) Although
these intervals were at first rare, and of very short duration, yet
afterwards, as the true good became more and more discernible to me,
they became more frequent and more lasting; especially after I had
recognized that the acquisition of wealth, sensual pleasure, or fame,
is only a hindrance, so long as they are sought as ends not as means;
if they be sought as means, they will be under restraint, and, far
from being hindrances, will further not a little the end for which
they are sought, as I will show in due time.
==========
I feel that Spinoza would like to be encouraging to his reader in the
above paragraph. If the true, or "real good," affects the mind
singly, to the exclusion of all else, and if a true idea is clear and
simple, it seems a difficulty that it would be relative, that is,
"more and more discernible to me." If it was unknown to begin with,
how would one then know that is was "more and more discernible to
me?" If it were innate...Strictly speaking, we must inquire whether an
idea of the most perfect being, known only through itself and not by any
lesser being, is somehow emergent within us.  We become like divers into
the cold waters where icebergs dwell.  We dive to a depth from which we
may never return, driven by an innate desire to find what is at the very bottom
of all things.

Someone in our discussions inquired about the meaning of a "real good," 
which is distinct in meaning from a "true good."
In p12 below, Spinoza discusses briefly what he means by a "true
good." This notion of a "true good" is, I think, a principle theme
of Ethics.
==========

[12] (1) I will here only briefly state what I mean by true good,
and also what is the nature of the highest good. (2) In order that
this may be rightly understood, we must bear in mind that the terms
good and evil are only applied relatively, so that the same thing
may be called both good and bad according to the relations in view,
in the same way as it may be called perfect or imperfect.
(3) Nothing regarded in its own nature can be called perfect or
imperfect; especially when we are aware that all things which come
to pass, come to pass according to the eternal order and fixed
laws of nature.
[13] (1) However, human weakness cannot attain to this order in its
own thoughts, but meanwhile man conceives a human character much more
stable than his own, and sees that there is no reason why he should
not himself acquire such a character. (2) Thus he is led to seek
for means which will bring him to this pitch of perfection, and
calls everything which will serve as such means a true good.
(13:3) The chief good is that he should arrive, together with other
individuals if possible, at the possession of the aforesaid
character. (4) What that character is we shall show in due time,
namely, that it is the knowledge of the union existing being
the mind and the whole of nature. [c]

footnote[c] These matters are explained more at length elsewhere.
==========
The footnote obviously doesn't say where the further explanation is,
or precisely which "matters" Spinoza means. Sometimes he says this
or that will be explained in "his philosophy," but not here. Perhaps
if Spinoza had finished the treatise, he might have pointed the
reader to specific passages, either in TEI or in "his philosophy."
As it is, this footnote seems vague, and perhaps superfluous. There
are plenty of instances in which more is revealed later, or in other
writings, which do not receive a footnote, so why here especially, I
wonder?

Monday, April 8, 2013

More Response to Stuart's Cogent Remarks

Stuart, a true student of Spinoza remarked before:

> S: Anyway, if we think about the comparison he makes of caution and
cowardice (in the Ethics) where he pretty much talks about them being essentially the same emotion but the former is the response of a rational person, while the latter is the response of an irrational person, the following ratios would be natural: caution/ cowardice::providing for oneself/seeking wealth::being a respected individual/seeking fame and notoriety(or adulation).

>D. As we get deeper into "The Improvement" you could parse your text/ideas and determine what kinds they are according to Spinoza's typology, which will be revealed later. Compare your ideas with these from Spinoza's Ethics.  You seem to be on the right
track.

