Discussion of and reiteration of Previous Post-good for review of Important Topics

D: Again, I haven't read as much western philosophy as I'd like to, so 
far, but I don't know any other philosopher whose mission seems to be 
to mentor us through a fundamental transformation that is ethical and 
spiritual. 

S: Does Socrates/Plato ring a bell? Of course, the spiritual side of that assertion as it applies to S/P does depend on how much "spirituality" you pack in to the concept of the "philosopher king," the one who knows himself. Perhaps the following biconditional has value. One is fully ethical iff one fully knows himself. 

D: Spinoza in this way seems to me more akin to Jnana Yogis, 
or "the Fourth Way," than to his fellow rationalists. let alone 
empiricists.

S: Do you have a GOOD book to recommend on the subject of Jnana Yoga? I not too sure about the couple of things I currently have.

D: I think if we are going to experiment with such an hypothesis, which, for us 
now, is a general "being of reason," we ought to be mindful that we 
apply this standard only to our own nature, because by the measure of 
this abstraction, we are imperfect. Cosmically, if I read Spinoza 
correctly, everyone else may be regarded as quite perfect as they 
are, if in fact there is nothing really defective in nature. 

S: I think I can see your point , but surely Spinoza thought that if it is valid to compare my current self with a more idealized version of myself, and to see the value of the latter by comparison with the former, then it is certainly valid, even necessary, to provide the same service for others. But don't we have to remember, as well, that for Spinoza, perfection=reality=power? And that power is expressed within certain limits since all finite power is a limitation of the power of substance. We literally, if I understand Spinoza at all, become a new individual reality at each step of the way toward that idealized version. One that in itself express more perfection (as defined above) than the individual that existed one step previously. Therefore, when you say


D: Spinoza rarely employs any "ideals" per se, however, we have an exceptional 
situation here, and if we are able to observe ourselves with 
sufficient impartiality, perhaps we will come to understand our 
nature, per item !, not as a result of duration of attention, but 
through the fullness of attention itself.

"We shall thus discern the highest degree of perfection to which man 
is capable of attaining."

I have to confess to a little disappointment with this remark. What 
is it that compels so many philosophers to have to comment on the 
limits of "man?" 

S: I tend to think that it is because you are dealing with an instance of the Socratic tradition. Socrates, you will recall, who is well known for having the reputation of having acquired the highest possible wisdom and at the same time he is said to have admitted that he was ignorant of the consequences of death. He thereby demonstrated, as I like to understand the point anyway, that the fear of death was a form of superstition. As was any opinion formed in the absence of acquaintance with the relevant "Forms." That is why it seems to me that, for example, a David Hume should not only not be dismissed from a spiritual approach to western philosophy, he must be, IN CERTAIN RESPECTS, be treated as indispensable. 


D: Even with the few books I've read, I still seem to 
discover a pattern whereby they seem compelled to express and seem to 
sincerely believe that their own attainments have set the high water 
mark for the entire species, as it were. Because of my love of him, 
I like to think Spinoza might have changed this somehow, even if he 
understood it to be true, because so many state it, and, I believe, 
in error.

S: Here, nevertheless, I totally agree with you. In fact it follows from what I said in the paragraph previous to this one. Setting limits from outside the fourth way of knowing seems a fairly superstitious activity. But you know, I didn't read that specific remark of Spinoza's in that way. BTW, the one Ideal he certainly did mention was acquiescence. Is perfect acquiescence possible? I think Spinoza did think there were limits, eg, your personality can't survive the destruction of the body. I'm guessing, perhaps more relevantly, that he didn't think a completely indomitable Joy was possible, despite the fact that in part 5 of the Ethics, he certainly does speak that way when it comes to the transformation of the affects which is equivalent to the Intellectual Love of God.

D: These four items in p25 are again, vital to my aim of understanding 
what Spinoza is suggesting that we do. If anyone can shed more light 
on them, please do so.

S: Spinoza does not adduce general natures. No. But he does think we, virtually all of us (he admits that he doesn't know what to say about "madman," for example), are alike in certain respects. A perfect Stuart will not be identical to a perfect Donovan, but we would in those conditions, being each of us a perfect each of us, we would have much, if not most things in common. Certainly the things in the Ethics which "pertain to wisdom."



