Why Didn't Spinoza Finish Such a Powerful Treatise?

Oops, I overlooked a post that should have preceded the post before

last concerning "Certain Rules of Life." It doesn't matter; my primary

purpose here today is to invite more participation by individuals who

have a love of philosophy and who would be willing to share their know-

lege of Spinoza with us either in comments or on our weekly phone meeting.

Please send me an email if you would like to join our inquiry. 

==========

"Another item that I overlooked is the table of contents. I've been
using the Dover edition for a long time, and the contents page is
separated from the text of TEI by all the propositions of Ethics. In
our study, we are about to embark upon #17, "Certain Rules of Life,"
--perfectly germain to one of my chief interests in this reading.
That is, responding to the question, "What would Spinoza have us
ordinary readers do that is perhaps within our power now?" That is

a most vital question, but one which has many pitfalls which in sum

are perhaps symbolized by Baron Munchausen who, if memory serves,

managed to pull himself out of the dreck by grabbing his own hair.

A Bulgarian composer I once studied with called it, "trying to jump

higher than your belly button."

At this point, I feel compelled to explain the obvious. I am not
educated in philosophy generally, although I had an excellent teacher
insofar as the practical aspects of following Spinoza are concerned.
Even then, however, I was not among the most advanced students. I
expect that anyone with a reasonable degree of education in the field
of philosophy may have many ideas come to mind which would be worthy
of note with regard to TEI, ideas which are beyond my very limited
knowledge. I am interested in learning, so please do offer your
remarks if you are out there following along. I doubt anyone is going to

be put off by my bias that  intellectual knowledge of Spinoza is likely to

be very incomplete  knowledge without being accompanied by the endeavor 

to live the teachings. But the converse is also true, I believe. Critical
thinking about the philosophy is clearly useful, and this must
include not only the eternal aspects, but also the historical and
philosophical context within which they were expressed, and what
Spinoza means to philosophers now.

After doing a little research, I've encountered an opinion by an
historian of philosophy, to the effect that Spinoza chose not to
finish TEI for reasons pertaining to the science of logic. For me, a
better understanding of the substance and history of logic would be a
prerequisite to attempting to paraphrase the idea. I want to come
to my own ideas about why the treatise is incomplete, but will
gladly accept help in acquiring evidence useful in developing them.
Because of Spinoza's mention of Logic in Part 5 of Ethics, I have
tried to make progress in learning about its evolution, and to come
to terms with what Spinoza understood as the difference between
classical Logic and what he called "true logic." However, I must say
that my efforts have been rather paltry thus far, as such studies do
not come easily for me even when I put in the time.

From what I am learning, it turns out (not surprisingly) that for
some, Spinoza's TEI is an important document in the whole history of
logic. If anyone can explain more about this, I hope they will,
especially since it may shed light on why TEI is unfinished.

Cheers,

DR"
*****
TABLE OF CONTENTS:

1 On the Improvement of the Understanding
3 Of the ordinary objects of men's desires
12 Of the true and final good
17 Certain rules of life
19 Of the four modes of perception
25 Of the best mode of perception
33 Of the instruments of the intellect, or true ideas
43 Answers to objections


First part of method:

50 Distinction of true ideas from fictitious ideas
64 And from false ideas
77 Of doubt
81 Of memory and forgetfulness
86 Mental hindrances from words - and from the popular confusion
of ready imagination with distinct understanding.


Second part of method:

91 Its object, the acquisition of clear and distinct ideas
94 Its means, good definitions
Conditions of definition
107 How to define understanding

Stuart's Remarks About the Previous Post Re: "Provisional rules of life..."

What follows are remarks by Stuart treating of the question of the "provisional" nature of the rules of life Spinoza is setting forth.  Why doesn't Spinoza just say, "Here are a few rules I suggest you follow to progress toward our aim...?"