==========E5P4note"For it must be especially remarked,that the appetite through which a man is said to be active, and that through which he is said to be passive is one and the same. For instance, we have shown that human nature is so constituted, that everyone desires his fellow-men to live after his own fashion (III. xxxi. note) ; in a man, who is not guided by reason, this appetite is a passion which is called ambition, and does not greatly differ from pride ; whereas in a man, who lives by the dictates of reason, it is an activity or virtue which is called piety (IV. xxxvii. note. i. and second proof). In like manner all appetites or desires are only passions, in so far as they spring from inadequate ideas ; the same results are accredited to virtue, when they are aroused or generated by adequate ideas. For all desires, whereby we are determined to any given action, may arise as much from adequate as from inadequate ideas (IV. lix.).E4P64PROP. LIX. To all the actions, whereto we are determined by emotion wherein the mind is passive ; we can be determined without emotion by reason.Proof.-To act rationally, is nothing else (III. iii. and Def.ii.) but to perform those actions, which follow from the necessity, of our nature considered in itself alone. But pain is bad, in so far as it diminishes or checks the power of action(IV. xli.) ; wherefore we cannot by pain be determined to any action, which we should be unable to perform under the guidanceof reason. Again, pleasure is bad only in so far as it hinders a man's capability for action (IV. xli. xliii.) ; therefore to this extent we could not be determined by it to any action, which we could not perform under the guidance of reason. Lastly,pleasure, in so far as it is good, is in harmony with reason (for it consists in the fact that a man's capability for action is increased or aided) ; nor is the mind passive therein, except inso far as a man's power of action is not increased to the extent of affording him an adequate conception of himself and his actions (III. iii., and note).Wherefore, if a man who is pleasurably affected be brought tosuch a state of perfection, that he gains an adequate conception of himself and his own actions, he will be equally, nay more, capable of those actions, to which he is determined by emotion wherein the mind is passive. But all emotions are attributable to pleasure, to pain, or to desire (Def. of the Emotions, iv.explanation) ; and desire (Def. of the Emotions, i.) is nothing else but the attempt to act ; therefore, to all actions, &c.Q.E.D.Another Proof.-A given action is called bad, in so far as it arises from one being affected by hatred or any evil emotion. But no action, considered in itself alone, is either good or bad (as we pointed out in the preface to Pt. IV.), one and the same action being sometimes good, sometimes bad ; wherefore to the action which is sometimes bad, or arises from some evil emotion, we may be led by reason (IV. xix.). Q.E.D.Note.-An example will put this point in a clearer light. The action of striking, in so far as it is considered physically, and in so far as we merely look to the fact that a man raises his arm, clenches his fist, and moves his whole arm violently downwards, is a virtue or excellence which is conceived as proper to the structure of the human body. If, then, a man, moved by anger or hatred, is led to clench his fist or to move his arm, this result takes place (as we showed in Pt. II.), because one and the same action can be associated with various mental images of things ; therefore we may be determined to the performance of one and the same action by confused ideas, or by clear and distinct ideas. Hence it is evident that every desire which springs from emotion, wherein the mind is passive, would become useless, if men could be guided by reason. Let us now see why desire which arises from emotion, wherein the mind is passive, is called by us blind."

More Catching Up With the Notes: [b] P7S3

Spiniza, TEI:

"[7] (1) Further reflection convinced me that if I could really get
to the root of the matter I should be leaving certain evils for a
certain good. (2) I thus perceived that I was in a state of great
peril, and I compelled myself to seek with all my strength for a
remedy, however uncertain it might be; as a sick man struggling with
a deadly disease, when he sees that death will surely be upon him
unless a remedy be found, is compelled to seek a remedy with all his
strength, inasmuch as his whole hope lies therein. (7:3) All the
objects pursued by the multitude not only bring no remedy that tends
to preserve our being, but even act as hindrances, causing the death
not seldom of those who possess them, [b] and always of those who
are possessed by them.

[b] These considerations should be set forth more precisely."
==========


Spinoza does not say here that this clarifying should be done
elsewhere, as he did in the previous note. The subject matter is
closely related. I feel as if Spinoza is saying that this topic in
the treatise could use polishing. I have never heard anyone raise
the subject and speculate upon what more he might have said about
these matters. With a little reflection, I think most of us could
observe hindrances along these lines within ourselves at any given moment.
What objects or ends are being pursued within the content of my own
consciousness? I feel that Spinoza often artfully invites us to
learn as much about our own nature as we can.


Here is a bit of dialogue between Stuart and I a few years ago, slightly
edited to avoid certain difficulties in recalling source material and with
certain additions which I hope shed a bit more light on the subjects at hand:
===============
D:What did S. know of riches and fame?

S: If Spinoza is not a clever fraud, then he appears to be a "spiritual" prodigy
of some sort. And he is pretty confident, since while he does not ..."come out
and say, 'If you want to follow me, this is how it goes,' he does say if you
want to understand certain things more clearly, you will need to think like me
on a few points. I believe the phrase is pretty much something like '...so that
others may understand even as I understand.' Anyway, if we think about the
comparison he makes of caution and cowardice (in the Ethics) where he pretty
much talks about them being essentially the same emotion but the former is the
response of a rational person, while the latter is the response of an irrational
person, the following ratios would be natural: caution/cowardice::providing for
oneself/seeking wealth::being a respected individual/seeking fame and
notoriety(or adulation).