-----Original Message-----
From: Rundle Donovan 
To: spinoza@yahoogroups.com
Sent: Tue, 29 May 2007 12:22 pm
Subject: [spinoza] TIE p25-29






I wanted to make this post shorter, but I couldn't figure out how to 
separate p25 from the rest of the material here without loss of 
continuity.
*****
[25] (1) In order that from these modes of perception the best may
be selected, it is well that we should briefly enumerate the means
necessary for attaining our end.

I. (2) To have an exact knowledge of our nature which we desire to
perfect, and to know as much as is needful of nature in general.

II. To collect in this way the differences, the agreements, and the
oppositions of things.

III. To learn thus exactly how far they can or cannot be modified.

IV. To compare this result with the nature and power of man.
(4) We shall thus discern the highest degree of perfection
to which man is capable of attaining.

[26] (1) We shall then be in a position to see which mode of
perception we ought to choose. (2) As to the first mode, it is
evident that from hearsay our knowledge must always be uncertain,
and, moreover, can give us no insight into the essence of a thing,
as is manifest in our illustration; now one can only arrive at
knowledge of a thing through knowledge of its essence, as will
hereafter appear. (3) We may, therefore clearly conclude that
the certainty arising from hearsay cannot be scientific in its
character. (4) For simple hearsay cannot affect anyone whose
understanding does not, so to speak, meet it half way.

[27] (1) The second mode of perception [i] cannot be said to
give us the idea of the proportion of which we are in search.
(2) Moreover its results are very uncertain and indefinite,
for we shall never discover anything in natural phenomena by its
means, except accidental properties, which are never clearly
understood, unless the essence of the things in question be
known first. (3) Wherefore this mode also must be rejected.

[28] (1) Of the third mode of perception we may say in a manner
that it gives us the idea of the thing sought, and that it
us to draw conclusions without risk of error; yet it is not by
itself sufficient to put us in possession of the perfection we
aim at.
=======
[for my convenience I have interjected Spinoza's description of mode 
III here]

III. (19:4) Perception arising when the essence of one thing is inferred
from another thing, but not adequately; this comes when [f] from 
some
effect we gather its cause, or when it is inferred from some general
proposition that some property is always present.
=======
[29] (1) The fourth mode alone apprehends the adequate essence of
a thing without danger of error. (2) This mode, therefore, must be
the one which we chiefly employ. (3) How, then, should we avail
ourselves of it so as to gain the fourth kind of knowledge with
the least delay concerning things previously unknown? (4) I will
proceed to explain.
=======
[likewise, I've recapped mode IV here for easy reference]

IV. (5) Lastly, there is the perception arising when a thing is
perceived solely through its essence, or through the knowledge
of its proximate cause.
=======
*****

In p25, Item I is to my purpose, that is, Spinoza is, he is making a 
suggestion of action. We are going to be using the favored mode of 
perception in order to "have an exact knowledge of our nature." If 
David is still with us, I want to mention to him that this is where 
the rubber meets the road in the adventure. Very soon we will be 
commencing the "great labour," not just talking about it. As far as 
nature in general goes-important, but secondary here in the sentence 
subordinate to getting exact knowledge of our nature. A lot of 
philosophers concentrate on "nature in general." It is implied that 
we are somehow going to get ideas via this selected mode of 
perception that will aid us in "perfecting our nature," which is, to 
an extent, synonymous with our aim. The "means" here described then, 
seems to suggest that we come to intuitive ideas about our nature, 
and of nature in general to an extent. There have been many able 
commentators on Spinoza who, in neglecting this advice regarding 
means, have, I believe, denied themselves a chance to understand his 
philosophy, except "in abstracto."

Again, I haven't read as much western philosophy as I'd like to, so 
far, but I don't know any other philosopher whose mission seems to be 
to mentor us through a fundamental transformation that is ethical and 
spiritual. Spinoza in this way seems to me more akin to Jnana Yogis, 
or "the Fourth Way," than to his fellow rationalists. let alone 
empiricists.