On the "provisionality" of the rules: 

Spinoza has already shown the limitations of the endeavor to obtain, for their own sake, fame, sensual pleasures and wealth and power. The first rule speaks to the acquisition of fame which has the defect of imprisoning one in the passivity of conforming oneself to the opinions of others. But men, even men of unequal clarity, are ultimately dependent on each other. By adopting this rule, the need for acceptance, respect and utility of and by others is furthered while not having to indulge in submissive "thinking" or "actions." Second rule, states the basic minimum principle that follows from his earlier critique of the life denying consequences of overindulgence in pleasures. Similarly for the third rule. In other words, if the dear reader has gotten that far in TEI, then if he has understood what has gone before, he sees these three rules as necessary beginning points. For though one must begin by completely giving up the love of those three qualities as things in themselves, nevertheless a certain cultivation of these same qualities is necessary for one's sustenance and even for one's thriving. Even though the practicality for his project of adopting these rules seems obvious to him, he allows that at the level of mental discipline they also function as practical hypotheses that will be borne out as correct by further personal development. Also, since at this stage of one's development -one is just beginning on the project suggested by the critique of the previous 16 paragraphs - it is unknown whether the sought for selfsustaining Good is actually obtainable beyond being a matter of Platonic principle, one must practice certain dynamics -moderation in the pursuit of pleasure and power and adaptability in the pursuit of good communication that results from mutual respect - one must act "as if" or one may never be able to determine whether the "as if" can be transformed into an "it is." So there is a kind of tension here. On the one hand, the rules are simply distillations from the earlier critique and are certainly correct to that extent. But whether following them as a disciplinary first step will ultimately lead to the place where they are followed by the force of reason is precisely what one must still learn. To that extent there is still uncertainty. That, of course, is almost the entire purpose of the Ethics. To pass from the external necessities of being in bondage to rule governed behavior to the internal necessity of the freedom of behavior based on one's understanding. To that extent there is still uncertainty at this point in the development of the argument in TEI.
=============

Thank you, Stuart.  I wish I could get you to join our conversations on Thursday nights, but I realize you are not on the telecommunication grid at this time.  Do you remember writing this? 

"Certain Rules of Life as Provisionally Good"

• Spinoza had said:
  *****
  [15] (1) We must seek the assistance of Moral Philosophy [d] and
  the Theory of Education; further, as health is no insignificant means
  for attaining our end, we must also include the whole science of
  Medicine...
  *****
  Now he is going to elaborate a bit, that is, he will engage in some
  moral philosophizing. N.B. below he lays down these rules as
  "provisionally good..."
  
  *****
  17 Certain rules of life...
  
  [17] (1) Yet, as it is necessary that while we are endeavoring to
  attain our purpose, and bring the understanding into the right path
  we should carry on our life, we are compelled first of all to lay
  down certain rules of life as provisionally good, to wit the
  following:-
  I. (2) To speak in a manner intelligible to the multitude, and to
  comply with every general custom that does not hinder the
  attainment of our purpose. (3) For we can gain from the multitude
  no small advantages, provided that we strive to accommodate
  ourselves to its understanding as far as possible: moreover,
  we shall in this way gain a friendly audience for the reception
  of the truth.
  II. (17:4) To indulge ourselves with pleasures only in so far as they
  are necessary for preserving health.
  III. (5) Lastly, to endeavor to obtain only sufficient money or other
  commodities to enable us to preserve our life and health, and to
  follow such general customs as are consistent with our purpose.
  *****
  I wonder why Spinoza uses that word, "provisionally?" To me, it
  suggests that the goodness of the rules cannot be completely
  understood until some later development of one's ethical objectivity
  with regard to one's own nature and the nature of our relationship
  with our fellows.
  
  The first rule is complex and seems to cohere because, while it
  consists really in two distinct rules and explanations of their
  advantages, it is all concerned with my relationship to my fellows in
  the social order.
  