D:Spinoza may have expressed that "Jesus is the best philosopher."

S: Did he actually use that wording? I know in the Tractatus, he says that Jesus
was the last and the greatest of the Jewish prophets. And he unpacks that phrase
with the description of Jesus as one who spoke and thought with the "mind of
God." If I remember correctly.

D: I believe it was expressed in a note to Tschirnhausen, but I am not clear about it.

I am clear that Spinoza said that Jesus understood God by means of a clear idea, a
true idea of the highest order, whereas the Prophets connected with more imagination.
E.g. Moses experienced God as a burning bush, some prophets saw angels, etc.  There is a tremendous difference.  God alone understands God clearly, and that is why it was said that "I am in the Father and the Father is in Me."  So, Christ was human, except for the God Consciousness.  One comes to the point of asking, "Is God synonymous with Reality?" 
Matt. 19:26: But Jesus beheld them, and said unto them, With men this is impossible; 
but with God all things are possible.

S: "Stamp out" ill will, cultivate gratitude, and be prepared for grace.

The Note in Sentence 2, Paragraph 4-Spinoza's View of "The Middle Way"


[4] (1) By sensual pleasure the mind is enthralled to the extent
of quiescence, as if the supreme good were actually attained, so
that it is quite incapable of thinking of any other object; when
such pleasure has been gratified it is followed by extreme
melancholy, whereby the mind, though not enthralled, is disturbed
and dulled. (2) The pursuit of honors and riches is likewise very
absorbing, especially if such objects be sought simply for their
own sake, [a] inasmuch as they are then supposed to constitute the
highest good.
==========
Sorry, I overlooked the note in p4 in s2 so we will need to review 
paragraph 4, in light of the note (a). Here it is:
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[a] (1) This might be explained more at large and more clearly:
I mean by distinguishing riches according as they are pursued for
their own sake, in or furtherance of fame, or sensual pleasure,
or the advancement of science and art. (2) But this subject is
reserved to its own place, for it is not here proper to
investigate the matter more accurately.
==========
So, we learn that Spinoza is not dogmatically opposed to the acquisition
of wealth.  However, it should be noted that while Spinoza was not an advocate
of asceticism, a study of his life shows that when he said "the wise man is 
content with little," he practiced what he preached.

The concern here is not with money or property, possessions and so on,
for there is nothing in these that cannot be put to good use.  The difficulty
for the follower of Spinoza's path lies in the emotional identification with
these things, as if they were parts of our body.  So, we experience pain when
there is a modification of loss in our investment portfolio, or discover that someone
has stolen the box of cash we had hidden in a piece of furniture.  We are identified
with the existential first and the spiritual is often lost and forgotten.  This is the
wrong order.  The best illustration of the true order is the crucifixion of Jesus, and 
how unfortunate that his ultimate sacrifice of the existential for the sake of Truth,
has been perverted into superstition for the profit of the priest class and at great cost 
to humanity in general.  Likewise, perhaps, Socrates displayed an indifference to 
death and continued to maintain his ideas to the end.

https://sites.google.com/site/jacqueslouisdavidlifeandworks/the-death-of-socrates

Nature begins with the incorporeal Eternal and Infinite, and our
conceptions of particular things are not objective because we don't understand 
their cause.  The finite mind cannot understand the infinite in essence.

Jesus famously said that a rich man has about as much chance of entering Heaven as
a camel has of passing through the eye of a needle.  However, a
close reading of what comes after reveals the humility of Jesus before God,
indicating that God may accomplish what is inconceivable for man.  As an
aside, it is very interesting that just after this saying, Jesus offers the parable
of the men hired to work in the vineyard. Each receives the same pay, regardless
of the hours they put in, and the last hired may be the first paid.
As Krishnamurti said, and I often repeat it, "It is the truth that frees, not your efforts to be free." K. gave his heart and soul to union with the immeasurable, and while he was educated in fine English
schools and given the trappings of wealth and prestige by his Theosophical "parents" who had
great ambitions for him, he came to see as Spinoza did, that these surroundings were vain and futile.  He divorced himself from the organization that was created for him because he had "been made simple" by
conscious contact with his real creator.  And while his friends always made sure that he was provided for, he actually had very few personal possessions despite the many books of his ideas that attained a certain popularity.  But, again, as Spinoza indicates in the last proposition of the Ethics, we are content with little because of our inner treasure.  In the spiritual paths known generally as "The Fourth Way," we don't renounce our position, family, possessions and so on as monks and certain Yogins and Fakirs may do, and as the Apostles of Christ did.  We merely begin to observe ourselves.  In a sense, this is the end and the beginning, just as the shaman put it: "to see…"