Moving on to p25 item II, we hit a rough patch. "To collect in this 
way..." What way? I would have supposed via perception mode IV, 
applied to our nature, and to nature in general. But Spinoza goes on 
to describe "collecting the differences, agreements and the 
oppositions of things." What things? Our body as compared with 
external causes? There is another problem here. Spinoza is going to 
tell us to chiefly employ mode IV, but by making reference to Ethics, 
we discover that what he is describing here sounds like what he calls 
"reason" in that other work. The terminology gets a bit messy, 
because our TIE mode III equals "the second kind of knowledge" in 
Ethics. Perhaps an explanation might be that, while we "chiefly" 
employ mode IV (in order to intuit our axioms and definitions with 
highest certainty), a process of true inference may follow, provided 
of course that we employ valid forms of deduction. Spinoza's 
"reason," we may find, is unusual in that, I think it depends upon 
direct intuitive knowledge of its premisses, rather than what is more 
usual. That is, the premisses remain "beings of reason." For 
example, we may say anything we like, but are we able, as Spinoza 
claims to be, to deduce truths adequately from intuitive 
understanding of the attributes, etc? I'm sure there are many 
philosophers who put no stock in the possibility that Spinoza may 
have attained a completely different level of insight than what is 
conceivable to ordinary logicians, and it is no part of my purpose 
today to disabuse them of that idea. But to repeat, Item II seems to 
me a bit rough in the intelligibility of its meaning, even if my 
provisional interpretation should prove verifiable.

Item III seems full of potential for action. I am put in mind here 
of the "Serenity Prayer."
"God, grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change, 
courage to change the things I can, and wisdom to know the 
difference." Technically, if a thing is intuitively understood to be 
unchangable, there can be no "separation" from this fact. In a way, 
"acceptance" still implies a accepter and the object accepted, i.e., 
a subject/object relationship, which would mean the idea had been, so 
to say, "reasoned away." But, are the "things" under study in Item 
III still both our nature and nature in general? I suppose, but the 
connective tissue here is a little tenuous, leaving room for doubt.

Item IV is again even more difficult. "To compare this result with 
the nature and power of man." "Man" as used here is general, not a 
real, particular thing. We've reflected early on about some 
universal "character more stable than our own." I can reach that, no 
problem, because I am sometimes more stable, sometimes less so. But 
now it seems we are to hypothesize a man whose nature is such that he 
is conscious of uniting with nature as a whole,is that it? I think 
if we are going to experiment with such an hypothesis, which, for us 
now, is a general "being of reason," we ought to be mindful that we 
apply this standard only to our own nature, because by the measure of 
this abstraction, we are imperfect. Cosmically, if I read Spinoza 
correctly, everyone else may be regarded as quite perfect as they 
are, if in fact there is nothing really defective in nature. Spinoza 
rarely employs any "ideals" per se, however, we have an exceptional 
situation here, and if we are able to observe ourselves with 
sufficient impartiality, perhaps we will come to understand our 
nature, per item !, not as a result of duration of attention, but 
through the fullness of attention itself.

"We shall thus discern the highest degree of perfection to which man 
is capable of attaining."

I have to confess to a little disappointment with this remark. What 
is it that compels so many philosophers to have to comment on the 
limits of "man?" Even with the few books I've read, I still seem to 
discover a pattern whereby they seem compelled to express and seem to 
sincerely believe that their own attainments have set the high water 
mark for the entire species, as it were. Because of my love of him, 
I like to think Spinoza might have changed this somehow, even if he 
understood it to be true, because so many state it, and, I believe, 
in error.

These four items in p25 are again, vital to my aim of understanding 
what Spinoza is suggesting that we do. If anyone can shed more light 
on them, please do so.

The Means to our End, where we find that the end and the means are One.

As an aside I wish to observe that perhaps deduction is: 
something that works in us very frequently, even as we make inner 
demonstrations to ourselves. Intuitive ideas are operative 
continually right under our noses, that is, like Poe's "Purloined 
Letter," they may seem like part of the familiar furniture. Breaking 
down the components of our thinking into simpler and simpler ideas 
increases the likelihood of producing valid arguments.