  I have wondered a good deal about the significance of "speak in a
  manner intelligible to the multitude." On the one hand, the efficacy
  of this rule seems so self-evident that it seems unworthy of
  mention. The explanation implicit in that would be that Spinoza is
  merely telling us to "comply with general custom" with regard to
  speaking, when carrying out our lives. I might confide to my wife
  during one of our daily walks on the beach, "Donovan feels...now,
  that... emptiness...that...Oceanic..." She will receive an
  impression from these words that she will describe as coherent to
  her. But we share what I'll call a "semi-private language."
  Obviously, there is no one among "the multitude" to whom I would
  utter such a remark, because it would be unintelligible and produce
  unwanted effects. If one of my surfing buddies complains "that
  freaking kook fully burned me," to which, if I respond with a mention
  of Spinoza's definition of hatred etc., which might be on my mind, he
  is going to find this unintelligible. Instead, perhaps the
  appropriate response in this hypothetical "language game" might be
  "yeah, this place is a pig-pile today." Ludwig Wittgenstein is a good

  philosopher of language, and his writings are full of cogent observations

  about the use of language.  I am tempted to try and explain how this

  deconstruction of language was vital to the pursuit of building smart

  cars, bombs, etc., but I leave it for another time or someone else to

  investigate.
  
  Another interpretation about why this first rule is important to our
  aims might be explained by "moreover, we shall in this way gain a
  friendly audience for the reception of the truth." Spinoza makes no
  bones about the fact that he knows he understands the true
  philosophy. It is a blessing, and he wants us to understand as he
  does. But we don't know these truths yet at this stage, so I must
  assume that he is saying we ought to go ahead and cultivate this
  correct way of speaking, in case we should learn what our master is
  endeavoring to impart and in turn have occasion to find an audience
  for it ourselves.
  
  But, is the rule "speak in a manner intelligible to the multitude"
  fully operative within Spinoza's own writings, or his discussions
  with his circle of friends and students? Or are we engaged in a
  "semi-private language" here, communing with Spinoza via language
  that is pretty much unintelligible to the multitude? What degree of
  understanding does "intelligible" signify?  "Intelligibility" may come

  after an arduous desire to learn meets a philosophy that emanates

  a sense of wisdom as it touches our intuition.
  
  Spinoza says in TPT that "such as persuade themselves, that the
  multitude or men distracted by politics can ever be induced to live
  according to the bare dictate of reason, must be dreaming of the
  poetic golden age, or of a stage-play." So how does this proposition
  of his fit in with the rule we are examining? Did Spinoza write the
  rule in an idealistic youth, which was tempered by experience by the
  time he wrote TPT? Does this issue of "intelligibility" play a role
  in the apparent fact that TEI languished in Spinoza's desk for years,
  never published? BTW, is there any evidence it was even circulated
  among his friends?
  
  As an aside, the matter of "degree" of "intellibility", with respect
  to "first philosophy, etc. (epistemology)" is extensively addressed in Yoga
  philosophy and in that of Gurdjieff, but seems absent in Western
  philosophy, by and large. Spinoza is talking about this "relativity
  of being" when he tells his readers that the true good became "more
  and more discernible" to him. Yogis who have penetrated within to
  the innermost "sheaths" discuss things intelligibly amongst
  themselves with a greater degree of objectivity than what can be
  obtained in discussion among professers of "hard sciences," and which
  would be complete nonsense to a logical positivist (if there are any
  left), or even to Descartes. Descartes at least recognized in his
  way that these inner sheaths "existed," and he endeavored to
  penetrate, which he did to a very limited extent.
  