Spinoza writes in TPT that "the arts and sciences...are also entirely necessary to the perfection and blessedness of human nature."  As we can clearly see from the citation below, Spinoza embraces what a Buddhist might well 
describe as "the middle way"  with regard to enjoyment of the sensual aspects of our existential life. The intention is precisely the same, and it would be fair to say generally that Spinoza is more akin to the Shakyamuni Buddha than he is to Locke, Hobbes, Descartes, Leibniz, Hume, Kant,or even Wittgenstein, Heidegger, etc.
==========
From Ethics Part IV:  Of Human Bondage, or the Strength of the Emotions

Proposition 45 (XLV)….
 Note.-Between derision (which I have in Coroll. I. stated to
be bad) and laughter I recognize a great difference.  For
laughter, as also jocularity, is merely pleasure ; therefore, so
long as it be not excessive, it is in itself good (IV. xli.). 
Assuredly nothing forbids man to enjoy himself, save grim and
gloomy superstition.  For why is it more lawful to satiate one's
hunger and thirst than to drive away one's melancholy? I reason,
and have convinced myself as follows : No deity, nor anyone else,
save the envious, takes pleasure in my infirmity and discomfort,
nor sets down to my virtue the tears, sobs, fear, and the like,
which are signs of infirmity of spirit ; on the contrary, the
greater the pleasure wherewith we are affected, the greater the
perfection whereto we pass ; in other words, the more must we
necessarily partake of the divine nature.  Therefore, to make use
of what comes in our way, and to enjoy it as much as possible
(not to the point of satiety, for that would not be enjoyment) is
the part of a wise man.  I say it is the part of a wise man to
refresh and recreate himself with moderate and pleasant food and
drink, and also with perfumes, with the soft beauty of growing
plants, with dress, with music, with many sports, with theatres,
and the like, such as every man may make use of without injury to
his neighbour.  For the human body is composed of very numerous
parts, of diverse nature, which continually stand in need of
fresh and varied nourishment, so that the whole body may be
equally capable of performing all the actions, which follow from
the necessity of its own nature ; and, consequently, so that the
mind may also be equally capable of understanding many things
simultaneously.  This way of life, then, agrees best with our
principles, and also with general practice ; therefore, if there
be any question of another plan, the plan we have mentioned is
the best, and in every way to be commended.  There is no need for
me to set forth the matter more clearly or in more detail.

Sunday, March 17, 2013

The Terror of the Situation/Root of the Matter

     And so, dear friends, we proceed on to the second part of the introductory 
material in which Spinoza reveals to us his inner life at the outset of his amazing adult life, which, while being brought to an end at the tender age of 44 by lung disease, bore such an abundance of philosophical treasures that it is impossible to imagine how anyone could accomplish so much in a couple of decades.  His observations on the intimate details of human nature, with respect to the mind and emotions, and the nature of enlightenment, and his work in the fields of political theory, study of the Bible, theology and other things, seem to many to be some of the grandest works of speculative philosophy extant.  Some, however, such as Goethe, Einstein and other luminaries of Western culture, feel that Spinoza had indeed conceived a "true philosophy," that is, not speculative, as the works of most other Western philosophers are, but actually objective such that the subject and object prove to be one and the same (cf. "Ethics" Proposition 7, Part 2).  In fact, Kant, who came more and more to discover and admire Spinoza, initially denied that the conception of "the true idea" (which is the main task of our work at hand) was a possibility for the mind/body of a human being.  
     If you will close your eyes for a moment, and simply sense your own body, and observe that the mind seems to be something else, even subdivided into a thinker/what is thought, then you begin to realize that you have never felt completely whole, and at one with whatever is the cause of your being as well.  No one can do this for you, nor can you simply read about it.  It requires a paradoxically simultaneous ultimate effort of the mind and its ultimate acquiescence. Perhaps we will speak more about this later, but for now, let us return to the second part of the introductory material. 