Let me reflect about my plans. Tomorrow I will take a drive to Santa 
Barbara, 30 miles from here. At 60 miles an hour on average, the 
trip will take 30 minutes. I don't need a calculator for that one, 
and I know that I know it. If you ask me how, I might say that I 
don't know how, or that it's just obvious, or, I'd have to think 
about how to put it together into a formula.  Like 30 is to 60=30 
divided by 60.

==============
To review: remember that my aim here is to find particular suggestions that
Spinoza makes to us of "things we may 'do'" in order to increase the probability
that the ineffable will realize itself within our mind as the cause of its essence.
Also, I want to know why the treatise wasn't finished.....I am getting no comments,
which is about par for the coarse.  For those loyal friends: Lilli, Bonnie, Joan and
my wife, Mrs. Rundle, I offer these posts as reminders of ideas we may seem to
have studied in a prior age!  Let's dig in and review, and with my undying gratitude
for these friends.  Where are the rest of you?  

I wanted to make this post shorter, but I couldn't figure out how to
separate p25 from the rest of the material here without loss of
continuity.
*****
[25] (1) In order that from these modes of perception the best may
be selected, it is well that we should briefly enumerate the means
necessary for attaining our end.

I. (2) To have an exact knowledge of our nature which we desire to
perfect, and to know as much as is needful of nature in general.

II. To collect in this way the differences, the agreements, and the
oppositions of things.

III. To learn thus exactly how far they can or cannot be modified.

IV. To compare this result with the nature and power of man.
(4) We shall thus discern the highest degree of perfection
to which man is capable of attaining.

[26] (1) We shall then be in a position to see which mode of
perception we ought to choose. (2) As to the first mode, it is
evident that from hearsay our knowledge must always be uncertain,
and, moreover, can give us no insight into the essence of a thing,
as is manifest in our illustration; now one can only arrive at
knowledge of a thing through knowledge of its essence, as will
hereafter appear. (3) We may, therefore clearly conclude that
the certainty arising from hearsay cannot be scientific in its
character. (4) For simple hearsay cannot affect anyone whose
understanding does not, so to speak, meet it half way.

[27] (1) The second mode of perception [i] cannot be said to
give us the idea of the proportion of which we are in search.
(2) Moreover its results are very uncertain and indefinite,
for we shall never discover anything in natural phenomena by its
means, except accidental properties, which are never clearly
understood, unless the essence of the things in question be
known first. (3) Wherefore this mode also must be rejected.

[28] (1) Of the third mode of perception we may say in a manner
that it gives us the idea of the thing sought, and that it
us to draw conclusions without risk of error; yet it is not by
itself sufficient to put us in possession of the perfection we
aim at.
=======
[for my convenience I have interjected Spinoza's description of mode
III here]

III. (19:4) Perception arising when the essence of one thing is inferred
from another thing, but not adequately; this comes when [f] from
someeffect we gather its cause, or when it is inferred from some general
proposition that some property is always present.
=======
[29] (1) The fourth mode alone apprehends the adequate essence of
a thing without danger of error. (2) This mode, therefore, must be
the one which we chiefly employ. (3) How, then, should we avail
ourselves of it so as to gain the fourth kind of knowledge with
the least delay concerning things previously unknown? (4) I will
proceed to explain.
=======
[likewise, I've recapped mode IV here for easy reference]

IV. (5) Lastly, there is the perception arising when a thing is
perceived solely through its essence, or through the knowledge
of its proximate cause.
=======
*****

In p25, Item I is to my purpose, that is, Spinoza is making a
suggestion of action. We are going to be using the favored mode of
perception in order to "have an exact knowledge of our nature." If
David is still with us, I want to mention to him that this is where
the rubber meets the road in the adventure. Very soon we will be
commencing the "great labour," not just talking about it. As far as
nature in general goes-important, but secondary here in the sentence
subordinate to getting exact knowledge of our nature. A lot of
philosophers concentrate on "nature in general." It is implied that
we are somehow going to get ideas via this selected mode of
perception that will aid us in "perfecting our nature," which is, to
an extent, synonymous with our aim. The "means" here described then,
seems to suggest that we come to intuitive ideas about our nature,
and of nature in general to an extent. There have been many able
commentators on Spinoza who, in neglecting this advice regarding
means, have, I believe, denied themselves a chance to understand his
philosophy, except "in abstracto."