  Well...it's a deep subject...Examination of this first rule could be
  drawn out at length. Did Spinoza, the bible scholar nonpareil, have
  some internal reference to the Biblical accounts of the apostles
  speaking to "multitudes" in their own languages (Gift of Tongues)?
  LOL, Orthodox Jews have something in common with logical positivists,
  and this has a lot to do with why some of the Orthodox still regard
  Spinoza as a heretic. He isn't "allowed/supposed" to know and talk
  about the "heavenly" things he understands and put into words. That
  is over-reaching for a human, according to their moral philosophy,
  which has some roots in this interesting story...
  *****
  Gen. 11:1 And the whole earth was of one language, and of one speech.
  Gen. 11:2 And it came to pass, as they journeyed from the east, that
  they found a plain in the land of Shinar; and they dwelt there.
  Gen. 11:3 And they said one to another, Go to, let us make brick, and
  burn them throughly. And they had brick for stone, and slime had they
  for morter.
  Gen. 11:4 And they said, Go to, let us build us a city and a tower,
  whose top may reach unto heaven; and let us make us a name, lest we
  be scattered abroad upon the face of the whole earth.
  Gen. 11:5 And the LORD came down to see the city and the tower, which
  the children of men builded.
  Gen. 11:6 And the LORD said, Behold, the people is one, and they have
  all one language; and this they begin to do: and now nothing will be
  restrained from them, which they have imagined to do.
  Gen. 11:7 Go to, let us go down, and there confound their language,
  that they may not understand one another’s speech.
  Gen. 11:8 So the LORD scattered them abroad from thence upon the face
  of all the earth: and they left off to build the city.
  Gen. 11:9 Therefore is the name of it called Babel; because the LORD
  did there confound the language of all the earth: and from thence did
  the LORD scatter them abroad upon the face of all the earth.
  *****
  Yoga-Sutra 3.17 The name associated with an object, the object itself
  implied by that name, and the conceptual existence of the object, all
  three usually interpenetrate or commingle with one another. By
  samyama on the distinction between these three, the meaning of the
  sounds made by all beings becomes available.
  *****
  "I begin, then, with the first point, and warn my readers to
  make an accurate distinction between an idea, or conception of
  the mind, and the images of things which we imagine. It is
  further necessary that they should distinguish between idea and
  words, whereby we signify things. These three-namely, images,
  words, and ideas-are by many persons either entirely confused
  together, or not distinguished with sufficient accuracy or care..."
  
  -Spinoza Ethics

"This, then, is the end for which I strive..."

After our hopefully interesting side trip to behold a cameo appearance here by one of my most beloved souls and purveyors of the real truth, J. Krishnamurti, we return to the text of TEI.  I've gotten behind in my blog posts, relative to our "creative conversations" phone conference, so I am playing catch up.  Our meeting takes place on Thursday evenings, 5:30 PM PDT.  Please join us, won't you?  Okay, back to TEI...

==========

[14] (1) This, then, is the end for which I strive, to attain to

such a character myself, and to endeavor that many should attain to

it with me. (2) In other words, it is part of my happiness to lend

a helping hand, that many others may understand even as I do, so

that their understanding and desire may entirely agree with my own.

(3) In order to bring this about, it is necessary to understand as much of nature as will enable us to attain to the aforesaid character,

and also to form a social order such as is most conducive to the

attainment of this character by the greatest number with the least

difficulty and danger.

==========

The first two sentences above can't be argued with to the extent that

Spinoza is offering a recap and development of his personal aims.

These aims are being fulfilled still, since some among us have more than

a sense that Spinoza's ideas are vitally important, and we wish to

understand just as he does.  Clearly, this is different from merely

being able to assimilate his philosophy logically/ intellectually.

It includes study of our own nature, and the nature of our relationship

with Cosmic Consciousness and with each other. Observation

through what Krishnamurti called "choiceless awareness," as

distinguished from analysis, is the most vital activity in living what

Spinoza is trying to impart.  I'm most thankful for having a small

but persevering group of friends (including my wife, Jeneth) who are

meeting by phone to see what we can do to understand as Spinoza does.

Already, some of us are noticing distinct changes in our experience of life

as our minds become sensitized to the qualities of the ideas which comprise

the content of our consciousness.

With regard to the first two sentences (expressing sentiments not 

generally found in Western philosophy): in order to discern the value

of Spinoza as distinguished from your run-of-the-mill televangelist

or perhaps very skilled and charismatic purveyor/orator of this or

that "road to salvation," (perhaps on "educational" TV, LOL...) we

must discriminate accurately between the properties of the truly

pious and those of  the merely ambitious. Real piety is a rarity in the

sense that Spinoza uses the word.  It is operative as the expression of

desires which Spinoza is here expressing.  Piety cannot be expressed by

someone without true knowledge.  And, when someone is blessed with such

knowledge, it comes with a high-minded compassion that renders it necessary

that those so blessed will reach out a hand to help pull us up.  It strikes me that this reaching out was painted by the remarkable Michelangelo on the ceiling of

the Sistine Chapel.  Jesus said, "My cup runneth over..."  Fortunate are those

who can strip away all the superstition and theology in order to pay attention

solely to the sayings attributed to Jesus.  The ideas contained in these sayings may be judged on their merits by the discriminative intelligence, which can become highly developed in people with a strong sense of their own essence, and once developed, can  recognize the essence of what all the great spiritual masters have placed into "vessels" of one sort or another to be transmitted to the spiritually thirsty down through the ages. In the Bhagavad Gita it is said that Yoga has existed since the origination of the universe.  In Silence, let us ponder the meaning of this...