[7] (1) Further reflection convinced me that if I could really get
to the root of the matter I should be leaving certain evils for a
certain good. (2) I thus perceived that I was in a state of great
peril, and I compelled myself to seek with all my strength for a
remedy, however uncertain it might be; as a sick man struggling with
a deadly disease, when he sees that death will surely be upon him
unless a remedy be found, is compelled to seek a remedy with all his
strength, inasmuch as his whole hope lies therein. (7:3) All the
objects pursued by the multitude not only bring no remedy that tends
to preserve our being, but even act as hindrances, causing the death
not seldom of those who possess them, [b] and always of those who
are possessed by them.
==========

     Spinoza experienced what Gurdjieff called "The Terror of the
Situation."  I refer to his perception that he "was in a state of great peril."  There are many facets of the Gurdjieff work that seem very much akin to what Spinoza had in mind.  I highly recommend "In Search of the Miraculous" by Ouspensky (sans all the mathematical/physics material, which I can't recommend because I don't understand it very well, if at all) as an introduction to serious attempts to  comprehend the practical aspects of the Spinozist Way. 
     I've been close to quite a few of these deaths that Spinoza mentions (friends lost to obsessive drinking and drugging)…and I believe that, for Spinoza, death can occur to an individual even though they are not rendered a corpse.  When a human being seems to have   irrevocably strayed so far from their essential nature that their being is completely determined by factors external to themselves, regardless of whether they seem "happy" or otherwise, they are devoid of connection to their own soul, hence are organic automata.  For G., these living dead were a fact.  Part of the appeal of vampire stories is that people have a sense that there is something beautiful, perhaps immortal, whose nature requires the acquiescence of the ordinary mortal who previously "occupied" a certain body.  It's interesting how "Nosferatu" has come to be something heroic in today's pop culture, whereas only a generation or two ago it was something monstrous.  I don't know what that signifies for our society, but it seems like something born of desperate alienation and the longing for something like Spinoza's "real good, having power to communicate itself, which would affect the mind singly, to the exclusion of all else."  Something beyond the spinning down of the humdrum of dullness which suffocates the living spirit so effectively in our culture of extroverted glad-handing.  Krishnamurti claimed that we live in a state akin to our house being on fire, but we are failing to even realize it.  Meanwhile, we imagine we are "doing something about it" whereas in truth our efforts are mostly the acting out of passions, a form of pragmatism, whereof the issue is merely another cycle of delusional "reforms" beset with seriously problematic unforeseen consequences.
==========

[8] (1) There are many examples of men who have suffered persecution
even to death for the sake of their riches, and of men who in pursuit
of wealth have exposed themselves to so many dangers, that they have
paid away their life as a penalty for their folly. (2) Examples are
no less numerous of men, who have endured the utmost wretchedness for
the sake of gaining or preserving their reputation. (3) Lastly,
are innumerable cases of men, who have hastened their death through
over-indulgence in sensual pleasure.
==========
So ends the overture, as it were.

==========
[9] (1) All these evils seem to have arisen from the fact, that
happiness or unhappiness is made wholly dependent on the quality
of the object which we love. (2) When a thing is not loved, no
quarrels will arise concerning it - no sadness will be felt if it
perishes-no envy if it is possessed by another-no fear, no hatred, in short,
no disturbances of the mind. (3) All these arise from the love of
what is perishable, such as the objects already mentioned.
==========

Okay, but do I see this in terms of facts, in the content of my own
consciousness, my own life, or do I remain abstract in my thinking, as if Spinoza is merely some scholar, theorizing away?   That is not the case, even though most of the individuals who study Spinoza never make whole- hearted attempts to live by his philosophy, which was his expressed aim..Note well the wording "happiness or unhappiness is made wholly to depend on the quality of the object which WE LOVE."  Spinoza is reaching across the centuries, in the field of the immeasurable, to include us as friends and co-students in this effort to raise our awareness to the level of connection, of  union, with both the cosmic consciousness and the consciousness flowing forth to all humanity.  Everyone at some point must have felt that there was "something more" that was quite close at hand.  So near…Why must we leave the stillness so soon?  What is so important that we cannot spend time in silence, observing ourselves with choiceless awaress, then carrying this attention out into the world.  The Yogis say that reunion with Ishvara ought never to be further away than the timespace of three breaths…Of course, to modern Western philosophers, such pronouncements are incomprehensible  nonsense.
This process of attachment to the temporal is going on. And on and on... What is at the root of it? Another musical image...The Titanic is sinking catastrophically, but never-mind the rising waters, that band still sounds first rate…Actually, the music isn't that great, but it's better than thinking about what is happening.

"After arranging the world in a most beautiful and enlightened
manner, the scholar goes back home at five o'clock in order to forget
his beautiful arrangement."