Again, I haven't read as much western philosophy as I'd like to, so
far, but I don't know any other philosopher whose mission seems to be
to mentor us through a fundamental transformation that is ethical and
spiritual. Spinoza in this way seems to me more akin to Jnana Yogis,
or "the Fourth Way," than to his fellow rationalists. let alone
empiricists.

Moving on to p25 item II, we hit a rough patch. "To collect in this
way..." What way? I would have supposed via perception mode IV,
applied to our nature, and to nature in general. But Spinoza goes on
to describe "collecting the differences, agreements and the
oppositions of things." What things? Our body as compared with
external causes? There is another problem here. Spinoza is going to
tell us to chiefly employ mode IV, but by making reference to Ethics,
we discover that what he is describing here sounds like what he calls
"reason" in that other work. The terminology gets a bit messy,
because our TIE mode III equals "the second kind of knowledge" in
Ethics. Perhaps an explanation might be that, while we "chiefly"
employ mode IV (in order to intuit our axioms and definitions with
highest certainty), a process of true inference may follow, provided
of course that we employ valid forms of deduction. Spinoza's
"reason," we may find, is unusual in that, I think it depends upon
direct intuitive knowledge of its premisses, rather than what is more
usual. That is, the premisses remain "beings of reason." For
example, we may say anything we like, but are we able, as Spinoza
claims to be, to deduce truths adequately from intuitive
understanding of the attributes, etc? I'm sure there are many
philosophers who put no stock in the possibility that Spinoza may
have attained a completely different level of insight than what is
conceivable to ordinary logicians, and it is no part of my purpose
today to disabuse them of that idea. But to repeat, Item II seems to
me a bit rough in the intelligibility of its meaning, even if my
provisional interpretation should prove verifiable.

Item III seems full of potential for action. I am put in mind here
of the "Serenity Prayer."
"God, grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change,
courage to change the things I can, and wisdom to know the
difference." Technically, if a thing is intuitively understood to be
unchangable, there can be no "separation" from this fact. In a way,
"acceptance" still implies a accepter and the object accepted, i.e.,
a subject/object relationship, which would mean the idea had been, so
to say, "reasoned away." But, are the "things" under study in Item
III still both our nature and nature in general? I suppose, but the
connective tissue here is a little tenuous, leaving room for doubt.

Item IV is again even more difficult. "To compare this result with
the nature and power of man." "Man" as used here is general, not a
real, particular thing. We've reflected early on about some
universal "character more stable than our own." I can reach that, no
problem, because I am sometimes more stable, sometimes less so. But
now it seems we are to hypothesize a man whose nature is such that he
is conscious of uniting with nature as a whole,is that it? I think
if we are going to experiment with such an hypothesis, which, for us
now, is a general "being of reason," we ought to be mindful that we
apply this standard only to our own nature, because by the measure of
this abstraction, we are imperfect. Cosmically, if I read Spinoza
correctly, everyone else may be regarded as quite perfect as they
are, if in fact there is nothing really defective in nature. Spinoza
rarely employs any "ideals" per se, however, we have an exceptional
situation here, and if we are able to observe ourselves with
sufficient impartiality, perhaps we will come to understand our
nature, per item !, not as a result of duration of attention, but
through the fullness of attention itself.

"We shall thus discern the highest degree of perfection to which man
is capable of attaining."

I have to confess to a little disappointment with this remark. What
is it that compels so many philosophers to have to comment on the
limits of "man?" Even with the few books I've read, I still seem to
discover a pattern whereby they seem compelled to express and seem to
sincerely believe that their own attainments have set the high water
mark for the entire species, as it were. Because of my love of him,
I like to think Spinoza might have changed this somehow, even if he
understood it to be true, because so many state it, and, I believe,
in error.