With ambition, we have daily experience.  "People pleasing" is part of it. What Spinoza means by "ambition" needs to be studied and understood, then compared with the content of our consciousness as we continue in life.  Everyone likes to feel that they are the cause of someone else's  happiness (or misery in the case of an enemy).  It is explained in Spinoza's Ethics that ambition and piety are both outcomes of the same appetite.  However,in the case of true piety, the high-minded person has true ideas which are shared for the well-being of the other.  Ambition, on the other hand, involves inadequate ideas, which the purveyor feels empowered by when others seem to affirm them, producing an egoistic illusion of leadership and superiority.I think it is especially important  to understand the definition of ambition (E3P30, and others in that part of the Ethics, inc. P37) because it is such a pervasive influence in our moment to moment imaginings with regard to other people. I don't think it is easy to observe this comprehensively in our thoughts/images/ feelings, because the mind has a desire to keep this power, not realizing that the machinations of ambition are stifling to the perception of the Real.

When Spinoza says "it is part of my happiness to lend a helping

hand," we may feel that we can relate; it sounds so perfectly natural

as a statement. But that isn't true, unless someone out there may be

truly pious. Instead, I maintain that we have perhaps only the

faintest glimmer of where he is coming from, and perhaps project our

own inadequate experience of "compassion" by way of trying to explain

Spinoza's motives.   This is the kind of compassion that

compels one who is overcome by it to attempt to rescue a drowning

person, even though the individual is not a strong swimmer themselves

and has no training. Often as not, they become the second fatality -

but our tendency to regard this as more heroic than foolish is what

I'm talking about as "compassion." (Little to do with the Buddhist

meaning of the term, BTW.)  Forgive me if to an extent I use hyperbole

rhetorically in an endeavor to illustrate a point, however, I do not

think I exaggerate. Please see Spinoza's def. of "compassion" in the

Ethics.

As an aside, I want to explain how practical it is to study Spinoza.

For example, if one realizes that we are all ambitious, it is

possible to go far from home and make friends easily, and learn a

great deal into the bargain. If we recognize that an individual

really wants to hear what we have to say, we tend to enjoy sharing

with them things they seem to likewise enjoy hearing about. Hence,

ask a stranger a few sincere questions, then do a great deal of

listening, and friendly people will regard you as a nice new friend

even though you may have said but little through which they might

have become acquainted with you.

==========

[15] (1) We must seek the assistance of Moral Philosophy [d] and

the Theory of Education; further, as health is no insignificant means

for attaining our end, we must also include the whole science of

Medicine, and, as many difficult things are by contrivance rendered

easy, and we can in this way gain much time and convenience, the

science of Mechanics must in no way be despised.

[16] (1) But before all things, a means must be devised for

improving the understanding and purifying it, as far as may be at

the outset, so that it may apprehend things without error, and in

the best possible way. (2) Thus it is apparent to everyone that I

wish to direct all science to one end [e] and aim, so that we may

attain to the supreme human perfection which we have named; and,

therefore, whatsoever in the sciences does not serve to promote

our object will have to be rejected as useless. (3) To sum up the

matter in a word, all our actions and thoughts must be directed to

this one end.

==========

I made comments about p15 and 16 at the outset, especially because

Spinoza says, "we must...etc." I forgot to include the footnotes.

==========

[d] N.B. I do no more here than enumerate the sciences necessary

for our purpose; I lay no stress on their order.

Spinoza and Krishnamurti's "Amma"

About ten years ago, and for several years, Jeneth and I spent every Thursday night in "Dialogue" with Mary Zimbalist and a number of other close associatesof J. Krishnamurti (whom the Dalai Llama called "the greatest philosopherof our age...)  There is much I understood and recognized in the K. teaching, and I went about investigating whether there might be some influence of Spinozaism on the seminal period of K.'s life when he was groomed by the leaders of Theosophy, particularly Annie Besant, for his mission as a new "World Teacher."  I went to research at the   library on the grounds of Krotona in Ojai (a property ownedand lived on by current day Theosophists) where I did certainly discover that Annie Besant, K.'s guardian whom he called "amma" orMother, was a discriminating and devoted Spinozist. 