-Don Juan Matus


Tuesday, March 12, 2013

PP 4-6 Re: Dependence on Pleasure, Money, Fame, etc.


Hello, friends.  For the convenience of being able to abbreviate some words I'm going to use "p" for paragraph, "s" for sentence in concord with Mr. Elwes enumerations  For example, we are now on to p4s1, beginning with "By sensual pleasure…" Before tackling these next paragraphs, I will borrow directly from Gurdjieff's suggestions on how the read the material at hand.  We must, as dgf suggests, get beyond merely reasoning about what Spinoza "means," which generally boils down to a sensation that we have reached a standard of comprehension with  which the mind is satisfied.  Or perhaps we must give up.  It's okay to say "I don't understand."  To say "I don't understand" is a simple, adequate idea.  The writings will serve us best if we use them as guides to self-observation.  Can we see ourselves in what is written?  More about this later.  There are paradoxes we must rise above.  For example, one of Spinoza's chief aims in TEI is to get us to recognize that we need to be consciously conscious of a standard by which to assess the adequacy of any idea.  Offhand, I might say that it is like having a photograph of your own face, then being able to pick yourself out of a line-up. What you need is already within you, but it needs to have everything else removed from it such that it may be discerned clearly.  

As an aid or method of actually just reading and studying the words of the treatise so as to realize the ideas,  Gurdjieff wrote at the beginning of his masterpiece, "Beelzebub's Tales to His Grandson: 
==========
 "I find it necessary on the first page of this book, quite ready for publication, to give the following advice:
“Read each of my written expositions thrice:
Firstly—at least as you have already become mechanized to read all your contemporary books and newspapers.
Secondly—as if you were reading aloud to another person.
And only thirdly—try and fathom the gist of my writings.”
Only then will you be able to count upon forming your own impartial judgment, proper to yourself alone, on my writings. And only then can my hope be actualized that according to your understanding you will obtain the specific benefit for yourself which I anticipate, and which I wish for you with all my being."
==========
What particular sorts of sensual pleasure is S. citing in p4s1 below?
==========
[4] (1) By sensual pleasure the mind is enthralled to the extent
of quiescence, as if the supreme good were actually attained, so
that it is quite incapable of thinking of any other object; when
such pleasure has been gratified it is followed by extreme
melancholy, whereby the mind, though not enthralled, is disturbed
and dulled. (2) The pursuit of honors and riches is likewise very
absorbing, especially if such objects be sought simply for their
own sake, [a] inasmuch as they are then supposed to constitute the
highest good.

==========
Sentence one (s1) puts me in mind of good sex, except I don't relate to the subsequent melancholy.  Hmmm…. getting sufficiently drunk, so as to suffer a nasty hangover? I begin to wonder then whether Spinoza may have imbibed a fair of amount of drink himself at some point. It doesn't sound like he is speaking abstractly to me. He earned the soubriquet, "The God-intoxicated man," but perhaps in his youth he experimented with less exalted forms of intoxication.  
Did he say somewhere,"Nothing human is alien to me..?" Well, no matter, perhaps I digress in speculations, but just here I wish to point out that in Ethics, we find specific mention of drunkenness.  I think that being "stoned" on other substances would equate to drunkenness for Spinoza.  Please feel free to offer your comments.  Here are a few citations from Spinoza's Ethics.
==========

"Among the kinds of emotions, which, by the last
proposition, must be very numerous, the chief are luxury,
drunkenness, lust, avarice, and ambition, being merely species of
love or desire..."

" For temperance, sobriety, and chastity, which we are wont to oppose
to luxury, drunkenness, and lust, are not emotions or passive
states, but indicate a power of the mind which moderates the
last-named emotions."

"Thus temperance, sobriety, and presence of mind
in danger, &c., are varieties of courage ; courtesy, mercy, &c.,
are varieties of highmindedness."

"Lastly, it follows from the foregoing
proposition, that there is no small difference between the joy
which actuates, say, a drunkard, and the joy possessed by a
philosopher, as I just mention here by the way.
[5] (1) In the case of fame the mind is still more absorbed, for fame
is conceived as always good for its own sake, and as the ultimate end
to which all actions are directed. (2) Further, the attainment of
riches and fame is not followed as in the case of sensual pleasures by
repentance, but, the more we acquire, the greater is our delight, and,
consequently, the more are we incited to increase both the one and the
other; on the other hand, if our hopes happen to be frustrated we are
plunged into the deepest sadness. (3) Fame has the further drawback
that it compels its votaries to order their lives according to the
opinions of their fellow-men, shunning what they usually shun, and
seeking what they usually seek.