These four items in p25 are again, vital to my aim of understanding
what Spinoza is suggesting that we do. If anyone can shed more light
on them, please do so.

TEI Footnote (h)

[h] (1)" A conclusion of this sort, though it be certain, is yet
not to be relied on without great caution; for unless we are
exceedingly careful we shall forthwith fall into error.
(2) When things are conceived thus abstractedly, and not
through their true essence, they are apt to be confused by the
imagination. (3) For that which is in itself one, men imagine
to be multiplex. (4) To those things which are conceived
abstractedly, apart, and confusedly, terms are applied which are
apt to become wrested from their strict meaning, and bestowed on
things more familiar; whence it results that these latter are
imagined in the same way as the former to which the terms were
originally given."
*****
The footnote [h]2-4 is an example of what I meant about Spinoza being
unique among Western philosophers insofar as here he implies that he
has conceived a particular thing through its "true essence." I
believe he claims to understand a "thing in itself," as Kant put it,
and which Kant believed beyond human nature to attain.

Does anyone know if Kant was aware of Spinoza's philosophy? It seems
unlikely. From what little I know, Kant is mainly responsible for
devising arguments that endeavor to establish credibility for some
aspects of "a priori" knowledge, which supposedly are part of our
nature. Something to do with "categories" of our reasoning. I
believe he came to speculate that our knowledge of the "thing in
itself" could not be perfectly objective (as Spinoza maintained) but
was precisely what Spinoza would call a mere "confused idea," that
is, a "hybrid" comprised of more than one essence; ours and the thing
we sensed and reasoned about. Philosophers, do please correct me. I
know you're out there, and know much more than I do about Kant, etc.

What does s3 refer to? Spinoza does not say, so perhaps the note
seems non-specific. Does it seem kind of "rough," insofar as it
leaves some puzzlement as to part of its subject matter (pun
intended)? We must refer to Spinoza's "philosophy" to find a fitting
candidate-E1P15 note:
*****
"Extended substance, in so far as it is substance, consists,
as they think, in parts, wherefore they deny that it can be
infinite, or consequently, that it can appertain to God. This
they illustrate with many examples, of which I will take one or
two...matter is everywhere the same...etc."
*****
In s4 we get a thread of Spinoza's philosophy of language. Again, we
have only a brief comment. However, it describes the process by
which meaning for the most important terms for ethical well-being and
for understanding a true philosophy are rendered devoid of substance
by the mind mispronouncing its desire to reduce the fundamentally
"unknown" to the "familiar," the "known." In this way, terms like
"idea" become synonymous with "image," "true ideas" end up
signifying only abstractions...and the awful tragedy is that >all the
words get taken up< with no words left to mean what the words
(supposedly) meant originally. Anyone who has really read
"Beelzebub's Tales to His Grandson" (at least three times, including
once out loud) will appreciate how necessary it becomes to coin
neologisms in an effort to bring some of the vitally important
qualities back to nonsense.

TEI Modes of Perception pp 19-24

• Message 1 of 2 , May 26, 2007

  [19] (1) Reflection shows that all modes of perception or knowledge
  may be reduced to four:-
  I. (2) Perception arising from hearsay or from some sign which
  everyone may name as he please.
  II. (3) Perception arising from mere experience - that is, from
  experience not yet classified by the intellect, and only so called
  because the given event has happened to take place, and we have no
  contradictory fact to set against it, so that it therefore remains
  unassailed in our minds.
  III. (19:4) Perception arising when the essence of one thing is inferred
  from another thing, but not adequately; this comes when [f] from
  some
  effect we gather its cause, or when it is inferred from some general
  proposition that some property is always present.
  IV. (5) Lastly, there is the perception arising when a thing is
  perceived solely through its essence, or through the knowledge
  of its proximate cause.
  
  [f] (1) In this case we do not understand anything of the cause
  from the consideration of it in the effect. (2) This is
  sufficiently evident from the fact that the cause is only
  spoken of in very general terms, such as - there exists then
  something; there exists then some power, &c.; or from the
  that we only express it in a negative manner - it is not
  or that, &c. (3) In the second case something is ascribed
  to the cause because of the effect, as we shall show in an
  example, but only a property, never an essence.
  