She wrote:

"Then Pantheism unveiled its all-alluring beauties, and the inter-
cosmic God shone forth dispelling all the clouds of doubt and fear,
and turning into gardens of delight the erstwhile desert sands. Had
it come in its native garb, it would have won all to itself, but to
intellectual Europe the most generally recognised exponent of this
theory was Spinoza, and while his strong thought fascinated and
compelled the intelligence, presented - as it often was by opponents
- without the ethic based on it, it left the spirit starving and the
heart a-cold. The idea got abroad that “Pantheism” was a chill and
stern philosophy, that its God was unconscious, inaccessible - the
“Father” had disappeared. “God is a being absolutely infinite; a
substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses
His eternal and infinite essence” (Ethics, Book 1, Definition 6.). Of
these attributes man knows but two, extension and mind or will. Mr.
Froude in his Short Studies - from which the quotation from Spinoza
is borrowed - says, summarising Spinoza’s views, that God “is not a
personal [Page 226] being, existing apart from the universe; but
Himself in His own reality, He is expressed in the universe, which is
His living garment” (Page 360). All things exist as He willed them to
be, evil is not positive, there is “an infinite gradation in created
things”, “all in their way obedient”. Two things in Spinoza have
repelled the emotional - his steady logical destructive analysis and
calm acceptance of its results, and his theory of necessitarianism.
The latter has been held fatal to morals, the former to devotion. Yet
Spinoza was so far from being incapable of strenuous devotion that he
was described by his enemies as “a God-intoxicated man”, and his
lofty, serene virtue and calm acquiescence in the law of life as he
saw it were in themselves evidences of the fine fibre of his soul."
-Annie Besant

When K. disbanded the Order of the Star in 1929, he told a story:

"You may remember the story of how the devil and a friend of his were
walking down the street, when they saw ahead of them a man stoop down
and pick up something from the ground, look at it, and put it away in
his pocket. The friend said to the devil, "What did that man pick
up?" "He picked up a piece of the truth," said the devil. "That is a
very bad business for you, then," said his friend. "Oh, not at all,"
the devil replied, "I am going to help him organize it."
When K. disbanded the Order of the Star in 1929, he told a story:
You may remember the story of how the devil and a friend of his were
walking down the street, when they saw ahead of them a man stoop down
and pick up something from the ground, look at it, and put it away in
his pocket. The friend said to the devil, 'What did that man pick
up?' 'He picked up a piece of the truth,' said the devil. 'That is a
very bad business for you, then,' said his friend. 'Oh, not at all,'
the devil replied, 'I am going to help him organize it.'
You may remember the story of how the devil and a friend of his were
walking down the street, when they saw ahead of them a man stoop down
and pick up something from the ground, look at it, and put it away in
his pocket. The friend said to the devil, 'What did that man pick
up?' "He picked up a piece of the truth,' said the devil. 'That is a
very bad business for you, then,' said his friend. 'Oh, not at all,'
the devil replied, 'I am going to help him organize it.'"

Love Towards a Thing Eternal....pp.10-13

The work here on the blog has fallen behind as our dialog group has proceeded to meet weekly.  Live dialog is best, however, our conversations on conference call are serviceable  for our ends.  Further:

==========

[10] (1) But love towards a thing eternal and infinite feeds the
mind wholly with joy, and is itself unmingled with any sadness,
wherefore it is greatly to be desired and sought for with all our
strength. (2) Yet it was not at random that I used the words,
"If I could go to the root of the matter," for, though what I have
urged was perfectly clear to my mind, I could not forthwith lay
aside all love of riches, sensual enjoyment, and fame.
==========
The first sentence above seems to implore the reader to undertake
Spinoza's inquiry along with him as he says "with all our strength."  
It's a hard road for most of us, but the only reasonable way once insight
is gained into metaphysical entities.