==========

What did S. know of riches and fame? I think he learned a good deal
about these in young adulthood, when he was still ensconced within
the community in which he was born and raised, etc. I'm no authority
on his bio, and understand that a mind absorbed in understanding
Reality has no personal history per se, that is, it is not drawing on
experience or remembering anything in the sense Spinoza uses the
term, but I thought that S., in his late teens and early 20's was
headed toward "success" in business and as a "rabbi" or highly esteemed leader in his Temple community.  And he certainly was able
to observe examples of the foibles in cosmopolitan Amsterdam.
==========
[6] (1) When I saw that all these ordinary objects of desire would
be obstacles in the way of a search for something different and new -
nay, that they were so opposed thereto, that either they or it would
have to be abandoned, I was forced to inquire which would prove the
most useful to me: for, as I say, I seemed to be willingly losing
hold on a sure good for the sake of something uncertain. (6:2) However,
after I had reflected on the matter, I came in the first place to the
conclusion that by abandoning the ordinary objects of pursuit, and
betaking myself to a new quest, I should be leaving a good, uncertain
by reason of its own nature, as may be gathered from what has been
said, for the sake of a good not uncertain in its nature (for I sought
for a fixed good), but only in the possibility of its attainment.
==========

Spinoza here speaks in the first person again about his own process. 
He is not didactic in tone, rather he is sharing his experience. I think
this "prelude" part of the Improvement is unique among all of Spinoza's
writing for its autobiographical, down to earth and direct explanation to 
readers about his personal pilgrimage out of society as he knew it and
into the metaphysical philosophy that he was too pronounce "the true
philosophy. However, for me, like the man Spinoza claimed to embody
the idea of God, Jesus of Nazareth, we find that his "yoke is gentle."
In other words, I find Spinoza's simple descriptions of his process contain
little of condescension or a berating of the reader that one finds in some
philosophers and many theologians.  These paragraphs we are examining
bring to mind a passage of the Gospel According to Matthew.  However,
we will find that Spinoza is not so committed to the notions that immediate
and complete renunciation of the worldly is a prerequisite.  More to come 
on that issue.
*****
Matt. 19:21 Jesus said unto him, If thou wilt be perfect, go and sell
that thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in
heaven: and come and follow me.
Matt. 19:22 But when the young man heard that saying, he went away
sorrowful: for he had great possessions.
Matt. 19:23 Then said Jesus unto his disciples, Verily I say unto
you, That a rich man shall hardly enter into the kingdom of heaven.
Matt. 19:24 And again I say unto you, It is easier for a camel to go
through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the
kingdom of God.
Matt. 19:25 When his disciples heard it, they were exceedingly
amazed, saying, Who then can be saved?
Matt. 19:26 But Jesus beheld them, and said unto them, "With men this
is impossible; but with God all things are possible."
*****
"The warrior's way offers a man a new life and that life has to be
completely new. He can't bring to that new life his ugly old ways."
-Don Juan Matus




Friday, March 1, 2013

re: "the Objects of My Fears..."



==========
 "...seeing that none of the objects of my fears contained in
 themselves anything either good or bad, except in so far as the mind is
affected by them...."
-Spinoza
==========
Stuart asked, regarding the citation above:

> What is the exact content of this recognition? That there are no
> human values independently of how things affect us individually and
> collectively? He refers to the fearfulness with which he responds
> to these objects. Which objects or events are objects that are
> normally feared? What is the precise significance of the
> qualification "except as the mind is affected by them....?" What
> else would anyone fear other than the painful or negative effects
> external events would have on one's experience? What alternative
> point of view is he actually ruling out here with this
> qualification? It is clear that the antidote would be an experience
> that is not sporadic (continuous) nor of partial value (supreme)
> nor is it finite (unending). Does the third characteristic imply
> transcendence of some sort? At first reading this seems an almost
> childish quest since the goal, the antidote to the vanity and
> futility of things, seems so escapist and fanciful. At first blush,
> even if not sheer fantasy, it certainly seems improbable that it
> could be attained.

In the sense that a child may be simple, the quest is to be made simple
and to live as such, integrating experience into this overarching simplicity
that is The Real.