  *****
  In the footnote [f] Spinoza says we will get an example later, which
  is probably "when they see that by this process the number is
  produced which they knew beforehand to be the proportional, they
  infer that the process always holds good..." from p23s3
  
  I'm reposting [19] in part because I do not yet feel clear that we
  know what "from some sign which everyone may name as he please,"
  means. Does he mean cases like ancient Hawaiians believing that
  volcanic activity means that Madam Pele is angry? But we are still
  plenty superstitious generally, if this is what Spinoza means. For
  basically superstitious reasons, I abstain from the consumption of
  shark flesh...
  
  With regard to Perceptions II and III, while these will be discarded
  as useless for philosophic research, it may be of interest to refine
  our awareness a bit both of the principal of induction, and of
  knowledge inferred from general principals. Hume's "Treatise on the
  Human Understanding" and Russell's "Problems of Philosophy" go into
  these at some length, and are pretty much "intelligible to the
  multitude." Suffice to say, that at best, these kinds of knowledge
  yield probabilities within a reality which, to an extent, "exists"
  only because of our agreement to participate in affirming it. Other
  cultures may have separate realities, which could be closer to the
  truth than our version. But we can't know if they are, because we
  are conditioned to accept certain premises which may be contradictory
  to those of others. For example, most of us affirm that a human being
  is "solid," whereas another take on reality presumes a human to be
  like "a luminous egg" of which solidity is not a property.
  *****
  [20] (1) All these kinds of perception I will illustrate by examples.
  (2) By hearsay I know the day of my birth, my parentage, and other
  matters about which I have never felt any doubt. (3) By mere
  experience I know that I shall die, for this I can affirm from
  having seen that others like myself have died, though all did not
  live for the same period, or die by the same disease. (4) I know
  by mere experience that oil has the property of feeding fire, and
  water of extinguishing it. (5) In the same way I know that a dog
  is a barking animal, man a rational animal, and in fact nearly all
  the practical knowledge of life.
  *****
  It's interesting that Spinoza chooses death as an example out of all
  the possibilities. As far as water extinguishing fire, did Spinoza
  only know this fact because it happened over and over again in the
  past? Wasn't it known that fire required the presence of a certain
  level of air which is not found in water? Couldn't a "cause" be
  inferred from other examples of fire being extinguished, e.g.inside a
  sealed jar, covered with soil, and so on? I'm not seriously
  challenging p20s5, however, if memory serves, Hume's "Treatise on the
  Human Understanding" shows convincingly that there is little in the
  way of observable ratiocination to distinguish men from dogs, if one
  is to judge by their behavior, and how they typically learn through
  repetitions of associated experiences.
  *****
  [21] (1) We deduce one thing from another as follows: when we
  clearly perceive that we feel a certain body and no other, we
  thence clearly infer that the mind is united [g] to the body,
  and that their union is the cause of the given sensation; but
  we cannot thence absolutely understand [h] the nature of the
  sensation and the union. (2) Or, after I have become acquainted
  with the nature of vision, and know that it has the property of
  making one and the same thing appear smaller when far off than
  when near, I can infer that the sun is larger than it appears,
  and can draw other conclusions of the same kind.
  
  [g] (1) From this example may be clearly seen what I have just
  drawn attention to. (2) For through this union we understand
  nothing beyond the sensation, the effect, to wit, from which
  we inferred the cause of which we understand nothing.
  [h] (1) A conclusion of this sort, though it be certain, is yet
  not to be relied on without great caution; for unless we are
  exceedingly careful we shall forthwith fall into error.
  (2) When things are conceived thus abstractedly, and not
  through their true essence, they are apt to be confused by the
  imagination. (3) For that which is in itself one, men imagine
  to be multiplex. (4) To those things which are conceived
  abstractedly, apart, and confusedly, terms are applied which are
  apt to become wrested from their strict meaning, and bestowed on
  things more familiar; whence it results that these latter are
  imagined in the same way as the former to which the terms were
  originally given.
  