If the "eternal thing" is unknown, what is to be the object (are we
not accustomed to imagine some end for which we strive?), sought with
all our strength? Whether we are communists, atheists or Buddhists,
whether we subscribe to this or that sect, belief system, etc., don't
we in some way create, or deal with the "God issue," according to our
understanding or ignorance just as it is? Or perhaps we are too busy
to bother with it at all, or we suffer negative emotions so
habitually that our minds are full of sorrows and swirling confusion
never leaving 10 minutes of quietude for pondering in silence.

Just in thinking about "a thing eternal" right now, is there an
image? So do we end up seeking, rejecting or otherwise opining
about, or forgetting, not-thinking about, a projection of something
that is put together out of our conditioning, rather than "a new
principle?" Or perhaps we have had "mystical experiences," and
endeavor to recapture them. But Spinoza tells us that understanding
true ideas has nothing to do with memory. Memory is associative, whereas
the mystic energy and light is unique unto itself.  It can be
"seen" by the impersonal essence of a human being, but not exactly 
"remembered."  

Is it possible to "do" anything about our minds? Because who would be the agent, 
if not ourselves?  Spinoza, in "the Ethics" explains why a conditioned thing cannot
un-condition itself.  In one respect, this seems true, so what is it that has

the power to simplify the mind?  Krishnamurti's utterance upon experiencing

a profound inner transformation was, "I have been made simple."

What does that mean?  "Made simple" by what?  And what was "made simple?"

==========
[11] (1) One thing was evident, namely, that while my mind was
employed with these thoughts it turned away from its former objects
of desire, and seriously considered the search for a new principle;
this state of things was a great comfort to me, for I perceived
that the evils were not such as to resist all remedies. (11:2) Although
these intervals were at first rare, and of very short duration, yet
afterwards, as the true good became more and more discernible to me,
they became more frequent and more lasting; especially after I had
recognized that the acquisition of wealth, sensual pleasure, or fame,
is only a hindrance, so long as they are sought as ends not as means;
if they be sought as means, they will be under restraint, and, far
from being hindrances, will further not a little the end for which
they are sought, as I will show in due time.
==========
I feel that Spinoza would like to be encouraging to his reader in the
above paragraph. If the true, or "real good," affects the mind
singly, to the exclusion of all else, and if a true idea is clear and
simple, it seems a difficulty that it would be relative, that is,
"more and more discernible to me." If it was unknown to begin with,
how would one then know that is was "more and more discernible to
me?" If it were innate...Strictly speaking, we must inquire whether an
idea of the most perfect being, known only through itself and not by any
lesser being, is somehow emergent within us.  We become like divers into
the cold waters where icebergs dwell.  We dive to a depth from which we
may never return, driven by an innate desire to find what is at the very bottom
of all things.

Someone in our discussions inquired about the meaning of a "real good," 

which is distinct in meaning from a "true good."
In p12 below, Spinoza discusses briefly what he means by a "true
good." This notion of a "true good" is, I think, a principle theme
of Ethics.
==========

[12] (1) I will here only briefly state what I mean by true good,
and also what is the nature of the highest good. (2) In order that
this may be rightly understood, we must bear in mind that the terms
good and evil are only applied relatively, so that the same thing
may be called both good and bad according to the relations in view,
in the same way as it may be called perfect or imperfect.
(3) Nothing regarded in its own nature can be called perfect or
imperfect; especially when we are aware that all things which come
to pass, come to pass according to the eternal order and fixed
laws of nature.
[13] (1) However, human weakness cannot attain to this order in its
own thoughts, but meanwhile man conceives a human character much more
stable than his own, and sees that there is no reason why he should
not himself acquire such a character. (2) Thus he is led to seek
for means which will bring him to this pitch of perfection, and
calls everything which will serve as such means a true good.
(13:3) The chief good is that he should arrive, together with other
individuals if possible, at the possession of the aforesaid
character. (4) What that character is we shall show in due time,
namely, that it is the knowledge of the union existing being
the mind and the whole of nature. [c]

footnote[c] These matters are explained more at length elsewhere.
==========
The footnote obviously doesn't say where the further explanation is,
or precisely which "matters" Spinoza means. Sometimes he says this
or that will be explained in "his philosophy," but not here. Perhaps
if Spinoza had finished the treatise, he might have pointed the
reader to specific passages, either in TEI or in "his philosophy."
As it is, this footnote seems vague, and perhaps superfluous. There
are plenty of instances in which more is revealed later, or in other
writings, which do not receive a footnote, so why here especially, I
wonder?