I think Spinoza agrees that few attain his aims.  At the very end of
the Ethics, he makes it clear that even finding a Way to progress
toward such lofty goals is improbable.  Even so, some of us, seeing
that "all is vanity" as it says in Ecclesiastes (which Spinoza knew well
I expect) and that there are "flashes" of this ecstatic and eternal being,
find nothing so enthralling as endeavoring to come to our own under-
standing of this Wisdom that seems to exist in one form or another in
almost all human cultures.  Spinoza is uniquely Western, not to diminish
the influence of Maimonides, Crescas et. al, but Spinoza attempts a
scientific approach to his subjects, even though their exists an enigma
about the "true idea conceived only through intuition" which seems
doubtful of being studied rationally, with detachment.  More about
this later.

I have the same questions about "the exact content of this
recognition." The best I can do so far is to observe, moment to
moment, for examples within the content of my own thoughts/feelings,
and to realize it when I don't fully understand why I have them,
although I could "explain," or the "explanation" may even be quite
"obvious." They are there, these fears. To say simply, "I don't know,"
is that not a simple idea?  I think we can leave aside for now
fears such as an imminent shark bite, or a close brush with a car collision.
I have imaginary fears, and these are what I am interested in for now,
often concerning things over which I have no control. Do you have
any fears which you realize are useless, either because they are
completely imaginary, or you can't do anything about them, or both?
These fit the bill for me, for openers at least. They are aspects of "me," and 
to understand me,myself, I, is to know a thing-in-itself-the philosopher's
stone, if you will.  Understanding the root of conditioning is something
utterly beyond merely analyzing an experience.  It is seeing "underneath"
all the complexity, as if viewing a great building from beneath the foundation,
which would seem to hide its footprint from all light.  But, underneath, it is
full of Light, regardless of what has sprung up, be it grand cathedral or some
cardboard hovel in the riverbottom where the homeless dwell.  Spinoza, we
will find, states that to really understand a thing, we must understand its 
cause, rather than observing its effects and then inferring the cause.  He
would say, "Where there's fire, there's smoke."  But we get ahead of ourselves,
as this will come out later in the treatise.

I can offer examples of a fear, like the degeneration of my spine.  From a
cosmic standpoint, its condition is just a fact, a material state of affairs.  For me,
subjectively, I fear it may pain me today, or get worse.  But do I say my spine
is something " bad" in itself?  The worry and fear affecting my mind accomplishes 
nothing unless I pay heed to how I get treatment, exercise and so on. That much
is very obvious.  But where does fear come from originally? Aside from the physical
pain, the fear breaks down into material action and psychological action.
This latter action involves meditation upon the marvel of self-preservation.
This desire to be, to persist in being, is something we are imbued with in every moment. 
The imagination works with this desire in highly complex ways.  But the intuition
of the immanent cause of the body lies beyond time, pain and degeneration.

The thing is to observe these fears in the moment, as they are
operative in us, as us. Then we have intimate acquaintance with
them. And then, perhaps, if we realize that an internal verbal
description, explaining to ourselves why we have the fear, or telling
ourselves that the fears are stupid, because we can't do anything
about them, etc., is by no means the same as understanding the fear
to the very root in our essence...we may be touched directly by the
conatus, even before it descends to an object of desire…What I mean
is, when we meditate upon the fear, so as to separate it from how I
imagine it may affect me, I may get in contact with what Spinoza calls
"Providence" in the Short Treatise.  If I can dwell with what the fear means
for me alone, I may see that it tends toward my self-preservation existentially.
In turn, this "desire to be" is kind of a DNA which I share with the totality of
all that IS.  That Being never goes away, it is the essence of Eternity, nothing to do
with time and the "before and after the body," as we imagine it.  Vis a vis this eternal 
creation, there is nothing good or bad, there is only perfection.  Vis a vis my own nature, 
I wish for it to be as much the image of this creator as possible.  For this, we must find 
a place in ourselves which is consciously conscious of our union with our Creator, and to 
acquiesce unto that Eternal Truth.  This is our freedom, our ultimate bliss.  We may rest there,
and our soul is nourished, prepared for the next round of experiences.  There will be
fears again, and again.  But even physical pain can be eluded in this timeless shelter, if only for 
a certain period.  We gather great energy there, to see the objects of our fears, and to see them
as they are, rather than considering how we are affected by them.  Or, we may observe how we are 
affected by the idea of them so as to discover how real these notions we have of other things are.  
How real is the content of my consciousness, or is it all imagination?  If we observe with
sufficient clarity and lack of bias, we may discover that all consciousness is One, the the Observer
and the Observed are One.  With this knowledge, we may inquire into the mind with much
greater objectivity.