  *****
  p21s1 shifts gears, radically and a bit suddenly, from the fairly
  mundane, to the very subtle and intimate. We are no longer in
  relationship with the "outside world" as before, with fire, dogs,
  etc. We may have believed we were "experiencing" that world
  directly. Now, Spinoza raises a question in my mind. Do we
  ordinarily clearly perceive that "we feel a certain body and no
  other?" Is this related to Russell saying that we don't know anything
  to certainly exist, except our own sense-data? It's quite an
  experiment to see if we can do this "feeling a certain body and no
  other," (I must assume he is saying we feel our own body, nothing
  else) and also thereby clearly infer that the mind is united to the
  body, etc. In Ethics, Spinoza maintains that the mind "feels." Can
  the mind "feel" the idea of the body as a whole without reference to
  an external cause? Yoga, I think, says so. If a posture is done
  correctly, the entire body is a unified homogenous field of energy
  (prana), as is the mind which is the reflection.
  *****
  [22] (1) Lastly, a thing may be perceived solely through its essence;
  when, from the fact of knowing something, I know what it is to know
  that thing, or when, from knowing the essence of the mind, I know
  that it is united to the body. (2) By the same kind of knowledge
  we know that two and three make five, or that two lines each parallel
  to a third, are parallel to one another, &c. (3) The things which I
  have been able to know by this kind of knowledge are as yet very few.
  *****
  By "a thing," or "things," in p22s1 and s3 respectively, we suppose
  actually existent things, not "beings of reason." p22 seems to
  maintain what I think most philosophers deny. Russell, for example,
  says we are acquainted with our sense-data, not a thing in itself,
  and only probably with ourselves. In TPT Spinoza states flatly that
  few people know themselves. Spinoza endeavors to show what he means
  by giving us (abstract) examples in p22s2, which could be piled up
  indefinitely, but then he explains immediately thereafter
  (indirectly) that he's not really talking about what he was just
  giving so many examples of, because the "things" he knows by the mode
  in question are in fact very few. He could name these very few
  things, one supposes, but he does not. If he had told us, perhaps we
  might concentrate on understanding those few things too. What could
  they be?
  *****
  [23] (1) In order that the whole matter may be put in a clearer
  light, I will make use of a single illustration as follows.
  (2) Three numbers are given - it is required to find a fourth,
  which shall be to the third as the second is to the first.
  (23:3) Tradesmen will at once tell us that they know what is required
  to find the fourth number, for they have not yet forgotten the rule
  which was given to them arbitrarily without proof by their masters;
  others construct a universal axiom from their experience with simple
  numbers, where the fourth number is self-evident, as in the case of
  2, 4, 3, 6; here it is evident that if the second number be
  multiplied by the third, and the product divided by the first,
  the quotient is 6; when they see that by this process the number
  is produced which they knew beforehand to be the proportional,
  they infer that the process always holds good for finding a fourth
  number proportional.
  
  [24] (1) Mathematicians, however, know by the proof of the nineteenth
  proposition of the seventh book of Euclid, what numbers are
  proportionals, namely, from the nature and property of proportion
  it follows that the product of the first and fourth will be equal
  to the product of the second and third: still they do not see the
  adequate proportionality of the given numbers, or, if they do see it,
  they see it not by virtue of Euclid's proposition, but intuitively,
  without going through any process.
  *****
  Spinoza's proportionals are an elegant demonstration if you are of a
  certain type, I suppose, but an example might work better for me
  which could not be so readily imagined as scaled relative quantities.
  "I am exactly here at this moment." Or, "I'm here, now." Do I go
  through a process to understand these propositions? I guess
  Descartes did.
  *****
  
  "The general principles of science, such as the belief in the reign of
  law, and the belief that every event must have a cause, are as
  completely dependent upon the inductive principle as are the
  beliefs of daily life. All such general principles are believed because
  mankind have found innumerable instances of their truth and no
  instances of their falsehood. But this affords no evidence for their
  truth in the future, unless the inductive principle is assumed."
  
  -Bertrand Russell, Problems of Philosophy