More Response to Stuart's Cogent Remarks

Stuart, a true student of Spinoza remarked before:

> S: Anyway, if we think about the comparison he makes of caution and
cowardice (in the Ethics) where he pretty much talks about them being essentially the same emotion but the former is the response of a rational person, while the latter is the response of an irrational person, the following ratios would be natural: caution/ cowardice::providing for oneself/seeking wealth::being a respected individual/seeking fame and notoriety(or adulation).

>D. As we get deeper into "The Improvement" you could parse your text/ideas and determine what kinds they are according to Spinoza's typology, which will be revealed later. Compare your ideas with these from Spinoza's Ethics.  You seem to be on the right
track.

==========E5P4note"For it must be especially remarked,that the appetite through which a man is said to be active, and that through which he is said to be passive is one and the same. For instance, we have shown that human nature is so constituted, that everyone desires his fellow-men to live after his own fashion (III. xxxi. note) ; in a man, who is not guided by reason, this appetite is a passion which is called ambition, and does not greatly differ from pride ; whereas in a man, who lives by the dictates of reason, it is an activity or virtue which is called piety (IV. xxxvii. note. i. and second proof). In like manner all appetites or desires are only passions, in so far as they spring from inadequate ideas ; the same results are accredited to virtue, when they are aroused or generated by adequate ideas. For all desires, whereby we are determined to any given action, may arise as much from adequate as from inadequate ideas (IV. lix.).E4P64PROP. LIX. To all the actions, whereto we are determined by emotion wherein the mind is passive ; we can be determined without emotion by reason.Proof.-To act rationally, is nothing else (III. iii. and Def.ii.) but to perform those actions, which follow from the necessity, of our nature considered in itself alone. But pain is bad, in so far as it diminishes or checks the power of action(IV. xli.) ; wherefore we cannot by pain be determined to any action, which we should be unable to perform under the guidanceof reason. Again, pleasure is bad only in so far as it hinders a man's capability for action (IV. xli. xliii.) ; therefore to this extent we could not be determined by it to any action, which we could not perform under the guidance of reason. Lastly,pleasure, in so far as it is good, is in harmony with reason (for it consists in the fact that a man's capability for action is increased or aided) ; nor is the mind passive therein, except inso far as a man's power of action is not increased to the extent of affording him an adequate conception of himself and his actions (III. iii., and note).Wherefore, if a man who is pleasurably affected be brought tosuch a state of perfection, that he gains an adequate conception of himself and his own actions, he will be equally, nay more, capable of those actions, to which he is determined by emotion wherein the mind is passive. But all emotions are attributable to pleasure, to pain, or to desire (Def. of the Emotions, iv.explanation) ; and desire (Def. of the Emotions, i.) is nothing else but the attempt to act ; therefore, to all actions, &c.Q.E.D.Another Proof.-A given action is called bad, in so far as it arises from one being affected by hatred or any evil emotion. But no action, considered in itself alone, is either good or bad (as we pointed out in the preface to Pt. IV.), one and the same action being sometimes good, sometimes bad ; wherefore to the action which is sometimes bad, or arises from some evil emotion, we may be led by reason (IV. xix.). Q.E.D.Note.-An example will put this point in a clearer light. The action of striking, in so far as it is considered physically, and in so far as we merely look to the fact that a man raises his arm, clenches his fist, and moves his whole arm violently downwards, is a virtue or excellence which is conceived as proper to the structure of the human body. If, then, a man, moved by anger or hatred, is led to clench his fist or to move his arm, this result takes place (as we showed in Pt. II.), because one and the same action can be associated with various mental images of things ; therefore we may be determined to the performance of one and the same action by confused ideas, or by clear and distinct ideas. Hence it is evident that every desire which springs from emotion, wherein the mind is passive, would become useless, if men could be guided by reason. Let us now see why desire which arises from emotion, wherein the mind is passive, is called by us blind."